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Since the beginning of digitalisation, the music industries have struggled to develop systems 
for the accurate and fair collection and distribution of remuneration for the exploitation of 
rights. Systems are often found to be less than optimal, as a consequence of them being 
designed to work in an offline environment that is no longer present, making them outdated 
and dysfunctional. Ideally, such systems are developed naturally in tandem with disruption 
and change. This however, does not always happen, and it is in cases like these that 
lawmakers are forced to step in. Legislation does have a remarkable tendency of arriving late, 
often years after the need for it arises; but if the need is there, legislation will eventually make 
its appearance.  
 
This thesis is a study on the implications of the CRM Directive on the Norwegian field of 
rights management and the Norwegian music environment. The study seeks to present the 
case of Norway as it is today, the relevance of the Directive in this regard, and the viewpoints 
of important individuals linked to the Norwegian organisational environment. In order to do 
so, relevant theory and analyses of the CRM Directive and interviews with leading 
professionals in Norway have formed the basis for evaluating the circumstances and 
challenges surrounding the field.  
 
The findings of the study suggest that the Norwegian environment is both a modern and 
favourable place to be for rights holders, but that some changes will have to occur in order for 
the industry to be able to meet the challenges ahead. Although digital change has a 
longstanding tradition of being met with fear and resistance, this thesis will show that the 
Directive might not be so scary or radical after all. Perhaps, this time the EU has managed to 
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The motivation behind this thesis is a common interest in the Norwegian music environment 
and the management of rights. Both authors are former and current students of music. Espen 
has a bachelor’s degree in Music Technology, and Mats has a bachelor’s degree in 
Performance Design & Communications as well as having studied performing music for a 
year. Both have been performing and composing music for years, but only on an amateur or 
semi-professional level. Two years of studying Music Management at the University of Agder 
has created an interest for the field of copyright and copyright legislation for both.  
 
The subject matter of this thesis is first and foremost relevant due to several new legal 
initiatives on copyright, licensing structures and the rights of rights holders in the online 
environment, both on a national and international level. In Norway, the proposal for a new 
and revised Copyright Act has heavily engaged creators, performing artists and interest 
organisations to initiate public campaigns and to participate and express their concerns in 
parliamentary hearings. Internationally, the European Union (EU) has initiated several legal 
proposals in order to regulate the new digital environment and protect rights holders, and in 
the United States there have been proposed several bills in Congress in order to increase 
royalty payments for music creators in the digital age, and in order to make life more efficient 
for digital music services1. 
 
To our knowledge, there is a lack of research and academic writings in the field of collective 
rights management and digitalisation. What is worth mentioning is the doctoral dissertation of 
Daniel Nordgård (2017) which deals with factors relating to digital change in the music 
industries. Other relevant academia in this regard is Gervais (2010), Wikström (2013), 
Wikström & DeFillippi (2016), Frith & Marshall (2004) and Hesmondhalgh (2013), as well 





                                               





1.2 Digital change and challenges in the music industries 
The music industries have been through some radical changes throughout the last 30 years. A 
lot of these changes have come from, or is a response to, technological development and 
digitalisation. Since the early 1990s, with the introduction of the compact disc-recordable 
(CD-R), the compact disc rewritable (CD-RW), MP3-files, and file-sharing services like 
Napster, the music industries have struggled to find the best way to cope with new digital 
technologies and subsequent disruptions in the market. A big part of the industries tried to 
fight this development by measures of digital rights management (DRM), such as copy 
protection on CDs and DVDs, and through massive lawsuits against file-sharing communities 
(McIntyre, 2018). Finally, the major record labels banked their hopes on services such as 
Apple and iTunes and proceeded to licence their entire music catalogues to Steve Job’s 
empire. It is only in recent years, after several years in decline, that the different stakeholders 
within the music industries have once again begun to look at their own future in a fairly 
optimistic manner. One of the main reasons for this is the introduction of subscription-based 
and on-demand music streaming services like Spotify, Apple Music and Deezer, as well as 
improved digital tools for reporting, monitoring and distribution for the use of copyright-
protected material.  
 
In his blog on Music Business Research, Peter Tschmuck provides an overview of the 
different periods in the recorded music market in the US for the last 25-30 years. The changes 
and developments that have taken place there are pretty similar to how things developed in 
Europe in the same timeframe. Tschmuck describes the different periods of change like this:  
 
• 1990-1999: ‘CD boom’. The CD replaces all other formats. 
• 2000-2003: CD sales peak. File-sharing disrupts the business. Decrease in recorded 
music sales. Apple introduces iTunes. 
• 2004-2009: Market hit by severe recession despite a boom in music for mobile phones 
and increasing download sales. 
• 2010-2015: Download sales stabilise the market on a low level. Streaming generates 
considerable revenues. 
• 2016: New era. Consumers spend more money on accessing music through streaming 







Digital change has proven to be a challenge to the music industries. Perhaps the most 
challenging issue of all has been monitoring the use of music, and through this being able to 
generate and collect a sufficient and fair amount of revenue for the exploitation of rights on 
behalf of creators, performing artists, producers and other different stakeholders. This 
challenge is still ongoing and heavily discussed, despite there being a continuous economic 
growth and a clear optimism in the field. The latest annual report from IFPI2 Norway for 2017 
shows that the total number of sales of recorded music in Norway generated NOK 730 
million. This is a growth of 3.7 percent from 2016, when the total number of sales generated 
NOK 704 million. Although the increased revenues from music streaming is plateauing a little 
when compared to the growth of previous years, it is still a positive and growing market (IFPI 
Norge, 2018b: 3). Globally, the recorded music market grew by 8.1 percent in 2017. This 
was, according to IFPI, the third consecutive year where it experienced growth (IFPI Norge, 
2018a). 
 
Collective management organisations and licensing 
Collective management organisations (CMOs) play an important role in the licensing, 
collection and distribution of revenues for the use of music and the exploitation of rights. In 
2015, CISAC3 released an article called The Role of Collective Management Organisations. 
Here, they provide an overview of the role and workings of CMOs in the online music 
environment:  
 
Online music uses including download and streaming services (interactive or 
otherwise) are becoming increasingly important to both rights owners and music 
users. Since many of these new services operate across borders, CMOs have 
responded by building multi-territory licensing capability and capacity. In Europe, for 
example a number of alliances between different CMOs have emerged, in line with 
calls by the Commission of the European Union, and as now embodied in EU 
legislation, to facilitate user-friendly, pan-European licensing. (CISAC, 2015a)  
 
Due to the digitalisation of music services and music providers, some problems relating to 
licensing have occurred. The most stand-out problem is the licensing of content for services 
                                               
2 International Federation of the Phonographic Industry. IFPI represents the major recording industry worldwide. 





operating in multiple territories, but there are also problems connected to the accuracy of data, 
especially for catalogues of some age. Licensing of music is intended to ensure that rights 
holders of musical works are compensated for the use of their work, and that music services 
are able to provide access to said musical works to their customers. Music streaming services 
such as Spotify have tens of millions of songs in their catalogues, and one can only assume 
that there are at least as many rights holders affiliated with these songs. Record labels, 
publishing companies and CMOs may clear the rights of works, as can individuals who insist 
on managing their own rights – the problem is that an all-encompassing registry of works and 
affiliated rights holders has never been established. In most cases, it is possible to locate and 
remunerate the correct rights holders for the use and exploitation of their works, but due to 
flaws in the systems, this is not always so. Someone might claim to hold the rights to some 
obscure recording of an old psychedelic rock band, a recording that is going to be put up on 
Spotify or Apple Music. The question then becomes: how can these services verify that this 
person is the one and only correct rights holder? This could be a very real problem for both 
online services, record labels, publishers and CMOs. Another hypothetical problem might 
occur in a scenario where the publishing rights to an artist’s catalogue used to be managed by 
an American publishing company that went bankrupt some 20 years ago. Now, these rights 
are split between 15 different publishers, whereas some of them have also gone bankrupt in 
the meanwhile. The question then becomes: who do you contact, as an online service 
provider, in order to properly clear the rights? 
 
In addition to the above, there could be problems relating to transparency when it comes to 
the interaction between CMOs and streaming services. When streaming services distribute 
revenues directly to record labels and CMOs, based on the service’s own user-data, it might 
be difficult for record labels, CMOs and rights holders to be certain that the reporting and 
distribution is accurate and fair. This issue has been made topical by the ongoing case 
concerning the streaming service Tidal, which has been reported to the Norwegian police and 
is being accused of manipulating the numbers of listeners in favour of the two American 
artists Kanye West and Beyoncé4. If this turns out to be true, stricter regulation and legislation 
on the online area would be welcomed.  
 
                                               





To sum up, the complications involving online licensing include, amongst others, issues 
relating to transparency, non-disclosure agreements, the accuracy of reporting and monitoring 
of correct usage, and the accuracy of databases of rights holders and rights.     
 
User-generated content and a need for legislation 
As mentioned, stakeholders within the music industries now seem to be more optimistic about 
the future of music, after years of coping with challenges and struggling to adapt to digital 
change. The amount of illegal file-sharing and downloading of protected content has 
decreased as a consequence of streaming services such as Spotify, and the music industries no 
longer seem to be permeated by despair. 
 
One big problem that the music industries are facing is the massive amount of music 
accessible for free through services such as YouTube, SoundCloud and Facebook. These are 
services that live off of user-generated content (UGC), in that they provide their users with 
the opportunity to become content creators themselves and make available that content for 
free on the various platforms. These services do however also live off of copyright protected 
content, content that their users make use of in their UGC and make available on the 
platforms. In contrast to licensed digital distributors such as Spotify or Netflix, who spend 
roughly 70 percent of their turnover on acquiring copyrighted content, services such as 
Facebook do not return the revenues derived from using said content to the creative 
community (Hofseth, 2016). This becomes a big problem for the industry as a whole when 
you consider the fact that YouTube in 2017 attracted 46 percent of all music streaming 
listening time globally, excluding China, and the audio streaming services attracted only 45 
percent, making YouTube by far the most dominant streaming platform in the world (Music 
Business Worldwide, 2018). This was also pinpointed by Crispin Hunt, chairman of the 
British Academy of Songwriters, Composers and Authors (BASCA): 
 
I want to thank YouTube and Facebook for cracking the funniest joke online: the one 
where they pretend they’re just a dumb pipe and not the biggest and best streaming 
services on the planet. You guys! You’re killing us… literally! (Dredge, 2017) 
 
This seems to be a problem that can only truly be fixed by lawmakers, seen as the various 





protected under the so-called safe harbour rules5. Marte Thorsby, the managing director of 
IFPI Norway, states that “YouTube is not doing anything wrong – but the legislation is wrong 
[…] If the service plays an active role in promoting the music, they should not be covered by 
safe harbour rules.” (Forde, 2017). 
 
 
1.3 Introducing the topic 
One of the legislative proposals aiming to solve some of the challenges mentioned in this 
chapter is the Directive 2014/26/EU on Collective Management of Copyright and Related 
Rights and Multi-Territorial Licensing of Rights in Musical Works for Online Use in the 
Internal Market (hereinafter referred to only as the Directive). As the title of the Directive 
says, this document provides requirements to CMOs in the European Economic Area (EEA) 
on governance structures, transparency, membership terms, the rights of rights holders and 
users, and non-discrimination, as well as several requirements intended to facilitate multi-
territorial licensing.  
 
This thesis will examine the content of the Directive with the purpose of discussing whether it 
will affect the Norwegian music scene, and in particular the Norwegian CMOs, directly or 
indirectly. In order to do so, the following research questions form the basis for the 
theoretical, methodological and analytical works performed in the thesis.     
 
 
1.4 Research questions  
This thesis aims to answer the following questions: 
• What are the circumstances surrounding the field of rights management in Norway 
and how is the Norwegian music environment doing in general? 
• What are the effects of the Directive, directly and indirectly, on the field of rights 
management in Norway and the Norwegian music environment? 
 
 
                                               
5 For more information on safe harbour rules and YouTube, see: Mulligan (2016). For more information on the 





1.5 Focus and limitations 
The focus of this study is twofold. First, it will attempt to describe the Norwegian field of 
rights management and the Norwegian music environment as a case. This will be done 
through the presentation of two Norwegian CMOs, namely TONO and Gramo, and two 
interest organisations affiliated with these CMOs, namely NOPA and GramArt. These 
organisations are being prioritised due to their relevance, relative size and affiliation with the 
interview objects. Second, the study will attempt to gauge the effects of the Directive on the 
Norwegian field of rights management and the Norwegian music environment, both direct 
and indirect, through analyses of the Directive and empirical data collected through 
interviews. 
 
The thesis will be mainly limited to the focuses above. The analyses and ensuing discussion 
and conclusion will reflect this in that not every aspect of the initial data is deemed relevant in 
order to answer the research questions, and therefore not included. This is however not the 
case for the theoretical frameworks, which necessarily need to branch out in order to provide 
an adequate description of the difficulties and complexities of digitalisation and the music 
industries as a whole, both nationally and internationally. 
 
In addition to the above, the thesis will attempt to present some views on the future of the 
Norwegian field of rights management and the Norwegian music environment, as a result of 




Chapter one introduces the thesis and research questions. Chapter two through four provides 
the theoretical frameworks, which include an overview of the music industries and 
digitalisation, collective rights management, organisations and relevant legislation, and finally 
the Norwegian organisational environment. Chapter five deals with the methodological 
approach of the thesis. Chapters six and seven include the findings of the analyses. Chapter 
eight provides a discussion around said findings in relation to the theoretical frameworks, and 







2 The music industries and digitalisation 
This chapter attempts to define the music industries as being a copyright industry and 
provides an overview of digitalisation. It also introduces several concepts with regards to 
technology and economic processes. 
 
 
2.1 The copyright industry 
The music industries have been categorised in many different ways throughout the years by 
music industry scholars in an attempt to define what the industries really are about. In The 
Music Industry: Music in the Cloud, Wikström presents some of the labels put on the music 
industries, such as the ‘creative industry’, ‘experience industry’ or ‘cultural industry’ 
(Wikström, 2013: 12). None of these labels are truly suited to describe the essence of the 
industries, Wikström argues. Instead, he quotes Negus in stating that the “core of the music 
industry is about ‘developing musical content and personalities’ … and, to be able to license 
the use of that content, they need to be protected by copyright legislation” (ibid.: 17). It is on 
this basis that Wikström says that the best way to categorise the music industries is to 
consider them as a ‘copyright industry’. He then goes on to describe how products are traded 
in the copyright industries: 
 
When people purchase a vase or a CD, they do not purchase the design of the vase or 
the copyrights to the sound recording. The only thing purchased is an example of the 
vase design or a right to listen to the sound recording within certain carefully defined 
restrictions. (ibid.: 20) 
 
The example of the CD could might as well have been replaced with the example of accessing 
recorded music through the subscription-based music streaming services in the digital 
environment. In the copyright industries the customer does not buy the idea, expression or 
creativity behind the commodity. The customer buys the right to enjoy the outcome, physical 
or non-physical, of the expression of the idea, but the ownership of that idea and the affiliated 
rights remain with the creator or rights holders. 
 
The concept of the music industries being parts of a copyright industry is also provided by 





industries as being primarily ‘the record business’, seen as success in the music business often 
is measured in record sales or streams, “Copyright provides the framework for every business 
decision in the industry” (Frith & Marshall, 2004: 1). Frith & Marshall claim that copyright 
actually “is the currency in which all sectors of the industry trade” (ibid.: 2). Any form of 
revenue and remuneration in the music industries are connected to rights, and the protection 
and exploitation of these rights. Hesmondhalgh adds to this in The Cultural Industries (2013) 
by stating that “Copyright is the main means by which culture becomes commodified” 
(Heslmondhalgh, 2013: 159).       
 
It seems clear that there is a consensus amongst scholars about the importance of copyright 
and how to deal with it. It also seems clear that the labelling of the music industries as being 
copyright industries is well argued for. The challenge for the last 30 years, however, has been 




2.2.1 A brief introduction to digitalisation 
Digitalisation has served as a kind of buzzword when stakeholders and scholars have tried to 
define the challenges and changes within the music industries for the last 30 years. Per Oxford 
World Encyclopedia, digitalisation is defined as “Data or information expressed in terms of a 
few discrete quantities, often associated with a digital computer” (Digital, n.d.). The few 
discrete quantities referred to are represented as zeros and ones in a binary system6, which is 
the basis for all information and data in computers and on the internet. With the development 
of the CD by the two tech-companies Sony and Phillips in 1980, a new standard for digitised 
recorded music was introduced to the mainstream audience. Even though the CD was, and 
still is, considered by many as being a physical format for music, almost like the smaller 
version of the gramophone record, the content of the CD is digital. This introduced a new era 
wherein consumers could store, alter and share recorded music on a much bigger scale than 
before. The compact audio cassette did open up for copying and physical sharing of music 
even before that, but not in the way the CD did.  
 
                                               





Technological development and new formats of production, distribution and consumption of 
music have always led to changes in the music industries. Often, these changes have been 
made through close relationships between the music industries and technology and 
communications industries (Nordgård, 2017: 43-45). The big difference from previous 
changes is that digital formats, especially relating to online services, seem to have made a 
greater impact on the overall economy of the industries, and therefore also on the 
remuneration for the exploitation of rights. One theory is that this is because the structures for 
licensing, reporting, monitoring and distribution were based on the old physical environment, 
and because of this the music industries could not or did not want to keep up with the digital 
development. Wikström & DeFillippi (2016) adds to this idea by describing how the internet 
impacted physical sales of recorded music at the turn of the millenia, and how it “shocked 
many industry executives who spent much of the 2000s vigorously trying to reverse the 
decline and make the disruptive technologies go away” (Wikström & DeFillippi, 2016: 1). 
 
 
2.2.2 New technologies and disruptions  
A term often used to describe the changes caused by new technologies and services in the 
digital environment is disruptive innovations. New services and platforms have disrupted the 
established systems and structures, and they have opened up for new stakeholders to claim 
large shares of the overall music market. Disruptive innovation is a term first coined in the 
January-February 1995 issue of Harvard Business Review. In the article Disruptive 
Innovations: Catching the Wave, Bower & Christensen present a theory on how new business 
entrants sometimes change entire markets by creating their own market and value network 
before they overtake and disrupt the existing market and value network (Bower & 
Christensen, 1995). The theory of disruptive innovations is based on the question of how a 
small, young company is able to beat an industry giant on its own turf. In other words: 
 
“Disruption” describes a process whereby a smaller company with fewer resources is 
able to successfully challenge established incumbent businesses. Specifically, as 
incumbents focus on improving their products and services for their most demanding 
(and usually most profitable) customers, they exceed the needs of some segments and 
ignore the needs of others. Entrants that prove disruptive begin by successfully 
targeting those overlooked segments, gaining a foothold by delivering more-suitable 





2.2.3 The new digital economy 
With digitalisation came a new digital economy. Valenduc & Vendramin (2017) explain how 
information and the sharing of information has become some of the most valuable assets in 
the new economy: 
 
One of the key features of the digital economy concerns the central place of digitised 
information. Digitally codified information is becoming a strategic resource, while the 
network is becoming the overarching organising principle of the economy and society 
as a whole – the information society or network society. 
(Valenduc & Vendramin, 2017: 122) 
 
The term digital economy was first introduced by Tapscott in his 1994 book The Digital 
Economy: Promise and Peril in the Age of Networked Intelligence (Don Tapscott, n.d.). The 
term refers to “an economy that is based on digital computing technologies” (Digital 
economy, 2018). Different technologies provide possibilities of doing transactions over the 
internet, transfer goods and commodities, and to give consumers access to content and 
services through paying either lump sums or by subscription. From this, one can assert that 
most of the production, distribution, marketing and consumption of recorded music today is 
part of the digital economy. A lot of musical content is created, produced and finally 
distributed digitally. Consumers pay for access to music using credit cards or digital internet-
based payment systems like PayPal. In many cases, the entire process, from production to 
consumption, never needs leave the digital world.  
 
In an article on Forbes.com, Gada describes the impact of today’s digital economy thus: 
 
Today, half the world’s population is online, a third are one a social network, 53% 
are mobile, and they span all ages, races, geographies and attitudes across the planet. 
The culmination of this explosion in consumer connectivity is the Digital Economy. A 
young, dynamic, $3 trillion ecosystem based on technological infrastructure, 
increasingly intuitive devices and interfaces, vast audience networks, a whole new 
medium for advertising and an unlimited supply of content. (Gada, 2016) 
 
This ubiquitous presence of digital solutions and services has made several industries become 





distribution and sharing of digital content like music, pictures, films and games, interpersonal 
communication through social media platforms, e-mails and web pages, and banking and 
payment solutions for quick and cashless transactions of money, the copyright industries have 
become highly digitalised.   
 
With the introduction of the new digital economy and digitalisation, many seemed to think 
that traditional providers of cultural content, such as record labels and movie production 
companies, would have outplayed their roles. Activities such as creating, producing and 
releasing content onto different online platforms have become easier and more accessible. 
Services like YouTube and SoundCloud provide the possibilities of posting and promoting 
works for anyone to access, and professional intermediaries seem more and more 
unnecessary. The fact remains however, that major record labels and movie production 
companies still exist. The most significant difference is that new digital players are able to 
make an impact on the industry as well. Big stakeholders in the digital market do rule the 
digital economy, and the idea that new online markets would become the freest of all free 
markets, like some digital optimists imagined in the 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s – 
that idea has not exactly come to fruition. Gada provides some numbers on the digital 
economy: 
 
The Digital Economy may still be in its adolescence but 9 companies currently 
generate 90% of its revenue and profits – Apple, Google, Facebook and Amazon, […] 
Microsoft, and the four Chinese digital giants. (ibid.)  
 
Common to all of these companies – perhaps with the exception of the Chinese ones, which 
are probably on the list due to the huge Chinese population, governmental censorship and 
protectionism – is that they are all mostly built on external content creators. They act like 
gatekeepers, controlling access to different kinds of content on their platforms and services. 
Also, due to their significance in assisting consumers in finding and discovering new content 
and products, they have become almost impossible to ignore for creators, producers and 
consumers of creative works and intellectual property (IP). This could also mean that 
consumers are spending more of their money on devices and other various forms of access to 







Hesmondhalgh (2013) addresses the synergy between change and continuity in what he calls 
the cultural industries. In these industries, “Digitalisation has helped to create a massive 
demand for cheap content” (Hesmonshalgh, 2013: 406). This goes for the music industries as 
well, where the fight against free has been, and still is, one of the main challenges to 
overcome in order to re-establish a business that protects rights holders and investors. 
However, Hesmondhalgh also states that new digital services cannot be blamed for the 
challenges that seem to come with them: 
 
Digitalisation does what designers ask of it and that depends on so many other factors 
that the actual zeros-and-ones nature of its technological apparatus matters very little 
in terms of the social uses of the technology, other than allowing devices to be 
marketed as efficient and convenient. (ibid.: 406-407)  
 
Hesmondhalgh is essentially saying that for instance Napster, Spotify or YouTube is not to 
blame here. These services were created because their creators saw in the consumers’ 
behaviour a need for change. The problem was already well established within industry; the 
incumbents were trying to force their products onto the consumers through a format that the 
consumers were no longer interested in. Furthermore, Hesmondhalgh argues that we should 
not speak of a new digital ‘era’. The technological developments of today are more or less 
part of a phase that began in the 1980s in the cultural industries: 
 
there is sufficient continuity to undermine the suggestion that we have entered a new 
era of cultural production. Rather, we should think of the period since 1980 as 
representing a new phase within the complex professional era, marked by greater 
competition and a greater centrality for the cultural industries within advanced 
industrial economies as a whole, but latterly with those cultural industries under 
serious pressure from developments in the telecommunications and IT sectors 
(namely, digitalisation and the internet). (ibid.: 407)   
 
New digital platforms and services have put pressure on the music industries to seek solutions 
to some of their challenges, but it seems important to keep in mind that there have always 
been challenges connected to making money from cultural productions. New players have 
entered the field of providing musical content. As mentioned, huge corporations like Google, 





at the top by being the best content providers in the business. Even though Apple has invested 
some in the music business, and the other corporations have their own streaming services as 
well, their interests most likely do not lie with talent development. This could be a threat to 
the cultural diversity of the music business. Hesmondhalgh describes these corporations like 
this:  
 
Their main interests is to make profit. […] Their efforts to pursue profits can often 
prove detrimental to the interests of people as citizens, even if they give us more 
choice and control over our leisure time as consumers. As businesses, they also tend 
to support political and economic conservatism, often opposing attempts to achieve 
social justice. (ibid.: 408) 
 
This could be a reason as to why services like Facebook and YouTube have been trying to 
protect and maintain the safe harbour rules. These services seem to only provide and facilitate 
cultural content on their platforms because their user-data shows them that this is what their 








3 Collective rights management, organisations and legislation 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overall picture of the history and workings of 
collective rights management (CRM) and relevant international organisations. 
 
 
3.1 A brief history of collective rights management 
The statute of Anne 
Copyright is one of those seemingly modern phenomena that has in fact been around for a 
very long time. The first written law to provide copyright regulation was the Copyright Act of 
1710, commonly known as the Statute of Anne (Parliament of England, 1810-1825). This was 
an act passed by the English parliament, and its purpose was to provide protection for literary 
works. This protection was to be maintained for fourteen years after a work was first 
published, and its rationale was to encourage literate and educated writers to compose and 
write useful books. This kind of incentive is still one of the strongest rationales for 
maintaining copyright in modern society. 
 
The first collective management organisation 
The history of collective rights management also goes back a long way. The first collecting 
society, and the first example of collective rights management in music, was established in 
1851 in France. This was at a time when writers and composers were usually forced to give 
up their rights, denying them future remuneration for their work. It was after a dispute over 
payment at a café in 1847 that Ernest Bourget went to trial and won the right to get paid for 
his music. The verdicts also established that the transaction costs for a systematic collection 
of performing right fees could be covered by amounts claimed at a level which was related to 
the indemnity decided on by the Parisian courts of justice (Albinsson, 2014: 67-68). Thus, the 
legal foundation for collective management was laid, and on the 18th of March 1850, Ernest 
Bourget, Victor Parizot and Paul Henrion created the first CMO, that later became known as 
the Société des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Éditeurs de Musique (SACEM). Now, similar 








3.2 The role and function of CMOs 
Collective rights management is the licensing of copyright and related rights by organisations 
on behalf of rights holders. This is typically done by collective management organisations, 
sometimes referred to as collecting societies. These societies are usually represented and 
governed by their various members or member organisations, which are consisting of 
everything from authors, writers and publishers to photographers, musicians and performers. 
Collective management organisations serve several purposes. The main reason for their 
existence is the fact that in many cases it is practically impossible, not to mention 
unprofitable, for individuals to manage their own rights, as is exemplified by the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO): 
 
An author cannot contact every single radio or television station to negotiate licenses 
and remuneration for the use of his works. Conversely, it is not practical for a 
broadcasting organization to seek specific permission from every author for the use of 
every copyrighted work. The impracticability of managing these activities individually 
… creates a need for … CMOs. These organizations ensure that creators receive 
payment for the use of their works. (WIPO, 2018) 
 
In this way, CMOs enable copyright owners to have their rights administered effectively and 
cheaply in order to obtain fair remuneration for their work. At the same time, it provides a 
service to users of rights by facilitating ready access and licensing of copyright works.  
 
 
3.2.1 An introduction to rights 
There are two primary functions that CMOs perform: the administration and licensing of 
rights, and the collection and distribution of revenue to rights holders. All owners of copyright 
and related rights are free to start a membership with a CMO. They are then able to make a 
claim and declare works that they have created, which enables the CMOs to administer the 
following rights: 
 
• the right of public performance (music played or performed publicly); 
• the right of broadcasting (e.g. on radio or television); 





• the performing rights (e.g. theatrical plays); 
• the right of reprographic reproduction (photocopying); 
• the related rights (the rights of performers and producers of phonograms to obtain 
remuneration). 
 
From all of these rights, the two most important classifications of rights are commonly known 
as performing rights and mechanical rights7. These rights cover public performance and 
communication, as well as the right of reproducing recorded works for sale or distribution. 
Performing rights societies usually administer rights on behalf of composers, lyricists, 
arrangers, translators, etc. Mechanical rights, that is the right to mechanically reproduce and 
distribute a master tape, are usually administered on behalf of a publisher. The distinction 
between the two is important, seen as a stream is considered to be more of a performance than 
a sale, all the while a download is considered to be more of a sale than a performance8. 
 
 
3.2.2 Administration and licensing of rights 
There are different types of CMOs, that collectively manage different kinds of rights, but 
traditional CMOs all follow the same steps in acting on behalf of their members. They 
negotiate rates and terms of use with users of copyrighted works, issue licenses which 
authorise use, collect money, and finally distribute royalties. Throughout the entirety of this 
process, the individual owner of rights does not have to be directly involved in any way. In 
order for CMOs to administer and license rights, they will first have to negotiate the terms of 
the licensing contract with the users of copyrighted music. This includes striking an 
agreement on the terms of the deal and the fee for the licence. The licensees can be anyone 
from TV or radio stations, online sites and services to shopping centres or public events like 
concerts. In addition to licensing the rights, CMOs must also be able to enforce them. This 
can be done through launching an investigation into entities such as organisations and 
business to see if they use unlicensed music, by way of spot testing or based on other intel. If 
                                               
7 In Norway, these rights are administered by TONO and Gramo respectively. 
8 It should be noted that in the digital world, a digital sale or download is considered a sale in roughly the same 
way as a physical sale. Following that, streams are actually considered low-value MP3 file sales, but since they 
are only copies that are temporarily owned by users, it is not obvious that it is the same as selling a regular copy 






these entities do in fact use unlicensed material, the CMOs must ensure that they send records 
of usage in order to determine the correct collection and distribution of revenue. 
 
 
3.2.3 Collection and distribution of revenue 
Once a licence is granted a user, this gives rise to fees for the use of works, which are 
collected on behalf of both local and foreign rights holders. These fees are then converted into 
payments commonly referred to as royalties, but they can also come in other forms of 
remuneration. After the CMOs have collected all the revenue from the users of copyrighted 
works, the remuneration is distributed to their members according to distribution rules and 
policies within the CMO. These rules and policies are established by agreement between the 
CMO and the members of the CMO, through negotiation; this to ensure fairness, efficiency, 
accuracy and transparency9. The basis for said qualities comes from estimations through the 
use of statistics and various generalisable usage reports. 
 
 
3.2.4 National and international repertoire 
The entirety of works declared by the members of a CMO constitutes what is known as the 
national or local repertoire, as opposed to the international repertoire which is made up of all 
the foreign works managed by various CMOs in the world.  
 
 
3.2.5 CMOs in the digital era 
Since the turn of the millennia, online music usage has become increasingly important. The 
advent of the internet has in many ways made it more difficult to manage and enforce rights. 
It allowed for the distribution of music across national borders, making the collective 
management system that was based on national control unfeasible. At the same time though, 
the availability of music has expanded the potential market enormously. CISAC addresses 
some of the challenges that face CMOs in the digital era: 
 
 
                                               





The advent of digital technology and the increasing importance of online music 
services have drawn attention to the importance of collective management … The 
challenge of effective licensing of online use of copyright works is essentially about 
finding solutions that will scale, that can accurately and cost effectively perform the 
licensing tasks in a global market and in relation to the vast and ever increasing 
volume of use. Only CMOs can provide necessary infrastructure and systems to 
achieve this, fairly and efficiently, on behalf of a growing population of rights owners. 
The role of CMOs has also evolved in other ways as well so that nowadays they 
undertake additional tasks which are not directly connected with the administration of 
rights but which have a more general (but no less important) cultural or social 
purpose. These activities include the provision of social and legal support services to 
right owners; educational and public relations activities aimed at ensuring a better 
understanding of and respect for authors’ rights/copyright by the general public; and 
representation of their members’ interests with national governments and in relation 
to intergovernmental bodies responsible for authors’ rights/copyright such as WIPO 
WTO at the international level. (CISAC, 2015a)  
 
It seems clear that the role of CMOs, due to digitalisation, has changed towards more 
cooperation and sharing of data with other CMOs, and towards education of members, 
lobbying to ensure the rights of their members, and towards providing social and legal support 
to their members.  
 
 
3.3 International organisations 
3.3.1 CISAC 
CISAC10 is an international non-governmental, non-profit organisation that aims to protect the 
rights and promote the interests of creators around the world. It was founded in 1926 by 18 
authors’ societies from 18 European countries; now, there are 239 member societies from 121 
different countries, representing more than three million creators and publishers with royalties 
collected totalling almost $9 billion (Smirke, 2015). The main activities of CISAC are: 
 
 
                                               





• to strengthen and develop the international network of copyright societies; 
• to secure a position for creators and their collective management organisations in the 
international scene; 
• to adopt and implement quality and technical efficiency criteria to increase copyright 
societies’ interoperability; 
• to support societies’ strategic development in each region and in each repertoire; 
• to retain a central database allowing societies to exchange information efficiently; 
• to participate in improving national and international copyright laws and practices. 
(CISAC, 2015b) 
 
CISAC is one of the main governing bodies of CMOs, and vital for the maintenance of trust 
and high standards through the obedience of their Professional Rules and conduct 
requirements. CMOs are not required to be members, but other CMOs will expect 
membership before entering into reciprocal agreements11 with them. All members of CISAC 
must comply with its Professional Rules, whose overarching objectives govern their conduct. 
These are: 
 
• to have as its aim and effectively ensure the advancement of creators’ moral interests 
and the defence of the material interests of creators and publishers; 
• to have at its disposal effective machinery for the collection and distribution of income 
to creators and publishers and assume full responsibility for the administration of the 
rights entrusted to it;  
• to have regard to its high and long-standing duty to its affiliates in the conduct of all 
its operations;  
• to encourage the lawful dissemination of works by facilitating the licensing of rights 
in return for equitable payment (“licensing income”);  
• to distribute income (less reasonable expenditure) to creators, publishers and sister 
societies on a fair and non-discriminatory basis;  
• to conduct its operations with integrity, transparency and efficiency;  
• to strive to adopt best practice in the collective administration field; and to adapt 
continually to market and technological developments. (ibid.) 
 
                                               





CISAC also requires each CMO to provide a yearly report with “a declaration stating that it 
has complied with all relevant and applicable laws and regulations” (ibid.), as well as making 
available to CISAC, other CMOs and its members certain financial and licensing information. 




BIEM12 is an organisation similar to CISAC, representing mechanical rights societies. It was 
founded in 1929, with its headquarters situated in the same office block as CISAC in Paris. 
The organisation coordinates statutory license agreements among different countries and 
negotiates a standard agreement for its members with IFPI (BIEM, n.d.). 
 
 
3.4 Licensing structures 
Below is described a couple of different standards for licensing. These are all being used in 
various situations in order to simplify the licensing process, although some are more relevant 
than others moving forward. 
 
 
3.4.1 Reciprocal agreements 
The notion of reciprocity stems, like much else, from the Berne Convention, which provides 
the principles of national treatment and reciprocity, shown in Article 5(1-2): 
 
Authors shall enjoy … in countries of the Union other than the country of origin, the 
rights which their respective laws … grant to their nationals […] Protection in the 
country of origin is governed by domestic law. However, when the author is not a 
national of the country of origin of the work … he shall enjoy in that country the same 
rights as national authors. (WIPO, 1982) 
 
In this way, national treatment guarantees foreign authors the same treatment as domestic 
authors, all the while reciprocal agreements can guarantee foreign authors the same protection 
                                               






as in their own country. In order for reciprocity to work however, signatory states had to 
overcome their differences, which have proved troublesome in certain areas13. 
 
Most CMOs now operate within an international framework, and they are able to represent 
their members both at home and abroad, by mandate from an author or publisher. This means 
that CMOs grant licences on a national basis, but that they are also able to enter into 
reciprocal agreements with CMOs in foreign countries, and from there on grant those CMOs 
the necessary rights to license to users in their respective countries. These rights may be 
granted on both an exclusive or non-exclusive basis, subject to local or regional antitrust or 
competition laws. 
 
In order for this to work, the different CMOs need to cooperate to ensure the accuracy of 
cross border collection and distribution of remuneration. They do this by sharing a vast 
amount of data on copyrighted works and how they are used in their territories. CMOs need to 
somehow be able to monitor the transmissions and operations of internet services, in order to 
review documentation and enforce their own rights, as well as the rights of the foreign CMO. 
This cannot be done across borders without the CMOs agreeing to cooperate. 
 
 
3.4.2 Multi-territorial, cross border licensing 
CMOs have been able to enter into reciprocal representation agreements (RRAs) for years 
prior to digitalisation, organised through the umbrella organisations CISAC and BIEM14, for 
performing rights and mechanical rights, respectively. This enabled national CMOs to license 
the rights of members from foreign signatory CMOs in their own territories. These RRAs 
were signed by close to all collecting societies worldwide, and in the analogue world, they 
reduced the transaction and administration costs of negotiation and the clearance of licenses 
that would have incurred by having to actively and directly interact with every CMO whose 
repertoire one wished to make use of. There was not yet a real need for multi-territorial 
licensing, a need which came in full force with digitalisation and the internet, where licenses 
could no longer be given nationally. 
 
                                               
13 A great example of this is the differing views on performing rights, with the French model and continental 
Europe embracing it on one side, and the Anglo-American model rejecting it on the other. 





Seen as a lot of new online services are now operating across borders, difficulties have 
emerged with consumers who are utilizing services that originate in another country to access 
music. This begs the question of which CMO should license said operations, and how to 
handle all the issues that go with it; keeping track of data and documentation on all the 
different rights holders, making sure that no two CMOs are attempting to issue the same 
license, causing elements of double charging, and so forth.  
 
CMOs have responded by building multi-territorial licensing capabilities. This has shown 
some promise, but there are also a number of complications and difficulties that have not all 
yet been overcome, mainly due to the lack of consensus amongst CMOs and legislative 
authorities. In July 2012 however, the European Union published a proposal for a Directive15 
tackling this very issue (European Parliament and Council, 2012). This is following a 
Recommendation published by the European Commission (EC) in 200516, stating that: 
 
Right-holders should have the right to entrust the management of any of the online 
rights necessary to operate legitimate online music services, on a territorial scope of 
their choice, to a collective rights manager of their choice, irrespective of the Member 
State of residence or the nationality of either the collective rights manager or the 
right-holder. (European Commission, 2005a) 
 
 
3.4.3 Blanket licensing 
When prospective licensees want access to music, they are generally offered blanket licences 
that allow them to make the authorised use of the entire repertoire represented by a CMO, 
both national and international. There are of course certain provisions with regards to the 
time-frame, purpose and usage of the authorised works, but beyond that a blanket licence is 
an all-encompassing representation of a bulk of rights licensed in one single agreement. 
Licences can be arranged for one-time usage (e.g. events) as well as for long-term use, and 
CMOs usually offer a range of different licensing tariffs that reflects the different ways that 
music is used.  
 
                                               
15 The Proposal is per 26.02.14 no longer in force. 





The biggest upside to having blanket licenses is the way they significantly reduce transaction 
costs in comparison to other business schemes, seen as they require only a one-time fee. 
Another is the security it provides to users, who no longer have to worry about utilizing 
unlicensed music17, as well as the fact that they provide users with a big repertoire. As soon as 
the initial investment into setting up the licensing structure has been made, there is very little 
cost associated with adding additional members or repertoire (Towse, 2012: 12). Yet another 
argument for blanket licensing is the way it includes every individual creator, be they small or 
niche artists or big superstars. Smaller acts need to be a part of a bigger repertoire in order to 
receive a reasonable reward for the use of their works, seen as they would be forced to accept 





3.5.1 Natural monopolies 
National CMOs often enjoy operating as what is commonly called natural monopolies18. This 
type of monopoly has been tolerated and enabled by governments simply due to the 
practicality of having one place to go to get a license, and it is as such a result of blanket 
licensing, which has been the dominant practice for a long time. Blanket licensing has only 
really begun to be challenged in the digital era, and when it is, it is almost always concerning 
competition and an ideology conflicting with the European single market19. 
 
Natural monopolies, or de facto monopolies, occur when it is more cost effective for market 
demand to be met by one single entity than by several, for whatever reason. In collective 
management specifically, this happens when rights holders give CMOs exclusive rights to 
manage their rights, which can be a requirement for registration. When such a monopoly 
manifests, it is usually met with some form of regulation from the government, in order to 
                                               
17 According to Katz (2005), the purchase of a license from a legitimate collecting society is considered by 
courts to be a good defence against unauthorised use, regardless of whether the CMO in question has the 
mandate to license the works or not. Where it not for blanket licensing, users would not have this security. 
18 Natural monopolies both economically and in the sense that they can control the rights they manage 
exclusively, as a membership condition. 
19 The KEA European Affairs remarked upon the following disadvantages of the collective management 
paradigm: it creates national monopolies; it reduces price competition; it dampens inclinations towards 
understanding and/or adapting to market realities; it promotes territorial licensing rather than pan-European 





ensure that socially desirable outcomes which would have come naturally from competition 
still presents itself. Natural monopolies are usually associated with utility services such as 
electricity or water supply, but the term is perfectly fitting for collective management so long 
as it is still widely accepted that it is the most efficient form of administering rights.  
 
 
3.5.2 Arguments for competition 
There are both advantages and disadvantages to such de facto monopolies, most of them 
related to competition, or the lack thereof, and the ramifications that follow, such as the lack 
of incentive for efficiency and to adapt to new markets; or, the fact that excessive competition 
might cause lower standards or accuracy in distribution of remuneration, as a consequence of 
CMOs competing with their administrative costs.  
 
In a competitive environment, a rights holder would have the option of electing which CMO 
he wants to manage his rights. Here, he might choose one over the other for reasons related to 
efficiency, high fees, or general quality of service. Anti-competitive activities within CMOs, 
such as limiting its members’ freedom of assigning rights or terminating contracts, 
discriminative treatment between members, or insisting on blanket licenses, could hinder 
“good commercialization practices [which] would promote creation and utilization of 
intellectual property rights” (Wenqi, 2012: 50). 
 
An example of discriminative treatment could be found in the distribution of royalties, as a 
result of inadequate systems of information disclosure as well as the lack of standard 
agreements. The factors that CMOs take into consideration when distributing royalties can be 
anything from past income and seniority to artistic personality and overall contribution. This 
kind of flexibility and subjectivity can create an unfair environment for members (ibid.: 51). 
 
The biggest argument for increased competition is probably the fact that the EU is heavily 
pushing for it. According to the EC, eliminating territorial restrictions and opening up EU 
wide licensing would reduce management costs associated with each CMO taking a 
management deduction from RRAs (European Commission, 2005c: 54), and at the same time 
improve accuracy when it comes to the distribution of royalties, although, this is highly 









3.5.3 Arguments against competition 
The KEA for European Affairs expects that a migration may likely only occur in relation to 
Anglo-American repertoire, effectively separating the international repertoire from the 
national. Furthermore, they have pointed out these following disadvantages that would result 
from increased competition between societies:  
 
• national repertoire would suffer higher management costs; 
• collecting societies representing national repertoire would lose bargaining power as 
users would be looking for the more attractive international repertoire; 
• international users may no longer seek to license national repertoire or may want to 
pay less for it; 
• local authors and composers may not be paid on the same tariff than international 
authors and composers (solidarity will be lost); 
• societies controlling international repertoire would have no incentive to recruit certain 
right holders; 
• smaller societies unable to compete are unlikely to gather international repertoire 
independently of reciprocity representation agreements. (KEA European Affairs, 
2006: 47) 
 
What can be taken from this is the likelihood of smaller rights holders, smaller CMOs and 
niche artists losing position to bigger players, which is a threat to the principle of solidarity 
and cultural diversity. Furthermore, it might mean national repertoire losing position to 
international repertoire, seen as Anglo-American music would no longer ‘subsidise’ the 
management costs of local music. Adding to that, the separation of national and international 
repertoire would place national users in a situation where they would have to negotiate a 
license for both local and international repertoire, from different places. In the case of 
international users, they might find it easier, seen as they would be able to utilize a one-stop-
shop for all their international activities; however, The KEA report points out that 





collecting societies with the largest number of rights holders are strengthened, and are 
therefore able to abuse its monopolistic position20. 
 
 
3.5.4 Data and the GRD 
CMOs need to keep track of information about their members, specifically concerning the 
ownership of their musical works. This information is usually provided for them by their 
members, but they may also be forced to actively seek out missing information from their 
members, neighbouring societies, or elsewhere. Because of their ability to collect data, 
through members and established networks of reciprocal agreements both nationally and 
internationally, CMOs make for natural hubs of data. This gives them a certain amount of 
power and ability, as well as making them important in issues of counterclaim or plagiarism. 
 
There are however problems when it comes to the quality of data that CMOs possess, 
especially with regards to having the correct information about ownership of works. This 
problem is mainly due to human error on the input-side, which is also augmented by the lack 
of a centralised or globally shared database21. There have been several attempts to sort this 
out, but the biggest endeavour by far was the Global Repertoire Database (GRD). The GRD 
was a collaborative effort undertaken by EU Commissioner Neelie Kroes22 and her working 
group consisting of several organisations, including Universal and EMI Music Publishing, 
tech companies such as Apple, Nokia, Amazon and Google, and CMOs like PRS for music, 
STIM and SACEM, including CISAC. The main objectives of the GRD was to achieve 
increased transparency in terms of royalty collection and distribution, as well as lowering 
administrative costs. The potential benefits of the GRD are described thus: 
 
An authoritative, comprehensive, and open multi-territory database would benefit the 
entire music industry, particularly societies, publishers, authors, and licensees. 
Societies would have proper and accurate databases to administer, which would 
                                               
20 One must keep in mind that the exclusive management of a rights holder’s rights would not disappear in a 
scenario where the rights holders are free to choose between societies internationally. 
21 One can just imagine a scenario where a song is registered to several rights holders in multiple different 
databases, all controlled by different entities, with different formats and algorithms for different writing systems 
and complete with human error. 
22 Neelie Kroes was the European Commissioner for Competition from 2004 to 2009 and became Commissioner 
for Digital Agenda in 2010, making her a very central person where the subject of this thesis is concerned 





facilitate tracking the flow of royalties. Consequently, they would be able to issue 
invoices and collect and distribute royalties to their constituent publishers and authors 
promptly. Furthermore, all works owners would be able to register their works only 
once, with GRD, rather than numerous times in different territories, which can be both 
time consuming and cause inconsistencies in information. Additionally, the GRD 
would facilitate licensing processes by allowing licensees to easily identify licensors. 
This GRD-aided licensing process would be particularly useful to lesser known, but 
nonetheless commercially appealing, songs, the ownership information for which 
would have otherwise been difficult or impossible to find. Finally, the GRD would 
allow for organizations to maintain their current systems by giving collection societies 
and others access to GRD data through their own portal. (Milosic, 2015) 
 
The GRD project did eventually fail, this in 2014, after several collection societies had begun 
pulling out. It has been suggested as a reason that CMOs feared losing revenue from 
operational costs under a more efficient GRD system, that there might have been a dispute 
over control of the database, or that the CMOs feared the GRD might make them redundant as 
intermediaries if publishers were to start licensing songs directly to users (ibid.). Efforts are 




3.6 Legislative framework 
This part of the chapter provides a thorough overview of the development of the European 
legal framework concerning rights management all the way from the 19th century up until 
today. The significance of this is that it provides a backdrop for the rationale behind the 
Directive, as well as providing the reader with a lot of necessary information relating to 




Copyright is a legal right that grants the creator of an original work the exclusive rights for its 
usage and distribution. This right protects the original expression of an idea, not the 





be owned. This is more often than not a shared ownership, especially in music, where there 
are usually more than one contributing party involved in the creation of works. These owners 
of IP are commonly referred to as rights holders, of whom CMOs act on behalf. CMOs are 
entirely dependent on copyright as a rationale and would not be in business without it. 
 
The Berne Convention and copyright 
The foundation for modern copyright law is the Berne Convention of 1886, which states that 
the author of a literary or artistic work has the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit the 
reproduction of his work, in any manner of form23 (WIPO, 1982: 8). The value of copyright, 
and rights related to copyright24, lies in the protection they provide for the individuals who 
dedicate their lives to the creation and dissemination of art, knowledge and culture. This 
includes, as stated in the Berne Convention, the authorisation and prohibition of reproduction 
of their works, but it also translates into financial protection. In order for creators to continue 
creating, they must benefit financially when their works are consumed. Copyright and related 
rights provide the mechanism for this benefit. This protection also covers professionals who 
make significant investments in the production, dissemination and marketing of works, as 
well as the performers who perform and the broadcasters who broadcast works25. In summary, 
the aforementioned rights protect creators, performers, producers and broadcasters alike, all 
falling under the general term of rights holders. 
 
 
3.6.2 International and regional legislation 
Legislation is ultimately the responsibility of the national government. National copyright 
legislation must however be in harmony with commonly accepted international and regional 
norms, that is to say, abide by the treaty obligations of the country, such as the Berne and 
Rome Conventions. Therefore, although copyright and related rights are regulated on a 
                                               
23 This exclusive right may however be subject to limitations or exceptions. According to Article 9(2) of the 
Berne Convention, countries of the union can permit the reproduction of works in special cases, provided that it 
does not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work and prejudice the interests of the author  
(WIPO, 1982: 8). 
24 The international system of related rights has its foundation in the Rome Convention for the Protection of 
Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations (1961), as well as the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (1996). 
25 The articles of the Berne Convention that give protection to the modes of hearing music are Article 11, 
covering the right of public performance, and Article 11bis, covering the right of broadcasting. Together, these 
two articles cover public performance by both musicians and recordings, including all aspects of broadcasting 





national level, they are also applicable internationally. If they were not, rights holders would 
not be able to exercise their rights across territories. 
 
Due to the nature of globalisation and the extent to which musical works are able to exploit 
this ever-increasing connectedness in the global society, some political and economic 
groupings of countries have found it highly advantageous to coordinate, and to a certain 
degree standardise, copyright and related rights laws across national borders. This becomes 
clear when we for example look at international copyright treaties such as the Buenos Aires 
Convention of 191026 and the Berne Convention. Since the beginning of this trend, there have 
been many major and minor alterations to international and/or regional legislation.  
 
The Santiago and Barcelona agreements 
When the transition from analogue to digital occurred, and online digital services came with 
it, the CISAC system of reciprocal agreements between CMOs was not able to reconcile 
sufficient protection with online music consumption. The end of copyright territoriality made 
CISAC and BIEM initiate the Santiago and Barcelona agreements, which were to adapt the 
existing RRA network to the digital world. The scope of the licenses was to be worldwide, 
and it would include the entire collective repertoire of all signatory societies. In order for a 
licensee to access this repertoire, he would have to do it through the society of his respective 
economic residence. This agreement was signed by most societies in the world  
(Moscoso, 2011: 652). 
 
When the EC was notified of this agreement, they initially claimed to support it, however they 
inevitably found it to be in violation with article 81 of the European Union treaty, which is in 
place to fight restrictions of markets and impediments to the creation of a single European 
market. It was especially the provision of the Santiago agreement that required users to 
license all repertoire from their own domestic CMO that was held to be in violation of EU 
competition law: 
 
The agreements gave absolute national exclusivity to existing national societies, 
reinforced the already natural monopolies that these societies had in their countries 
                                               
26 The Buenos Aires Convention has since August 23 of year 2000 become mostly redundant due to all its parties 





and eliminated competition between collective societies through the most favoured 
nation clause. (ibid.) 
 
As a result of the response from the EC, European CMOs were forced to terminate both 
agreements, leaving them back where they started - in the analogue world. 
 
The European Commission 2005 Recommendation 
Although the EC had deemed the Santiago and Barcelona agreements unworthy of realisation, 
they still found it necessary to take steps in order to remedy the situation and develop an 
easier to use licensing system. This precipitated the proposal of the 2005 Recommendation27, 
which stated that rights holders resident to the European Union could have the freedom of 
choice in joining or transferring rights to any collective society they wished, and that they 
could determine for themselves the territorial scope of the mandate given to that CMO 
(European Commission, 2005a). 
 
Option 3 
Following the 2005 Recommendation, the EC conducted an analysis28 on the pros and cons of 
the different options available and applicable for the online music market. Out of the three 
possibilities presented by the commission, it was the third that was to be most widely adopted, 
commonly referred to as Option 3. This option would have national CMOs adopt the practice 
of issuing pan-European licenses regardless of the country of origin of the user, as well as 
competing on repertoire by allowing rights holders to assign whomever they wish the role of 
managing their rights for the online use of their musical works (European Commission, 
2005c). 
 
Fragmentation of rights 
A little while after the EC 2005 Recommendation, many multinational publishers decided to 
withdraw their rights from CMOs and instead create new licensing bodies for their own 
repertoires, causing a fragmentation of rights and repertoire. This meant that all authors’ 
rights were no longer available through collective societies, creating a need for separate 
                                               
27 Recommendation on Collective Cross-Border Management of Copyright and Related Rights for Legitimate 
Online Music Services. 
28 The 2005 Impact Assessment Reforming Cross-Border Collective Management of Copyrights and Related 





negotiations and agreements. In order for users to get all the necessary licences required to 
conduct their businesses, they would have to jump through several newly constructed hoops, 
such as SOLAR (EMI and Sony Anglo-American repertoire), DEAL (Universal), PEDL 
(Warner Anglo-American repertoire) or IMPEL (Independent publishers’ Anglo-American 
repertoire). This would grant users the rights to roughly half of the repertoire, the other half 
being the local repertoire pertaining to various countries and territories. 
 
This scenario obviously incurs high transaction costs and a complex legal environment, which 
creates a no small amount of uncertainty and massive entry barriers for new and smaller 
businesses. It also threatens smaller acts, smaller CMOs, solidarity, and cultural diversity in 
general, seen as a user is likely to neglect getting a license for a small repertoire if he deems it 
not worth the trouble. 
 
One remedy for these licensing difficulties, is the creation of hubs, which function as a 
collection of repertoires from certain collective societies. One example of these is Armonia, 
which is an alliance between SGAE in Spain, SACEM in France, and SIAE in Italy (Armonia, 
2017). Another is the International Copyright Enterprise (ICE), catering to several customers, 
such as PRS in the United Kingdom, GEMA in Germany, and Polaris Nordic, which is a joint 
system for the Nordic societies (ICE, 2018). 
 
Further EU legislation 
Continuing on the side of the European Union, the end goal remained to achieve the total 
harmonisation of copyright law across all EU member states (European Parliament, 2015), 
which in turn reinforces their digital single market strategy. The 2001 Directive on 
harmonisation, for example, affected many areas of copyright and related rights29. Other 
examples include the Directive of 2006, and its amendment of 2011, which altered the term of 




                                               
29 The 2001 Directive, commonly called the Information Society Directive, introduced amongst other things a 
‘making available’ right, a distribution right and provisions relating to the protection of devices or components 
which are intended to prevent or restrict acts not authorised by a rights holder and for the legal protection of 
rights management information. The Directive also lists a large number of exceptions to copyright (European 





3.6.3 National legislation 
As already mentioned, national laws are subject to the treaty obligations of the country in 
question, as well as the conventions and other contractual agreements it adheres to. For this 
reason, copyright and related rights legislation is relatively similar from country to country. 
National laws may however differ in certain ways, depending on each country's interpretation 
of treaties and directives, as well as how it chooses to enforce them. 
 
The most common requirement for CMOs on a national level is that they must be authorised 
by some form of authority, for instance the Ministry of Culture or similar. In some countries, 
there may be provisions in the law stating that there can be only one CMO per group of rights 
holders or category of rights. In other countries, this might not be the case, but the CMO is in 
either case required to take current competition law into account, which is there to prevent 
possible abuse of a dominant monopolistic position.  
 
On EU level, a survey has shown that even between EU member states there are considerable 
differences between member states with regards to how they regulate rights and to how the 
system of rules that national CMOs have to follow works (European Parliament, 2004, 4(47)). 
 
 
3.6.4 Norwegian legislation  
In Norwegian law, TONO30 is able to operate pursuant to § 38a of the Norwegian Copyright 
Act. Gramo31 is able to do the same, cf. § 45b (Åndsverkloven, 2015). TONO is also 
organised as a cooperative society and is therefore subject to legislation relating to this 
(Samvirkelova, 2016). 
 
There is currently a proposition in motion for a new copyright law that is set to replace the 
existing copyright act of 1961. Per today, the aim of the proposition is amongst others to 
simplify and defragment existing legislation, make it more technology neutral, strengthen the 
position of creative and performing artists as well as investors of creative content, increase 
availability of creative works, balance the interests of rights holders with those of users, and 
                                               
30 See: TONO, p. 36. 









3.6.5 The EU and Directives 
A directive is a legal act imposed by the European Union, one that requires member states of 
the union to achieve a particular result, although without actually dictating which means are 
to be used in achieving that result. This makes them differ from regulations, that become 
immediately enforceable as law in all member states, and recommendations, that are no more 
than non-binding acts carrying political weight (Folsom et al., 1996). This leaves member 
states a certain amount of leeway as to which rules they are going to adopt once presented 
with a directive. 
 
The actual text of a directive is drafted by the European Commission32, and is a result of 
extensive consultation with experts both internal and national. It is then first presented to the 
European Parliament (EP) and Council33 for comment and review, and then later for rejection 
or approval. When the directive is successfully implemented and adopted by the member 
states, they are given a timetable for the achievement of the intended result. In order to 
accomplish this, member states are usually compelled to make amendments to their laws, 
commonly referred to as a transposition. The European Union closely monitors that the 
transposition occurs in a timely and adequate manner, so as to pre-empt the various ways that 
member states might implement the transposition incorrectly34. If a member state were to 
inadequately transpose a directive, the EC may bring a case against it to the European Court 
of Justice. This however, rarely happens. The EC annually publishes a summary on how EU 
law has been transposed, including statistics on the numbers and types of infringements, per 
country and sector (European Commision, 1984-2017). 
 
 
                                               
32 The primary function of the European Commission is to promote the general interest of the European Union 
through the proposal and enforcement of legislation, as well as implementing policies and the EU budget 
(European Union, 2018). 
33 The European Council is composed of relevant ministers of member governments. 
34 This may be the result of member states leaving aside certain provisions, diverging from the scope or required 
definition, exceeding the requirements of the directive, overlapping between existing national law and the 






Recitals and Articles 
In EU law, Recitals and Articles fulfil two different purposes. A Recital is considered to be 
the justification or reasoning for the actual contents of the enacting terms of an act, which is 








4 Norwegian CMOs, interest organisations and funds 
The main collective management organisations in Norway are TONO and Gramo. TONO 
collects and distributes on behalf of creators and publishers, while Gramo collects and 
distributes on behalf of performing artists, record companies and other producers35 of 
recorded music. Affiliated with the two societies are several interest groups and organisations 
who are representing creators, artists and other stakeholders in the music industries, as well as 
allocating funds intended to promote Norwegian music and art. In this chapter, an overview of 




TONO is the Norwegian performing rights society administering the rights stated in the Berne 
Convention36. The organisation was founded in 1928, following the establishment of the 
Norwegian broadcasting company, Kringkastingsselskapet A/S, and the proposed legislations 
leading to the first Norwegian Copyright Act on intellectual property of 1930 (TONO, n.d.a). 
The first agreement between TONO and the broadcasting company was signed on April 6, 
1929.    
 
TONO is a cooperative society under the Norwegian Act on Cooperatives, and it is owned 
and governed by its members37. The organisation’s activities are run on the basis of the rights 
stated in the Norwegian Copyright Act of 1961, and they are mandated by the Norwegian 
Ministry for Cultural Affairs. In 2016, TONO managed the performance- and phonographic 
rights and collected revenue for public use on behalf of over 29 thousand Norwegian rights 
holders (TONO, 2016: 6), as well as approximately three million foreign rights holders 
(TONO, n.d.b). TONO also maintains reciprocal agreements with 73 sister companies 
(TONO, 2016: 6). In this way, TONO is able to manage the world repertoire of copyright-
protected music on Norwegian territory. TONO has assigned the management of its rights 
                                               
35 Here, producer is used in the economic sense of the word and should be understood as the owner of a 
recording. 
36 See: The Berne Convention and copyright, p. 29. 
37 According to the Norwegian Act on Cooperatives, those who have a management contract with TONO, and 
also have earnings that qualify for voting at the general assembly, are considered to be the members of TONO 
(for historical reasons, TONO uses in its by-laws the term ‘andelshavere’, which roughly translates to 
‘shareholders’). Those who have management contracts, but not the earnings that qualify for voting at the 






holders' mechanical rights to the Nordic Copyright Bureau (NCB) in Copenhagen. NCB is co-
owned by the Nordic CMOs, which are KODA (Denmark), STIM (Sweden), STEF (Iceland), 




As of December 31, 2016, there were 1 484 registered members in TONO. The proportion of 
creators were 98.7 percent. The remaining 1.3 percent of the members were music publishers.  
 
In order to become a member of TONO, you must be a rights holder who has had a 
management contract with TONO for at least two years, and your average earnings for 
performances and mechanical production for the last two fiscal years have to equal a certain 
amount, depending on your registered role. The payment amounts that qualify rights holders 
for membership are: 
  
• For composers: 0.5 G 
• For lyricists: 0.25 G 
• For an heir of a composer: 1.0 G 
• For an heir of a lyricist: 0.5 G 
• For a music publishing house: 3.0 G 
G = the Norwegian National Insurance Scheme’s basic amount (TONO, 2013) 
 
 
4.1.2 The annual general meeting 
The supreme authority of the members of TONO is effectuated at the annual general meeting 
(AGM), also known as the general assembly. According to TONO’s articles of association, 
the AGM is to be held within six months of the end of each fiscal year (ibid.). Members have 
the right to attend the AGM, and they are allowed to attend by a proxy of their own choice if 
they are prevented from being there in person. None may act as a proxy for multiple 
members. The members have the right to vote at the AGM, and each member constitutes one 
vote. In order to raise an issue, you must be a member of TONO, and you have to notify 
TONO of the matter at hand in writing to the board in due time for it to be included in the 





TONO is to be present at the AGM. The CEO and the board members have the right to make 
comments. A resolution of the AGM requires a majority of the votes to be cast, unless 
otherwise is stipulated in the articles of association. In the case of equal voting result, the 
chairman of the meeting has the final vote. When it comes to the election of board members 
and to the different committees, equal votes are settled by lot. 
  
 
4.1.3 The administration and board 
By the end of 2016, TONO had 63 full time employees in its administration, including five 
part-time positions. The board of TONO is elected by the AGM. All members may vote at the 
AGM, and all members are electable for honorary posts. The members of the board are 
elected to sit for either one or two years in an overlapping arrangement, this in order to ensure 
continuity of the work in progress. The board consists of 11 representatives from the three 
group associations Norsk Komponistforening (NKF)38, Norsk forening for komponister og 
tekstforfattere (NOPA)39 and Musikkforleggerne (MF)40, as well as independent members41 of 
TONO and employee representatives. As of February 2018, NOPA holds two seats, including 
the Chairman of the board. NKF holds two seats, MF holds two seats, the unorganised 
members (free seats) hold three seats, and the employee representatives hold two seats. In 
addition to these, the three group organisations have two deputy members each, while the 
independent members have three deputy members and the employees have four deputy 
members.      
 
 
4.1.4 Turnover and distribution42 
In 2016, TONO had a turnover of almost NOK 542 million43. After deductions of 2 percent to 
the Norwegian Composers’ fund44, administrative expenses and losses, a total of NOK 
447 million was left over for distribution. According to the 2016 annual report, costs, 
                                               
38 Norwegian Society of Composers. 
39 Norwegian Society of Composers and Lyricists. 
40 Norwegian Society of Music Publishers. 
41 The independent members should be understood as consisting of members that are not organised in NOPA, 
NKF or MF. 
42 The numbers below are rounded to the nearest big number. 
43 This is a number that has been steadily growing over the last several years, from 258 million NOK in 2004 to 
almost 542 million NOK in 2016 (TONO, 2004-2016).  





administrational and otherwise, came to 15 percent of the funds for distribution. Amongst the 
different member groups in TONO, the ordinary members received a total of NOK 46 million, 
averaging a remuneration of roughly NOK three thousand. The members, or shareholders, 
received a total of close to NOK 110 million, averaging a remuneration of roughly NOK 71 
thousand each. In the table below, TONO’s distribution by member category is presented: 
 
DISTRIBUTION BY MEMBER CATEGORY Amount Average amount 
Organised NKF 7 604 832 42 249 
Organised NOPA 56 644 753 52 303 
Organised NOPA/NKF (double membership) 1 614 834 47 495 
Independent 71 329 899 5 072 
Publishers 12 148 107 62 619 
Heirs 6 588 584 5 361 
Total 155 931 009  
(TONO, 2016: 22) 
 
The remuneration for ordinary members was distributed thus: 
 
DISTRIBUTION ORDINARY MEMBERS Amount Average amount 
Organised 3 367 584 6 987 
Independent 34 826 283 2 604 
Publishers 2 646 933 15 212 
Heirs 5 200 008 4 294 















The remuneration for shareholders was distributed thus: 
 
DISTRIBUTION SHAREHOLDERS Amount Average amount 
Organised 62 496 834 76 683 
Independent 36 503 616 52 827 
Publishers 9 501 175 475 059 
Heirs 1 388 576 77 143 
Total 109 890 201  
(ibid.) 
 
Through TONO’s reciprocal agreements with sister companies in other countries, a total 
remuneration of NOK 185 million was distributed to foreign rights holders. Some of these 73 
reciprocal agreements cover several countries, which means that TONO is actually 
representing more than 100 countries and territories. The biggest total of payments was made 
to STIM, the Swedish CMO. Even though Swedish music is popular in Norway, the payments 
made to STIM were largely due to Anglo-American repertoire, since this kind of repertoire 
often has sub-publishers in Sweden. Because of this, the figures distributed to each country do 
not necessarily reflect how much of the country’s repertoire is actually performed in Norway. 
The total revenues collected from foreign sister companies on behalf of Norwegian rights 
holders was close to NOK 41 million (ibid.: 24). According to a recent press release from 
TONO, which refers to the not yet published annual report for 2017, there has been a growth 
of 67.2 percent from 2016 to 2017 when it comes to income from abroad (TONO, 2018). 
 
 
4.1.5 Cultural funds 
In order to promote Norwegian music, Norwegian creators and Norwegian cultural purposes, 
TONO deducts a certain amount from its turnover as cultural funds. According to TONO’s 
articles of association, for each rights holder with a management contract with TONO, up to 
one tenth of the settlement amount is to be deducted before the total net amount is distributed. 
The same goes for foreign rights holders, in accordance with reciprocal agreements. In 2016, 
the total figure distributed through cultural funds was almost NOK 36 million. Two thirds of 
cultural funds are to be spent on schemes promoting national music culture, administered by 





gets one tenth of the funds. These organisations must provide a written account of how they 
intend to use the funds in advance and enclose their accounts and directors’ report for the 
previous year in order to receive their share. The remaining one third of the cultural funds is 
to be used for scholarship funds. One eight of these funds is distributed through MF’s 




Gramo is the independent association for the administration of the financial rights of 
performing artists and record companies stated in the Rome Convention. The association was 
founded in 1989 as a result of the introduction of Article 45b in the Norwegian Copyright 
Act, and the association’s work is approved by the Norwegian Ministry of Culture. Affiliated 
with the establishment were six rights holder organisations. These organisations were: 
 
• The Norwegian Independent Record Producers Association (FONO) 
• IFPI Norway 
• The Norwegian Musicians’ Union (MFO) 
• The Norwegian Society of Soloists (Norsk Tonekunstnersamfund) 
• The Norwegian Actors’ Equity Association (Norsk Skuespillerforbund) 
• The Actors’ Union of 1978 (Skuespillerforeningen av 1978) 
 
As of April 2018, there are 11 rights holder organisations affiliated with Gramo. These are: 
 
For the producers 
• IFPI Norway 
• The Norwegian Independent Record Producers Association (FONO) 
• Norwegian Recording Artists (NORA) 
 
For the performers 
• The Norwegian Recording Artists’ Association (GramArt) 
• Norwegian Musicians’ Union (MFO) 
• The Norwegian Society of Soloists (Norsk Tonekunstnersamfund) 





• The Norwegian Association for Folk Music and Folk Dance (Folkorg) 
• The Norwegian Association of Graduate Teachers (Norsk Lektorlag) 
• The Norwegian Association of Artists (Norsk Artistforbund) 
• The Norwegian Association of Contemporary Folk Music (Norsk Viseforum) 
 
The main purpose of Gramo is to negotiate, manage, collect and distribute remuneration on 
behalf of producers and performing artists when their sound recordings are broadcasted or 
performed publicly in Norway. Gramo is managing remuneration rights for both Norwegian 
and foreign rights holders, regardless of Gramo membership. Reporting made by eight 
different Norwegian broadcasters forms the basis for the distribution of collected fees. The 
broadcasters are all NRK’s45 channels and the commercial radio stations Radio 1, P4, P5, 1 
FM Molde, NRJ, Radio Norge and Radio Exact. The fees received from all of NRKs 
channels, Radio Norge and P4 are distributed according to actual airplay, while the rest is 
distributed according to samples in airplay. After the deduction of administrational costs, the 
funds received are distributed equally between producers and performers. In 2016, a total of 
NOK 57.6 million was distributed to performers and a total of NOK 56.8 million was 
distributed to producers (Gramo, n.d.: 9).  
 
 
4.2.1 The administration 
As of April 2018, Gramo has 28 employees in its administration. The CEO and director of 
Gramo is Martin Grøndahl (Gramo, 2017d). The board issues instructions that must be 
followed by the director in his managing of the day-to-day operations of the association. 
Administrative personnel are employed by the director, within the frameworks of the board 
(Gramo, 2017a). Gramo also manages the Norwegian administration of the International 






                                               
45 The Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation. 
46 The ISRC is a unique identifier for sound recordings and music videos where one identifying code is allocated 






All rights holders who are entitled to remuneration under Article 45b in the Norwegian 
Copyright Act may become members of Gramo. Until the AGM of the association in May 
2017, only those who were members of Norwegian rights holder organisations could become 
regular members of Gramo and vote at the AGM. Foreign producers and artists, other 
Norwegian rights holders and heirs could become affiliated members, with the right to attend, 
speak and submit proposals, but not vote at the AGM. By April 2017, Gramo had over 
26 thousand members divided into these categories: 
 
PERFORMER MEMBERS 
Regular47 4 043 
Affiliated48 12 579 
Regional49 3 207 
Heirs 236 





Affiliated 5 981 
Regional 34 
Total 6 180 
(Gramo, n.d.: 12) 
 
At the 2017 AGM, it was decided that the former differentiation between regular and 
affiliated members of Gramo should be abrogated. Now, everyone who is entitled to 




                                               
47 Regular members were also members of one or more of Gramo’s rights holder organisations. 
48 Affiliated members were not members of a rights holder organisation. 
49 Regional members were mainly foreign rights holders who are members of Gramo for the sake of receiving 





4.2.3 The annual general meeting 
The AGM is the highest governing body of Gramo. The ordinary AGM is to be held within 
the first six months of a year. Previously, only regular members had the right to vote. Now, all 
performing members that have accumulated remuneration through Gramo during the last 
three fiscal years have the right to vote. The right to vote for the producer’s rights holder 
group is weighted after the previous fiscal year’s accumulated remuneration: 
 
Remuneration/Year (NOK)  Votes 
From To  
1 9 999 1 
10 000 49 999 5 
50 000 99 999 10 
100 000 499 999 50 
500 000 999 999 100 
1 000 000 1 999 999 200 
2 000 000 4 999 999 400 
5 000 000 unlimited 500 
(Gramo, 2017a.) 
 
The voting rights of individual members are limited upwards to 18 percent of the votes of the 
producer members present at the AGM. Producer members who are affiliated with the same 
interest organisation cannot elect more than two members to the board.  
 
Electorate members that over the course of one of the last three fiscal years have received 
remuneration in excess of a thousand NOK may grant proxy rights to another member or to 
their rights holder organisation. This is to secure the representation of as many members as 
possible, including those who for some reason is prevented from being physically present at 
the AGM. 
 
The votes of the performer rights holder group and the producer rights holder group shall be 
weighted equally, meaning that joint matters require a simple majority in both the performers’ 







4.2.4 The board and sectoral committees 
The board of Gramo is responsible for the management of the association. The board shall 
ensure that the association’s activities are responsibly organised and monitor the director and 
the day-to-day operations of the association. There are seven members of the board; three 
elected by the producers’ rights holder groups and three elected by the performers’ group. The 
seventh member of the board must be independent of both rights holder groups and is elected 
by the AGM. By independent is meant that the person is unrelated to any of the approved 
rights holder organisations, and that he is not a member of Gramo. The six ordinary board 
members are elected for one year at a time, while the independent member is elected for two 
years. The independent board member shall be the Chairman of the board. The board employs 
the director, prepares the job description and issues proxies. 
 
In addition to the board, Gramo has so-called sectoral committees, which deals with matters 
pertaining to the two rights holder groups. There is one sectoral committee for each of the 
rights holder groups, one for the performers and one for the producers. The sectoral 
committees are not legal bodies that are supposed to act externally. Each of the sectoral 
committees consists of six persons: the three elected board members and their deputies within 
each rights holder group. The individual distribution within each rights holder group shall be 
such that each sector determines criteria for distribution and allocates its share of revenue 
without interference from the other sector. Allocations for collective purposes are undertaken 
by the respective sectoral committees. The board shall supervise the sector’s grants of 
collective funds before payment can be affected.    
 
 
4.2.5 Collective funds 
According to Gramo, 90 percent of remuneration is distributed and paid out individually to 
Gramo’s members on average. The remaining 10 percent become so-called collective funds. 
Collective funds are collected funds that Gramo, for different reasons, are unable to distribute 
to individual rights holders. In the association’s distribution rules, collective funds are 






Settled unpaid remuneration funds are converted to collective funds in each sector at 
the end of the retention period. The same applies to the settled remuneration under the 
minimum threshold payment (Gramo, 2016: 8) 
 
The minimum threshold payment is set to NOK 450 accumulated over the remuneration year 
within the retention period (Gramo, 2017c). The retention period for claims for individual 
remuneration is set to “three years from the earliest date the right holder could request the 
payment of remuneration” (Gramo, 2016: 8). Gramo has however made it possible for a rights 
holder to receive payment if the rights holder’s earnings, over the three retention years, 
exceed the minimum threshold payment. If the total earnings over three years do not exceed 
NOK 450, the remuneration becomes collective funds.  
 
Collective funds shall be granted as organisational support or to other purposes promoting 
new Norwegian music or Norwegian performing arts. The two sectoral committees decide on 
which organisations and which projects shall be granted support from the collective funds. In 
2016, the following grants were made (all figures in NOK): 
 
Producer sector Performer sector 
Organisational support  Organisational support  
IFPI 701 774 GramArt 3 615 075 
FONO 467 848 Musikernes Fellesorganisasjon 
(MFO) 
801 711 
  Norsk Artistforbund (NA) 378 722 
  Norsk Tonekunstnersamfund 29 511 
  Norsk Skuespillerforbund 4 918 
  Lektorlaget 60 290 
  Folkorg 34 429 
Sum 1 169 622 Sum 4 924 656 
    
Project support  Project support  
Spellemannprisen50 1 500 000 GramArt 904 237 
                                               





Support to NORA 100 000 Musikerne Fellesorganisasjon 
(MFO) 
200 275 
Gramo visibility project  150 000 Norsk Artistforbund (NA) 94 741 
  Gramo visibility project 450 000 
  Norcode 500 000 
  Spellemannprisen 1 000 000 
Sum 1 750 000 Sum 3 149 259 
  Granted for payment Black 
Sheeps 
129 727 
    
Total 2 919 622 Total 8 203 636 
(Gramo, n.d.: 16) 
 
In addition to the roughly NOK 11 million accounted for in the table above, Gramo also 
supported and contributed with NOK 150 thousand by scholarship to the winner of Jazzintro 
– Young Jazzmusicians of the Year at the jazz festival Moldejazz, and a scholarship of NOK 
250 thousand to the winner of Newcomer of the Year and Gramo scholarship at the 




GramArt is the largest interest- and competence organisation for performing artists in 
Norway. The organisation was established in 1989. According to the organisation’s articles of 
association, GramArt aims to work for, and to take care of, performing artists’ rights and 
economic interests (GramArt, 2016: 1). The organisation provides a number of services to its 
members, such as legal advising, favourable insurance agreements, free extra baggage for 
flight travels with Scandinavian Airlines (SAS), various discount deals, useful tools, relevant 
educational courses, social meeting places and so on (GramArt, n.d.b). Article 3(4) in the 
statutes states that GramArt should, to the greatest extent, make it so that as much as possible 
of its members’ remuneration from the management of public use of their protected works are 
distributed individually, and besides, to the best of Norwegian performing music (GramArt, 





million came from Gramo, divided into NOK 900 thousand in project support and NOK 3.6 




GramArt has approximately three thousand members (GramArt, n.d.b). Any music performer 
may register as a member of the organisation, as long as that member pays an annual 
membership fee. The membership fee is determined by the board. Most of GramArt’s 
members are Norwegian, self-employed performing artists or musicians.  
 
 
4.3.2 The administration and board  
As of April 2018, GramArt’s administration consists of seven employees. Elin Aamodt is the 
CEO of the organisation. Her job is to ensure the daily operations of GramArt, within the 
limits and instructions determined by the board (GramArt, 2016: 5). The board of GramArt 
consists of five members, with three deputies. At least four out of five permanent members of 
the board, and all three deputies, shall be elected from GramArt’s members. The board 
members and the chairman of the board are elected by the general assembly. The role of 
deputy chairman is elected by the board. All board members are elected for a period of two 
years, where half of them are up for election each year in order to secure continuity of the 
work in progress.  
 
The board of GramArt is responsible for the general management of the organisation, the 
accounts and the balance sheet. The board is also supposed to take care of the relationship 
with public authorities, the employment of the CEO and the instructions for the administration 
(GramArt, 2016: 4). 
 
 
4.3.3 The general assembly 
The general assembly is the highest governing body of GramArt. It is held annually within the 
period of April 1 and June 22. In order to have the right to vote at the general assembly, 
members must have received pay-outs larger than a thousand NOK from CMOs in Norway or 





satisfactory manner. It is also required that members have joined GramArt and paid the 
current year’s membership fee no later than one week before the general assembly is held.  
 
In order to grant proxy rights to another member, or to act as a proxy, requirements are set 
corresponding to the right to vote. Each proxy may carry up to five proxies, in addition to 




NOPA is the Norwegian society of composers and lyricists. The association was established 
in 1937, initiated by a group of Norwegian schlager composers, and the name is based on 
Norwegian Popular Authors (NOPA, n.d.d). NOPA’s work is “dedicated to the interests of all 
composers, lyricists and authors of other texts to musical works in Norway” (NOPA, n.d.a).  
The objective of the organisation is to promote Norwegian creative music, Norwegian 
musical works and text related to music, strengthen professional fellowships, facilitate 
meeting places, and work for the artistic and financial interests of professional songwriters. 
Out of over NOK 14 million in income for NOPA in the fiscal year of 2016, roughly NOK 
11 million came from cultural funds distributed by TONO. This equals 77 percent of their 
total income. NOK 500 thousand came from the Composers’ Remuneration Fund51, NOK 
900 thousand came from the Norwegian Composers’ Fund52 and NOK 100 thousand came 




There are approximately a thousand members of NOPA. In order to become a member, you 
must be a working composer, which includes arrangers and authors of lyrics to music. The 
conditions for being admitted as a member is that the applicant: 
 
• submits a written application including the information necessary to make a decision 
on the application; 
                                               
51 Komponistenes vederlagsfond. 
52 Det norske komponistfond. 
53 Kardemommestipendet is a grant awarded by NOPA. The grant is gifted from the Egner family and is given as 





• has a management contract with TONO; and 
• has had over the last three years an average income equivalent to 1/4 G, (NOK 23 
409) for composers or 1/8 G (NOK 11 704) for lyricists. 
 
The following copyright-related incomes are considered relevant for the membership 
application: 
 
• The Composers’ Remuneration Fund (work grants only)  
• The Lyric Writers’ Fund54 
• Remuneration for composing for film and theatre 
• Remuneration for musical arrangements of works 
• Advances from publishers  
• Advances from record labels 
• Processing of free musical works 
• Remuneration for commissions  
• Remuneration for commissions from the Norwegian Composers’ Fund 
• The Government Grants for Artists55 to composers/popular composers  
 
The application is decided upon by the board, upon recommendation from the administration 
or the expert council56. If an applicant does not meet the membership requirements of NOPA, 
the applicant may apply for an affiliated membership of the association, as long as the 
applicant is considered an active composer or lyricist and is a member of TONO (NOPA, 
n.d.c). The members are committed to pay the membership fee of NOPA. The membership 






                                               
54 Tekstforfatterfondet. 
55 Statens kunstnerstipend. 
56 The expert council consist of four members – two composers with deputies and two lyricists with deputies. 
Among others, the council is to make recommendations to the board in matters of membership applications and 





4.4.2 The general assembly   
The general assembly is the highest governing body of NOPA, and it is held annually ahead 
of TONO’s AGM. All ordinary members have the right to attend and vote, and the general 
assembly is a quorum with the members that attend. Each member has one vote, and the 
voting right may not be transferred or exercised by proxy. In order to be eligible to sit on the 
board of NOPA, a candidate has to be a member, i.e. shareholder, of TONO. The voting shall 
be conducted in writing if one of the voters would so request. Unless it is otherwise stipulated 
in the articles of association, all decisions shall be made by simple majority. If equal voting 
results occurs in votes other than elections or nominations, the proposed resolution is 
considered unapproved (NOPA, 2016).  
 
 
4.4.3 The board 
The board of NOPA consists of the elected chairman as well as six other members, all with 
deputies. At least three members, with deputies, shall be elected amongst the composers, and 
at least two members, with deputies, shall be elected amongst the lyricists. The members of 
the board are elected for two years at a time. Three or four members are up for election each 
year, in order to ensure continuity of the work in progress. The same goes for the deputies. 
The chairman of the board is also elected for two years (ibid.). 
 
The board of NOPA must ensure the day-to-day operations of the association in accordance 
with the resolutions made by the general assembly. The board elects the deputy leader and the 
second deputy leader amongst the board members. If the chairman of the board is a composer, 
the deputy leader shall be a lyricist and vice versa. All decisions of the board are adopted by 
simple majority, and in situations of equal voting, the chairman has the deciding vote.  
 
The board is responsible for the appointment of NOPA’s administrative leader, the CEO, and 
other staff necessary to conduct the day-to-day operations. The employees are governed by 









4.4.4 The administration 
As of April 2018, the administration of NOPA consists of four employees. NOPA shares 
office space with NKF and MF. Some administrative matters and several projects is 
performed in cooperation with NKF and MF (NOPA, n.d.f: 7). Tine Tangestuen is the 
administrative leader of the administration. She is responsible for all day-to-day operations, 
personnel management and financial management, and she has the overall responsibility for 
NOPA’s activities and representatives (NOPA, n.d.b).   
 
 
4.5 The Norwegian Composers’ fund 
The Norwegian Composers’ fund57 was established in 1965, pursuant to the Law on fees to 
the Norwegian Composers’ fund. The purpose of the fund is to stimulate the development of 
creative musical arts. The purpose of the grants from the fund is primarily to support 
commissions of new musical works, independent of genre, by composers and songwriters 
who mainly live and work in Norway. The recipients of the fund must have displayed their 
professional activity as composers publicly. Generally, the fund grants support to applications 
involving commissions and project works. In order to apply for the funds, an applicant has to 
document that there is an outstanding order from a concert venue, a festival, an orchestra, an 
ensemble, a band, a soloist, etc. The support is meant to subsidise composer fees for 
commissions to public concerts, performances, shows and such. Works that are already 
written or delivered do not qualify for funds. Neither is there any support for production costs 
and fees in connection with the recording or performance of works. (Musikkfondene, 2018a) 
 
The Norwegian Composers’ fund is led by a board of five members, with personal deputies, 
that are appointed by the Ministry of Culture for four years at a time. The board must comply 
with the rules of public administration regarding impartiality. Board members who are shown 
to be biased must withdraw themselves from the process of the application in question. 




                                               





4.6 Fund for Performing Artists 
The Fund for Performing Artists58 provides funding for recordings made in Norway, and for 
projects in which professional performing artists participate. The applicants of the fund must 
live and carry out most of their work in Norway. The fund’s revenues are derived solely from 
the use of non-protected recordings. Non-protected recordings are recordings that are not 
protected by the Copyright Act and to which Norwegian performing artists have no rights 
(FFUK, 2018a). The Norwegian Parliament, Stortinget, has decided that the fund must 
“ensure that there is a wide diversity of cultural expression” (ibid.). The fund is also 
committed to ensure that people all over Norway have the possibility to experience and enjoy 
live performances within all musical genres and all categories of performing artists (ibid.). 
Gramo collects fees from public use of recorded music on behalf of the Fund for Performing 
Artists. Gramo also settles and decides, after reviewing playlists from the broadcasters, which 
revenues are to be considered protected or not (FFUK, 2018b).   
 
The board of the Fund for Performing Artists consists of seven members, with personal 
deputies, all appointed by the Ministry of Culture, including the chairman of the board and the 
deputy leader. The chairman is appointed on an open basis, while the other board members 
are made up of five representatives for performing artists and one for producers. All relevant 
performers’ organisations make recommendations for members to the board. The Ministry of 
Culture appoints performer representatives in such a way that the board has the widest 
possible composition in terms of different art expressions. The board allocates the funds and 
is responsible for the fund’s operations (FFUK, 2018c).  
  
                                               






This thesis adopts a qualitative approach to the research questions, as it seeks to answer them 
through the use of analyses of document and interviews. 
 
 
5.1 Qualitative Research 
Qualitative research is a wide methodological approach that encompasses many research 
methods. These methods include various in-context observations such as comprehensive and 
thorough interviews with individuals, as well as the study of group constellations, typically 
ranging all the way from two to ten participants. Qualitative research sessions may be 
conducted in person, by phone, via video-conference calls and through chatting online. It uses 
in-depth studies of individuals or small groups of people to guide and support the construction 
of hypotheses. 
 
Qualitative research has several unique aspects that can contribute to both rich and insightful 
results, wherein the most important one might be that it gives the research the opportunity to 
probe, thus enabling him to reach beyond initial responses and rationales. The qualitative 
process is also dynamic by nature, which engages respondents more actively than structured 
and rigorous methods such as surveys. 
 
The results of qualitative research are descriptive rather than predictive. They are famous for 
examining the why’s and the how’s, not just what, where or when. It has a strong basis in 
sociology and the social sciences and is widely used in order to understand entities such as 
governments and organisations, or social programs and constructions. 
 
This thesis utilizes a qualitative research method because the desired end result cannot be 
obtained through the use of quantitative methods and raw statistics and numerical data. 
 
 
5.2 Document Analysis 
Document Analysis is a sub-branch of qualitative content analysis, where documents are 
reviewed and evaluated by the researcher in order to elicit meaning and gain understanding 





that may be relevant for the analysis of the researcher, ranging from public documents like 
white papers or directives, to private documents like diaries and letters. O’Leary categorises 
them into three primary types of documents: 
 
• Public record: The official, on-going records of an organisation's activities, e.g. 
student transcripts, mission statements, annual reports, policy manuals, student 
handbooks and syllabi. 
• Personal documents: First-person accounts, experiences and beliefs, e.g. calendars, 
emails, blogs, Facebook-posts, incident reports, journals and newspapers. 
• Physical evidence: Physical objects found within the study settings (often called 
artefacts, or physical artefacts), e.g. flyers, posters and other materials.  
(O’Leary, 2014) 
 
Documents can vary in both shape and content. They usually present themselves in writing, 
but they can also be in the form of sound recordings or visual representations. The document 
which is subject to analysis in this thesis is of public record and comes in written form. It is 
the only document that will be used in this way. 
 
 
5.2.1 Rationale for document analysis and triangulation 
Document analysis is an often-used tool for qualitative research, and it works particularly well 
in combination with other methods as a means of triangulation. Triangulation is the 
combination of different types of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon. As 
Bowen puts it: 
 
The qualitative researcher is expected to draw upon multiple (at least two) sources of 
evidence; that is, to seek convergence and corroboration through the use of different 
data sources and methods. (Bowen, 2009: 28) 
 
Such sources, in addition to documents, can be everything from interviews to different kinds 
of observations, and physical artefacts. Through the process of triangulating data, the 





against possible accusations claiming the study to be too one-dimensional or simply a result 
of the researcher’s personal bias.  
 
Document analysis should not replace other types of data, and one should not consider 
records, however ‘official’ they are, as absolute truth. Triangulation is helpful for the 
researcher to avoid relying too heavily on documents alone; although, in studies that reside 
within an interpretive paradigm, e.g. historical or cultural-research, documents may be the 
only viable or even necessary source of data. 
 
In a study where triangulation is employed, document analysis can also be viewed as a way of 
verifying findings or corroborate evidence from other sources. This is an especially good way 
to look at it from a social science point of view, where there is a lack of quantifiable data. If 
the document analysis provides findings that are contradictory to the primary sources, the 
researcher is forced to investigate further; when there is convergence of data from the 
different sources, credibility and trust is built around the findings. This also works the other 
way around, with document analysis functioning as the primary source of data. 
 
Another approach to document analysis is to use it as a way to formulate questions for use in 
other parts of the research, for instance in interviews, or situations that need to be observed. 
 
Documents provide an enormous amount of information and context that may have been hard 
to find elsewhere. Through documents, the researcher is able to extract either primary or 
supplementary data, track change and development, verify findings from different sources, 
and eventually formulate additional questions to be asked and researched in the future. All in 
all, it is an excellent tool to have in most research settings. 
 
In this study, the Directive will be used as a foundation for analysis, as well as a way to 
formulate questions for interviews at a later stage. It should be considered a secondary source 
of data, to supplement and corroborate the primary sources, and it can be interpreted through 









In her guide to doing research, sociologist Zina O’Leary formulates a planning process that 
ought to take place in any textual analysis, including a document analysis. Here are a few of 
the most central ones: 
 
• create a list of texts to explore (e.g., population, samples, respondents, participants); 
• determine accessibility and consider linguistic or cultural barriers; 
• consider ethical issues (e.g., confidential documents); 
• consider and identify types of data to gather from the document(s); 
• acknowledge and address biases; 
• consider strategies for ensuring credibility; 
• develop appropriate skills for research; 
• know the data one is searching for; 
• look for evidence; and 
• have a backup plan. (O’Leary, 2014: 179) 
 
When it comes to actually exploring the content, O’Leary provides two important techniques 
for accomplishing this (ibid.: 180). One is the interview technique, where the researcher treats 
the document as if it was a respondent or informant in an interview, that provides the 
researcher with relevant information. The researcher is then able to ask questions and 
highlight the answers within the text. The other technique is a more quantifiable approach, 
where the researcher notes the occurrences of particular words, phrases, and concepts that are 
preselected by the researcher. The frequency and number of occurrences, as well as the 
various correlations between elements, is then considered information and can be viewed in 
relation to the central questions of the research. 
 
Documents can be a rich source of data, but the researcher should look at documents with a 
critical eye and be cautious in the use of all documents. They should not necessarily be treated 
as precise, accurate or complete recordings of events or conveyors of meaning. Bowen 
stresses the importance that researchers not simply “lift words and passages from available 
documents to be thrown into their research report. Rather, they should establish the meaning 






It is also important that the researcher determine the relevance of the documents in question to 
the research problem and consider whether the documents are adequately comprehensive in 
covering the broad scope of the topic, or if it is selective in covering only a few aspects of it. 
Although having access to a wide array of documents can provide a preponderance of 
evidence, the quality of the documents should be the researcher’s first concern. If the 
document is assessed to be complete in terms of providing enough evidence to support the 
researcher’s claims, one need not necessarily look further. If there is insufficient data and the 
document is considered incomplete in relation to the study, the researcher ought to begin the 
search for additional documents that are able to fill the gaps of the original document. 
 
O’Leary introduces two major issues that may need to be addressed at the beginning of the 
document analysis (O’Leary, 2014: 178-180). The first is that the researcher should consider 
the purpose and origin of the document. Why was it produced? What was the target audience? 
Who produced it, and when? These are important questions for the researcher to ask, lest he 
overlook potential bias and subjectivity from the author(s). The second major issue is what 
she calls the unwitting evidence, or latent content, of the document (as opposed to just normal 
content, which refers to witting evidence). This refers to the style, tone, agenda, facts and 
possible opinions that are found within the document. Depending on the type of document in 
question, this point may vary in importance, but it should always be kept in mind. 
 
In this study, the qualitative interview technique will be used with regards to the document 




5.2.3 Advantages and Limitations 
In his examination of the function of documents as a data source in qualitative research, 
Bowen includes a list of what he views as the most prominent advantages and limitations of 
document analysis. He first takes a look at the advantages (Bowen, 2009: 31-32). 
 
• Efficiency: Document analysis is considerably less time-consuming than most other 






• Availability and affordability: Most documents are available to the public, and 
especially after the digital revolution they may be obtained without the author’s 
consent. This also makes it less costly than other research methods. Not only that, but 
if a public event took place, some official record of it most likely exists, so the 
researcher is almost always sure to find the data he needs. 
• Stability: Many qualitative research methods carry with them an inherent risk of being 
somehow affected by the research process. Documents are naturally unobtrusive and 
nonreactive, and so they are unaffected by this. This makes it so that the researcher 
need not worry about events proceeding differently due to observation, and reflexivity 
- which requires the researcher to be aware of his own contribution to the construction 
of meanings attached to interaction and influence on the research - is usually not an 
issue in analysing documents. Seen as they are nonreactive, they are stable, and the 
presence of the researcher does not alter what is being studied. This also makes 
documents suitable for repeated reviews. 
• Exactitude and coverage: Documents often include the exact names, references and 
details of events, which makes them valuable to the researcher. They also provide 
broad coverage with regards to long periods of time, multiple events and settings. 
 
Bowen proceeds to describe a number of limitations that are also inherent in documents: 
 
• Insufficient detail: Documents are not produced for the purpose of research (with the 
exception of previous studies located within documents), and so they might not 
provide sufficient detail in order to adequately answer a research question. 
• Low retrievability and biased selectivity: Although documents have high availability, 
they do not necessarily have high retrievability. Access to documents may be 
deliberately blocked, or they may be difficult to retrieve simply due to the nature of 
bureaucracy. Access to documents may also be partly blocked, and the researched may 
only be provided with an incomplete collection of documents. In an organisational 
context, the available (or selected) documents are likely to be aligned with corporate 
policies and the agenda of the organisation’s principles. They may also reflect the 






Bowen rounds out his list by pointing out that the advantages are most likely going to 
outweigh the limitations, and that the limitations should be viewed as potential flaws rather 
than major disadvantages. The advantages of document analysis represent the typical, where 
the limitations represent exceptions, which can easily be avoided by following a few simple 




Interviews are amongst some of the most common methods of conducting qualitative 
research. There is a total of three fundamental types of interviews: structured, unstructured 
and semi-structured. Each type of interview offers its own advantages and disadvantages, and 
it is the job of the researcher to select the one that is most suitable to the study. 
 
Structured interviews 
Structured interviews are very similar to questionnaires, with the exception of being 
administered verbally. Here, the interviewer asks the interviewee predetermined questions 
that are carefully constructed so as to only allow for a limited number of response categories, 
as well as rule out potential follow-up questions that would warrant further elaboration. This 
type of interview is easily conducted and is particularly useful when the questions are of a yes 
or no character, or if they are questions that simply require a clarification to be adequately 
answered. Structured interviews usually do not require much of time and effort and can often 
be done over a distance; however, as they only allow for limited participant responses, they 
do not provide the depth that many questions need to be answered in a complete way. 
 
Unstructured interviews 
At the other end of the spectrum of interview methods, we find the more informal 
unstructured interview. Here, the questions do not necessarily reflect any preconceived 
theories or ideas that the researcher might have, and they can be very open-ended. The 
interviewer might begin the interview by asking a very broad question, that kicks off a kind of 
conversation that could potentially last for hours. In this way, the researcher has little to no 
prior knowledge of which follow-up questions might be appropriate, as the lack of 
predetermined questions does not provide much of guidance on what to talk about. This can 





a more explorative nature, or where significant depth is required in order to provide a 
comprehensive answer. Seen as the process of conducting an unstructured interview can be 
very time-consuming, especially when one takes into consideration the amount of time it 
takes to transcribe sound recordings, it is important to first consider if this type of interview is 
even feasible within the time-frame of the researcher. 
 
Semi-structured interviews 
The third type of interview is the semi-structured interview, which provides the participant 
with several key questions that help to define the areas that are to be explored, while at the 
same time allowing for both the interviewer and interviewee to digress in order to pursue 
ideas and responses in more detail. This is a best-of-both-worlds approach. The key questions 
make sure that information crucial to the study is unveiled, all the while the flexibility of 
being able to diverge from script allows for the discovery or elaboration of information that 
may not have previously been thought of as pertinent by the researcher, as well as giving the 
interviewee the freedom of discussing topics that he himself finds important. 
 
In this study, the semi-structured way of conducting an interview will be utilized. The 
interviews should be considered the primary sources of data, to be supplemented and 




The purpose of qualitative research interviews is to explore the views, experiences, beliefs 
and/or motivations of the participants with regards to specific topics. In the process of 
planning the interview, the most important thing the researcher should keep in mind is 
constructing questions that are most likely to yield as much information about the study as 
possible, as well as questions that address the aims and objectives of the research. Qualitative 
interviewing can be described as a way of guided conversation, where the researcher carefully 
listens so as to extract meaning from what is being conveyed by the interviewee (Kvale, 
1996). 
 
Stuart Hannabuss advocates four important interviewing skills (Hannabuss, 1996). First, the 
interviewer must help the participant in building confidence and establish a rapport. It is often 





proceed with questions that are more difficult or sensitive in nature. Second, it is important 
that the interviewer knows how to keep the discussion going, by avoiding questions that 
might dampen the discourse; for example, yes or no questions that stop the flow of the 
interview, or jargon, abstractions, loaded questions and double negatives. Third, knowing 
when to interrupt the interviewee, keeping him on subject and stopping him from digressing 
too much. Lastly, it is paramount that the interviewer not be judgemental or impatient, 
regardless of the attitudes or opinions showcased by the participants. If the interviewee seems 
eager to introduce or follow up on a specific topic, he should probably be obliged. Also, it 
might prove beneficial to ask the participant at the end of the interview whether there is 
anything he would like to add, as well as quickly debriefing him on the study (Kvale, 1996). 
This gives him the opportunity to address issues or topics that he thinks are important, and 
that have not been properly dealt with by the interviewer. This can lead to the discovery of 
new and unexpected information. 
 
There are of course a multitude of other things that might disrupt the flow of the conversation, 
such as interrupting or redirecting the narrative of the interviewee, rushing to complete his 
sentences, failing to define and clarify difficult terms, and asking overly complicated 
questions. In order not to influence or in other ways lead the interviewee, the interviewer 
should avoid offering his own opinions, either through words or nonverbal cues such as 
excessive nodding to indicate approval or showing signs of surprise or shock; basically, 
adopting the values of stoic calmness, without actually acting like a robot. 
 
Below are a few examples of different types of interview questions that can work as a 
template in the planning of a research interview (adapted from Kvale, 1996: 133-135).  
 
Types of questions      Purpose of questions   Examples 
1. Introducing 
questions 
To kick-start the interview and move to the main 
interview 
“Can you tell me about 
[...]?” 
“Do you remember an 












To draw out more complete narratives “Could you say 
something more about 
that?” 
“Could you give a 
more detailed 




To develop more precise descriptions from 
general statements 
“What did you think 
then?” 
“What did you actually 
do when [...]?” 
5. Direct 
questions 
To elicit direct responses “Have you ever [...]?” 
“When you mention 




To pose projective questions “How do you believe 
others regard [...]?” 
7. Structuring 
questions 
To refer to the use of key questions to finish off 
one part of the interview and open up another, or 
indicate when a theme is exhausted by breaking 
off long irrelevant answers 
“I would now like to 
introduce another topic 
[...]” 
8. Silence To allow pauses, so that the interviewees have 
ample time to associate and reflect, and break 









Similar to some forms of probing questions, to 
rephrase an interviewee’s answer to clarify and 
interpret rather than to explore new information 
“You then mean that 
[...]?” 
“Is it correct that you 
feel that [...]?” 
“Does the expression 
[...] cover what you 




To serve a variety of purposes, i.e. to relax the 
subject when sensitive areas have been breached 
“Oh, I forgot to ask 
you [...]” 
 
Rubin & Rubin categorise the questions in a qualitative interview into three types: main 
questions that guide the conversation; probes that clarify answers or request further examples; 
and follow-up questions that pursue the implications of answers to main questions (Rubin & 
Rubin, 1995: 145). The most important part of doing a qualitative interview however, is that 
the interviewer remains flexible during the interview process. The nature of qualitative 
interviewing places limits on standardisation and the working relevance of existing literature; 
no two interviews will ever pan out the same way. 
 
In the process of designing a research interview, the researcher must consider the time 
available to complete the study, access to respondents, and the financial and potential 
emotional costs of conducting the study (ibid.: 54). He must also devote time and effort into 
finding the right respondents. 
 
 
5.3.2 Ethics, confidentiality and bias 
Once the right respondents have been identified, the researcher must necessarily ask them if 
they will agree to being interviewed. The right to privacy and confidentiality should be 
inviolable and guaranteed, which is why all participants must be asked to consent prior to 
being interviewed and recorded. This is necessary not only to ensure that the interviewee not 
be damaged in any way because of his or her participation in the interview, but also as a 






The researcher should also search for potential bias, and if found, make it understood how this 
could affect the study. Only when this is properly dealt with can the results of the study truly 
speak for themselves.  
 
In this regard, it is important for us to clarify the roles of a couple of the contributors, as well 
as our relations to them. The first is our supervisor Daniel Nordgård, who has also been our 
supervisor and teacher for the past two years. In addition to that, he sits on the boards of both 
Gramo and GramArt, in the capacity of being a researcher rather than being a performer. 
Therefore, he has no financial stakes in the matters described in this thesis. The second is one 
of our informants, Bendik Hofseth, who has also been our teacher for one and a half years59. 
 
Both Daniel and Bendik are very knowledgeable and are, amongst others60, responsible for 
teaching us a lot of what we know today about the field of rights management. Therefore, it is 
natural that a lot of what we consider to be factual knowledge ultimately stems from them. 
  
                                               
59 See: The informants, p. 82. 





6 Document Analysis 
This chapter includes a brief presentation of the Directive. After the presentation of the 
Directive follows the findings from the document analysis. These are sorted by use of several 
sub-headings, with the purpose of analysing the main themes and relevant requirements of the 
Directive in conjunction with the Norwegian model. 
 
 
6.1 Important dates 
Below is listed a number of important dates, with regards to: 
 
The Directive 
• April 16, 2004: The European Commission announced the CRM-Directive in a 
Communication (European Commission, 2004) 
• July 11, 2012: Proposal adopted by the Commission (European Commission, 2012) 
• December 12, 2012: Common position adopted by the Council (ibid.) 
• February 4, 2014: Approval by the European Parliament (ibid.) 
• February 26, 2014: Signed by the European Parliament and the Council (ibid.) 
• March 20, 2014: Publication in the Official Journal (European Union, 2014) 
• April 10, 2016: Directive to be implemented by the Member States (CRM Directive, 
Article 43(1)) 
 
The implementation of the Directive in Norway61 
• June 2, 2014: The Directive was processed by the special committee for intellectual 
property and found to be EEA-relevant and acceptable. (Regjeringen, 2017a) 
• September 22, 2017: EEA-committee decision no. 186/2017 to implement the 
Directive into the EEA-agreement. (ibid.) 
• N/A: Approval of the Norwegian Parliament of the EEA-committee decision, as 
necessitated by § 26(2) (ibid.) 
• N/A: The Ministry of Culture will produce a proposal to the implementation of the 
Directive into Norwegian law (ibid.) 
                                               
61 It has come to our attention, through word of mouth, that the proposition of the Directive is not likely to be 





• N/A: Deadline for implementation 
• N/A: Actual implementation 
 
 
6.2 Introducing the document 
The CRM Directive is a document of public record, produced by the European Union. It was 
published on March 20, 2014, and although it came into force in the Member States of the 
Union on April 9, 2016, it has at the time of writing yet to be implemented by the EEA 
signatory countries not formally part of the European Union, which include Norway, Iceland 
and Liechtenstein. 
 
The text of the Directive was prepared by the European Commission, then subsequently 
approved by the European Parliament and the Council. The Directive consists of 58 Recitals 
and 45 Articles, but for the sake of simplicity, the document can be referred to as being 
comprised of two separate parts. 
 
 
6.2.1 Part I 
Part I, which includes Titles I, II, IV and V, lays down requirements and regulations deemed 
necessary for the good governance of CMOs (CRM Directive, Articles 1-22; 33-45). Chapter 
one defines certain standards that CMOs must meet in order to ensure that they “act in the 
best interests of the rights holders”, including non-members of CMOs (ibid., Articles 1-10). 
These standards are then given substance in several Articles that stipulate specific 
requirements with regards to:  
 
• the collection and distribution of revenue, as well as certain deductions (ibid., Articles 
11-32); 
• transparency and reporting (ibid., Articles 18-22); 
• enforcement measures, including procedures relating to complaints and dispute 
resolution (ibid., Articles 33-38); and 






Part I, by far the longest and most comprehensive of the two, covers then regulations for 
CMOs, governance and the need for transparency, and it ensures that the provisions are 
applicable to all kinds of collecting societies established in the Union, regardless of the kinds 
of rights mandated.  
 
 
6.2.2 Part II 
Part II, the shorter of the two, applies to collecting societies established in the Union that 
manage online rights in musical works on a multi-territorial basis, and it deals with multi-
territorial licensing of online rights in musical works by CMOs (ibid., Articles 23-32, Article 
34(2) and Article 38). This part of the Directive is mainly focused on how CMOs should 
proceed when granting multi-territorial licences, which must be done in a way that allows for 
rights holders to either remain with their current CMOs, mandate a different CMO of their 
choosing or manage their rights individually (ibid., Article 5 and Articles 29-31). 
 
 
6.3 Rationales and objectives of the Directive 
There are three points that can be identified as the main reasons for the implementation of the 
Directive. In addition to that, the Directive has two main objectives that it aims to achieve. 
 
 
6.3.1 Identifying the problem 
The first point is the acknowledgement by the European Commission that: 
 
the EU suffers from a lack of innovative and dynamic structures for the cross-border 
collective management of legitimate online music services. This affects the provision 
of legitimate online music services. (European Commission, 2005c: 6) 
 
The EC found the main issues to be outdated structures and practices such as border rights 
management and blanket licencing, this in a highly technological era where there are available 






the large number of licensors – and variations as to the repertoire and rights they can 
licence – can be a major handicap. The numerous parallel negotiations are also time-
consuming … and are costly. … other factors such as repertoire fragmentation, the 
handling and reconciliation of invoices, and the administration of a considerable 
number of licences, do affect costs. (European Commission, 2012) 
 
They noted as well that: 
 
some services might choose to launch on the basis of major repertoire only, which can 
be secured with a small number of licences. This would be detrimental to niche and 
local repertoire … consumers ultimately have less choice and there is a loss of 
cultural diversity. (ibid.) 
 
The CRM Directive also describes some problems with the traditional models. Recital 5 of 
the Directive states that “problems with the functioning of collective management 
organisations lead to inefficiencies in the exploitation of copyright and related rights across 
the internal market, to the detriment of the members of collective management organisations, 
rights holders and users.” (CRM Directive, Recital 5). Recital 38 also describes the 
complexities and difficulties of collective rights management in Europe, which has:  
 
exacerbated the fragmentation of the European digital market for online music 
services. This situation is in stark contrast to the rapidly growing demand on the part 
of consumers for access to digital content … including across national borders.  
(ibid., Recital 38) 
 
 
6.3.2 The European single market 
As follows, the second reason for the implementation of the Directive is the aim of a 
European single market for the exploitation of musical works in digital format (European 
Commission, 2010: 14). The structures at play were considered to be a hindrance to the 
development of the single digital market, with the biggest issues being that online music 
service providers were compelled to purchase access to multi-repertoire licenses en bloc, and 
then negotiate a multitude of licences with different national collecting societies to acquire the 





situation, the EC has instructed CMOs to modernise their operations, especially where 
transparency, governance and the handling of revenue is concerned. 
 
 
6.3.3 The European Digital Agenda 
The third reason is the European Commission Digital Agenda for Europe and the Europe 
2020 Strategy, which works as an underlying argument: 
 
To create a true single market for online content and services (i.e. borderless and safe 
EU web services and digital content markets, with high levels of trust and confidence, 
a balanced regulatory framework with clear rights regimes, the fostering of multi-
territorial licences, adequate protection and remuneration for rights holders and 
active support for the digitalisation of Europe’s rich cultural heritage, and to shape 
the global governance of the internet. (ibid.) 
 
 
6.3.4 Possible secondary motives 
Besides the rationales stated above, there might be several other reasons and aims that lie 
behind the development and implementation of the Directive, that are not explicitly stated. 
One is that there is a need for better systems for keeping track of information relating to rights 
holders in order to facilitate a cross-territorial platform for the licensing of music rights, 
which after the failure of the EU-initiated GRD is still a topical issue62. Another might be the 
integration of different rights into one single license, also known as the one-stop-shop, or at 
the very least a simplification of the licensing system, which is referred to in Recital 40 of the 
Directive. These can also be better understood through hints to the EU believing that 
intermediaries such as CMOs and record labels have too much power over the industry, or 
that they blame record companies for halting the development of a well-functioning digital 
licensing system with cross-border licensing and one-stop-shops for music copyright63 
(Nordgård, 2017: 192-194). 
 
 
                                               
62 See: Data and the GRD, p. 27. See also: the Directive, Recitals 41-42. 
63 It must be emphasised that these are conjectures based on individual opinions that surfaced during roundtable 





6.3.5 Aims of the Directive 
The 2012 Proposal for the CRM Directive introduced two objectives moving forward:  
“(a) improve the standards of governance and transparency of collecting societies”, by 
establishing common governance and standards for financial management, so that rights 
holders are able to exercise more control; and “(b) facilitate the multi-territorial licensing by 
collecting societies”, also by the setting of minimum standards (European Parliament and 
Council, 2012).  
 
Following this, the European Commission has formulated the key aims of the Directive, 
which “aims at ensuring that rightholders have a say in the management of their rights, and at 
improving the functioning and accountability of Collective Management Organisations …” 
(European Commission, 2017). The Directive aims for a more capable process of licensing, 
through improving collective management structures, effectively modernising collective 
rights management and harmonise rules concerning good governance and transparency. It also 
intends to:  
 
facilitate the multi-territorial licensing by collective management organisations of 
author’s rights in musical works for online use who are subject to several 
requirements … adapted to the digital era, such as enhanced capability to process 
large amounts of data, accurate identification of the works used by the service 
providers, fast invoicing to service providers and timely payment to rightholders. 
(ibid.)  
 
The European Commission continues to list the specific objectives of the Directive, which 
are: 
 
• improving the way in which CMOs established in the Union are managed by 
establishing common governance, transparency and financial management standards; 
• setting common standards for the multi-territorial licensing by authors’ CMOs of 
rights in musical works for the provision of online services; 







These objectives are to be reached by: 
 
• ensuring among others adequate participation of rights holders in the decision-making 
process; 
• ensuring adequate financial management of the revenues collected on behalf of the 
rights holders they represent; 
• increasing their transparency vis-à-vis rights holders, other CMOs, service providers 
and the public at large. (ibid.) 
 
In addition to the already stated intents of the documents, the CRM Directive complements 
Directive 2006/123/EC of 12 December on services in the internal market64, “which aims to 
create a legal framework in order to ensure the freedom of establishment and the free 




6.4 Results from the document analysis 
6.4.1 Part I 
The first Article of the Directive describes the subject matter and the aims towards 
transposition by Member States65. The Directive lays down the requirements necessary to 
ensure the proper functioning of the management of copyright and related rights by CMOs, 
and for multi-territorial licensing by CMOs of authors’ rights for online use (CRM Directive, 
Article 1). Definitions of the different entities are provided. The definition of a CMO in the 
Directive is:  
 
any organisation which is authorised by law or by way of assignment, licence or any 
other contractual arrangement to manage copyright or rights related to copyright on 
behalf of more than one rightholder, for the collective benefit of those rightholders, as 
its sole or main purpose (ibid., Article 3) 
                                               
64 Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on rental right 
and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property. CMOs are subject 
to this Directive seen as they are providers of collective management services. 
65 The Member states are the states included in the European Union. In the Directive, member states refer to 
states that are part of the EEA. In addition to the 28 Member States of the EU, the EEA also consists of Iceland, 





The organisation also has to either be owned or controlled by its members, be organised on a 
not-for-profit basis, or both, in order to fall under this definition. In addition to traditional 
CMOs, the Directive refers to independent management entities (IMEs) as alternative 
managers of copyright and rights related to copyright. IMEs differ from CMOs in that they 
are neither owned nor controlled, directly or indirectly, wholly or in part, by rights holders, 
and they are organised on a for-profit basis (ibid.). IMEs should be understood as commercial 
entities who provide the function and services of a CMO for rights holders. As an example, 
one could imagine that digital data companies such as Google become IMEs, if they were 
interested in and saw the possibilities of entering the field of digital rights management for 
lucrative rights holders. According to Recital 16, audio-visual producers, record producers, 
broadcasters and publishers, as well as authors’ and performers’ managers or agents, shall not 
be regarded as IMEs. 
 
The rights of rights holders 
The main purposes of CMOs are to protect, represent, manage, collect and distribute 
remuneration for public exploitation of the rights of members and other rights holders. In the 
Directive, rights holders are entitled to several rights in order to protect their own rights and 
have the freedom of choice regarding what CMO they consider to be best suited to manage 
their rights. It is up to the Member States to ensure that rights holders are able to enjoy the 
rights laid down in the Directive and that those rights are included in the membership terms 
and statutes of CMOs. The rights of rights holders are: 
 
• the right to authorise a CMO of their choice to manage their rights, irrespective of the 
Member State or nationality; 
• the right to grant licenses for non-commercial use; 
• the right to terminate the authorisation to manage rights or to withdraw from a CMO 
any of the rights; 
• the right to retain rights for acts of exploitation which occurred before termination of 
authorisation or withdrawal; 
• that CMOs shall not restrict the exercise of rights under the two preceding paragraphs 
to another CMO; 
• rights holders shall give consent specifically for each right they authorise the CMO to 





• that CMOs shall inform rights holders of all the above rights before obtaining their 
consent to its managing. (ibid., Article 5(2-8)) 
 
Membership terms and the general assembly 
The requirements for membership of CMOs shall be based on objective, transparent and non-
discriminatory criteria (ibid., Article 6(2)). All members shall be enabled to participate in 
their organisation’s decision-making process (ibid., Article 6(3)), and the CMOs shall allow 
their members to communicate with them by electronic means, including for the purposes of 
exercising members’ rights (ibid., Article 6(4)). This could mean that electronic voting and 
live streaming of the general assembly must be facilitated. In addition to this, all CMOs shall 
keep regularly updated records of its members, which means that all CMOs are obliged to 
create their own database containing member information and associated rights, given that 
this is not already taken care of (ibid., Article 6(5)). 
 
When it comes to the exercising of members’ rights, a general assembly of members of the 
CMO shall be convened at least once a year (ibid., Article 8(2)). All members shall have the 
right to participate in, and the right to vote at, the general assembly, unless restrictions based 
on membership duration or amounts received are allowed by the Member State (ibid., Article 
8(9)). This is backed up by Recital 23 which states that only fair and proportionate restrictions 
shall be subject to the exercise of the rights to participate and vote. In addition to the rights of 
the members, rights holders who are directly represented by CMOs, but do not fulfil their 
membership requirements, shall be provided with rights to participate in decision-making 
processes (ibid., Recital 21). The Directive does not say whether this right to participate 
includes the right to vote or the right to submit proposals to the general assembly. The general 
assembly shall decide on any amendments to the statutes, membership terms, appointments or 
dismissals of directors, review their general performance, and so on (ibid., Article 8(3-4)). 
The Directive provides several minimum requirements of issues that the general assembly 
will have to decide on. These are some of the most interesting ones: 
 
• the general policy on the distribution of amounts due to rights holders; 
• the general policy on the use of non-distributable amounts; 
• the general policy on deductions from rights revenue, and from any income arising 





• the use of non-distributable amounts. (ibid., Article 8(5)) 
 
The supervisory function 
In order to continuously monitor the activities of the individuals who manage the business of 
the organisation, Member States shall ensure that each CMO has in place a supervisory 
function (ibid., Article 9(1)). In most cases, this supervisory function is the board of the 
CMO. Article 9(2) requires that there shall be a fair and balanced representation of the 
different member categories in the body exercising the supervisory function. One interesting 
paragraph in the Directive concerning the members of the board is paragraph 3 in Article 9:  
 
Each person exercising the supervisory function shall make an annual individual 
statement on conflicts of interest … to the general assembly of members. (ibid., Article 
9(3))  
 
This annual individual statement shall contain information on the person’s potential interests 
in the CMO; any remuneration received in the preceding fiscal year from the CMO, including 
pension schemes, benefits in kind and other types of benefits; any amounts received in the 
preceding fiscal year as rights holder from the CMO, and; a declaration concerning any actual 
or potential conflict between any personal interests and those of the CMO or between any 
obligations owed to the CMO and any duty owed to any other natural or legal person (ibid., 
Article 10(2)).  
 
Management of rights revenue 
It is important that CMOs are diligent in the collection and management of rights revenue 
(ibid., 11(2)). When concerning investments of rights revenue or any related income, the 
CMOs shall do so in the best interests of the rights holders. In order to do so, some rules are 
provided in the Directive: 
 
• where there is any conflict of interest, the CMO shall ensure that the investment is 
made in the sole interest of those rights holders; 
• investments shall be made in order to ensure the security, quality, liquidity and 





• the assets shall be properly diversified in order to avoid excessive reliance on any 
particular asset and accumulations of risks in the portfolio as a whole. (ibid., Article 
11(5)) 
 
CMOs are not allowed to obtain consent to manage rights for a rights holder without 
informing the rights holder on management fees and other deductions in advance (ibid., 
Article 12(1)). The management fees must be based on documented and justified costs in 
relation to the management of copyright and related rights, and they shall not exceed those 
justified amounts (ibid., Article 12(3)). When it comes to deductions, CMOs are allowed to 
deduct certain amounts from the total revenues, but the deductions shall “be reasonable in 
relation to the services provided by the collective management organisation to rightholders” 
(ibid., Article 12(2)). The amounts deducted and the use of it shall be transparent to the rights 
holders. CMOs who are using deductions or other income from investments of rights revenue 
to provide social, cultural or educational services are allowed to do so, but it shall be provided 
on the basis of fair criteria when it comes to access to, and the extent of, those services (ibid., 
Article 12(4)). The paragraph does not say anything about whom the services shall be 
provided to. 
 
The distribution of amounts due to rights holders is one of the most important features of 
CMOs. Member states shall ensure that CMOs distribute and pay remuneration for use of 
copyrighted works to rights holders “as soon as possible but no later than nine months from 
the end of the financial year in which the rights revenue was collected” (ibid., Article 13(1)). 
The exceptions from this rule is when bad data, bad reporting or other related circumstances 
prevent the CMOs, or the members, from meeting that deadline. The Directive also requires 
that CMOs shall take all necessary measures to identify and locate the rights holders. 
Information on works and other subject-matter for unidentified or non-located rights holders 
shall be made available by the CMO at the latest three months after the nine months deadline 
mentioned above (ibid., Article 13(3)). The information shall be made available to: 
 
• the rights holders represented or the entities representing rights holders, where such 
entities are members of the CMO; and 







Where it is available, the following information shall be included: 
 
• the title of the work; 
• the name of the rights holder; 
• the name of the relevant publisher or producer; and 
• any other relevant information which can assist in the identification of the correct 
rights holder. (ibid.) 
 
If these measures fail to produce results, the CMO shall make the information available to the 
public at the latest one year after the extended three months period mentioned above. If the 
amounts for plausible reasons cannot be distributed to the correct rights holder after three 
years from the end of the first fiscal year, the amounts shall be deemed non-distributable 
(ibid., Article 13(4)). The general assembly shall decide on the use of the non-distributable 
amounts in accordance with the adopted distribution policy of the CMO (ibid., Article 13(5)), 
but Member States may limit or determine the use by ensuring that the amounts are used to 
fund social, cultural and educational activities for the benefit of rights holders (ibid., 13(6)). 
 
Representation agreements   
CMOs often manage rights in their respective territories on behalf of other CMOs under so-
called representation agreements, or RRAs66. The Directive states that it is the Member 
States’ responsibility to ensure that a CMO does not discriminate against any rights holder 
whose rights the organisation manages under a RRA. It is in particular discrimination with 
respect to management fees, applicable tariffs, and the conditions for the collection of the 
rights revenue and distribution of amounts due to rights holders that is pointed out (ibid., 
Article 14). It is also important that a CMO does not make any deductions, other than in 
respect of management fees, from the rights revenue and related income derived from the 
rights it manages under a RRA, unless the other CMO signatory to the agreement “expressly 
consents to such deductions” (ibid., Article 15(1)). Distribution and payments from one CMO 
to another shall be carried out as soon as possible but no later than nine months from the end 
of the fiscal year in which the rights revenue was collected. The other CMO shall distribute 
and pay the amounts due to rights holders as soon as possible but no later than six months 
from receipt of the amounts (ibid., Article 15(3)). 
                                               





The minimum information provided to other CMOs on the management of rights under RRAs 
is listed in the Directive. The information for the period which it relates to shall be made 
available no less than once a year and it shall be provided by electronic means. Information 
shall be included on: 
 
• the rights revenue attributed, the amounts paid by the CMO per category of rights 
managed, and per type of use, for the rights it manages under the RRA, and any rights 
revenue attributed which is outstanding for any period; 
• deductions made in respect of management fees; 
• information on any licenses granted or refused with regard to works and other subject-
matter covered by the RRA; and 
• resolutions adopted by the general assembly insofar as those resolutions are relevant to 
the management of rights under the RRA. (ibid., Article 19) 
 
Information and transparency 
One of the main subjects of the Directive is the need for transparency of information between 
CMOs and their members, CMOs and other CMOs, CMOs and users, and between CMOs and 
the public. This is seen in quite a few Articles. Article 20, for instance, features information 
provided to rights holders, other CMOs and users on request. Information shall be made 
available by electronic means in response to duly justified requests, and the information shall 
contain the rights the CMO manages, the works or other subject-matter it represents, directly 
or under RRAs, and the territories covered. As well as this, the CMO shall provide 
information where such works or other subject-matter cannot be determined (ibid., Article 
20). Article 21 provides a list of the minimum information a CMO shall make public, for 
instance its statute, membership terms, standard licensing contracts, distribution policy and so 
on. The CMO shall publish, and keep up to date, the information on its public website (ibid., 
Article 21).     
 
The Directive conveys the responsibility of Member States to ensure that a CMO, irrespective 
of its legal form under national law, draws up and makes public an annual transparency 
report. A report shall be published and made public for each fiscal year no later than eight 
months following the end of that fiscal year, and the report shall be published on the CMO’s 
website, and it shall remain available there for at least five years (ibid., Article 22). All 





6.4.2 Part II  
Multi-territorial licensing 
In order to provide for a more efficient licensing system for protected works in the online 
music sector, the facilitation of multi-territorial licensing is important, according to the 
Directive. This will allow online music service providers such as Spotify and Apple Music to 
request and be granted licenses much more efficiently than with how the scheme is today. 
Instead of requesting licenses for use in one territory after another, they may request licenses 
for the exploitation of musical works in all or most territories. Recital 40 in the Directive 
explains that “it is essential to create conditions conducive to the most effective licensing 
practises by collective management organisations in an increasingly cross-border context” 
(ibid, Recital 40). In order to make this happen, a set of rules shall be provided, “prescribing 
basic conditions for the provision by collective management organisations of multi-territorial 
collective licensing of authors’ rights in musical works for online use, including lyrics” 
(ibid.). All musical works, including those incorporated in audio-visual works, shall apply to 
the same rules, with the exception of sheet music. If a CMO cannot or does not wish to fulfil 
the multi-territorial licensing requirements for online rights itself, the CMO is able to request 
another organisation to represent its repertoire on a multi-territorial basis (ibid.). Member 
States shall ensure that CMOs that grants multi-territorial licenses has:  
 
sufficient capacity to process electronically, in an efficient and transparent manner, 
data needed for the administration of such licenses, including for the purposes of 
identifying the repertoire and monitoring its use, invoicing users, collecting rights and 
distributing amounts due to rightholders. (ibid., Article 24(1)) 
 
The CMO shall also make sure that it, as far as possible, provides the correct and complete 
information on the online music repertoire it represents to online music service providers. 
This information shall include: 
 
• the musical works represented; 
• the rights represented wholly or in part; and 






The rules for transparency and information pertaining to users, rights holders and other CMOs 
whose rights are being managed apply in the cases of multi-territorial licensing as well as in 
all other aspects of a CMO’s daily operations. Databases have to be as accurate and as up to 
date as possible (ibid., Recital 41), and the Directive states that Member States shall ensure 
that online service providers, rights holders and other CMOs is enabled to request corrections 
to the data if they believe that the data or the information is inaccurate in respect of their 
online rights in musical works (ibid., Article 26(1)). It is also important that the invoicing to 
online service providers from CMOs managing online rights is accurate and timely, identifies 
the works and rights which are licensed, and the corresponding actual use. The online service 
provider shall accept the invoice if the CMO is using the format of an industry standard (ibid., 
Article 27(3)). Recital 43 elaborates on the need for industry standards: 
 
Industry standards for music use, sales reporting and invoicing are instrumental in 
improving efficiency in the exchange of data between collective management 
organisations and users … In order to ensure that these efficiency gains result in 
faster financial processing and ultimately in earlier payments to rightholders, 
collective management organisations should be required to invoice service providers 
and to distribute amounts due to rightholders without delay. For this requirement to 
be effective, it is necessary that users provide collective management organisations 
with accurate and timely reports on the use of works. (ibid., Recital 43) 
 
Nonetheless, the online service provider may challenge the accuracy of the invoice, especially 
if it receives invoices from one or more CMOs for the same online rights in the same musical 
works (ibid., Article 27(5)).  
 
Non-discrimination and cultural diversity in multi-territorial licensing 
Any RRA between CMOs whereby multi-territorial licensing is included shall be of a non-
exclusive nature. The mandated CMO “shall manage those online rights on a non-
discriminatory basis” (ibid., Article 29(1)). This is also described in Recital 44.  
 
A CMO that grants multi-territorial licenses for online rights in musical works is obliged to 
enter into a RRA with a CMO which is not granting such licenses if the latter CMO makes a 
request for it (ibid., Article 30(1)). The requested CMO shall “include the represented 





online service providers” (ibid., Article 30(4)). This builds on the aim of the Directive of non-
discriminatory treatment and amplifies the wish for cultural diversity in the online 
environment stated in Recital 3. It is a requirement of the EU to: 
 
take cultural diversity into account in its action and to contribute to the flowering of 
the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional 
diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore. 
Collective management organisations play, and should continue to play, an important 
role as promoters of the diversity of cultural expressions, both by enabling the 
smallest and less popular repertoires to access the market and by providing social, 
cultural and educational services for the benefit of their rightholders and the public. 







7 Interview results 
This chapter includes a short presentation of the interviewees and the rationale behind why 
they were chosen to participate. Following that, the findings from the interview analysis are 
presented, organised under sub-headings relating to the findings and the research questions. 
 
7.1 The informants 
In this study, a total of four interviewees have been selected and have agreed to participate. 
The interviewees are all prominent professionals within the Norwegian music scene who are, 
and have been, very much involved in the shaping of the music industry we see today. It 
follows then that they are highly knowledgeable individuals, which is the main reason as to 
why they have been chosen to participate in this study.  
 
Another reason for their inclusion in this study is the relevance of their expertise to the subject 
matter at hand, as well as the various positions they retain or have held in the past, which 
grant unique insight and understanding, as well as the ability to speak in the capacity of being 
in those roles. It should however be noted that the purpose of these interviews was first and 
foremost to extract meaning and information from the interviewees as individuals, not as 
instruments of their positions; although, being in those positions do necessarily shape their 
responses and personas in general. Another point in this regard is that within the music 
industry people have a tendency to move around a lot and occupy very different roles and 
positions at the same time. This is therefore very much the norm, and not something that is 
peculiar to the interviewees of this study. 
 
1) Ingrid Kindem is the chairman of the board for both TONO and NOPA. She has vast 
experience with music policy work, including sitting on the board of directors for 
NOPA and FFUK. In addition to that, she has a degree in music from NTNU67 in 
Trondheim and has had a long-standing career as a composer (TONO, 2017). 
 
2) Harald Sommerstad is a musician and keyboardist for the Norwegian pop group Minor 
Majority, and an Attorney at Law, specialised in the field of intellectual property 
rights, specifically copyright law and marketing law. He works at Zacco on 
                                               






intellectual property, and prior to that, he worked in the CMO Kopinor68. In addition 
to that, he has extensive experience from working in the music business and has held 
the position of chairman of the board for both Gramo and GramArt, as well as sitting 
on the board of directors for Music Export Norway69 and several commercial 
companies (Zacco, n.d.). Currently, he is a board member for both Gramo and 
GramArt (Gramo 2017e; GramArt, n.d.c). 
 
3) Martin Grøndahl is the CEO of Gramo. He has a law degree and has been working at 
Gramo since the fall of 2000. 
 
4) Bendik Hofseth is a Norwegian jazz musician, arranger and composer (Stendahl, 
2009). He is a professor at the University of Agder, has previously and for extensive 
periods of time retained the position of chairman of the boards of both TONO and 
NOPA, and has generally been very involved in both national and international music 
organizations.  
 
In proceeding to the interviews, it should be noted that Bendik Hofseth was our teacher for 
one and a half years at the University of Agder, where he held seminars on the subjects of IP 
Law, Rights Administration, Aesthetics Workshop and New Technologies70. 
 
 
7.2 Conducting the interviews 
The interview phase of this study was carried out in three steps: planning the interviews, 
executing the interviews, and finalizing the interviews. 
 
The planning step consisted of establishing contact with the prospective interviewees, and 
then deciding on the format, time and place. Given the nature of the subject and the scope of 
the study, a face-to-face interview was not deemed to be very important. As such, three out of 
the four interviews were conducted through Skype or over the phone, without any problems to 
                                               
68 Kopinor is the Norwegian CMO for authors and publishers. 
69 Music Export Norway was one of the precursors to Music Norway. Music Norway is the export office for 
Norwegian music, operated by the Ministry of Culture. Music Norway receives annual grants from the National 
Budget, and, in addition, is managing funds from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and acts as a consultant for the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the music field (Music Norway, n.d.). 





speak of. The actual length of the interviews ranged from roughly 30 minutes to an hour. We 
entered into the interviews without any preconceptions of time but found the lengths of the 
interviews to be of no concern. We were able to extract what we needed within the duration of 
the interviews, and we felt that we did not have to rush the interviewees in order to not 
overextend the interviews. 
 
Prior to the interviews, the interviewees were informed on how the interview was to be 
conducted, the nature and purpose of the interview71, the topic of the study and main research 
questions, and finally the key subjects of the interview. The key subjects were:  
  
1) The Norwegian model72 
2) Distribution of funds 
3) Competition 
4) The CRM Directive 
 
These topics were considered to be adequately broad so as to facilitate a wide range of 
responses from the interviewees, while at the same time steering the interviewees towards 
giving satisfying answers to the main research questions. Although the interviewees all have 
different areas of expertise, the key subjects remained the same, however the natural 
development of the direction that the interviews took could be vastly different from interview 
to interview. 
 
All four interviews went more or less exactly to plan. They all came fully prepared and were 
very talkative, which was very much in harmony with the intention of creating a sort of 
guided conversation. The questions posed by us, both introducing, follow-up and otherwise, 
were more or less answered in a satisfying manner. During the interviews, all interviewees 
had moments of digression, but none strayed too far from topic so as to warrant interruption. 
All in all, it was a pleasant experience, and highly educational. 
 
                                               
71 See: Qualitative Research, p. 54 and Semi-structured interviews, p. 61. 
72 With the Norwegian model is meant the general structuring of the field of rights management in Norway, and 






The final part of the process was fact-checking the interviews. This was done after we had 
transcribed and singled out all the potential quotations to be used in the thesis, by way of 
sending copies to the respective interviewees. This was done mostly in case they might have 
said something that turned out to be completely false73.  
 
 
7.3 Analysing the interviews 
In order to analyse the interviews, we first had to transcribe the audio recordings of the 
interviews into text. This can be a tedious process, but with only four recordings to transcribe, 
with durations of no more than an hour each, the process could be completed in a matter of a 
few days. The transcripts amounted to roughly 60 pages of text. All interviews were relatively 
easy to transcribe, with the exception of the interview with Harald Sommerstad, where the 
audio quality ended up being rather poor. This resulted in us having to concede that a few 
words here and there were simply unintelligible. However, this did not seem to take away 
from the context of the interview and the meaning behind the various sections of the 
interview, so it should not be considered a problem. 
 
As soon as the transcripts were completed, the next step was to prep them for analysis. This 
was done in two steps. First, through color-coding the different sections of the interview 
according to relevance, with four parameters:  
 
1) empty talk; 
2) historical facts; 
3) topical facts; and  
4) statements of meaning.  
 
This was helpful as a way to immediately filter out the noise and identify the usefulness of 
various sections of the texts. Second, through labelling the sections and excerpts of the 
sections by giving them titles74. This was helpful as a way to get an outline of the numerous 
topics that were touched upon during the interview; and there were surprisingly many. Also, it 
                                               
73 This turned out to be just a formality, seen as there was only one instance of redaction from the thesis, due to it 
being hearsay. It should also be noted that the complete, un-redacted version of the interviews is available in 
Norwegian at the bottom of this thesis, under Appendix. 





was helpful as a way to locate and revisit parts of the text, seen as the titles could be 
organized in an index and marked with the page number corresponding to the title in the text. 
 
 
7.4 Interview responses 
The responses included below are made up of everything considered to be relevant to this 
thesis, in some way or other. This does not however mean that everything will be discussed 
later, nor does it include the entirety of the interviews. The responses are organised by way of 
subjects relating to the research questions, and not necessarily relating to the key questions of 
the interview. The responses have been translated from Norwegian to English, with priority 
being given to the conveyance of meaning rather than a direct translation that would 
oftentimes seem awkward and clunky, as well as causing unnecessary confusion. If, however 
there are sections containing ambiguity in the eyes of the reader, the complete, un-redacted 




7.4.1 The case of Norway 
The Norwegian music environment 
Prior to the interviews, we had decided to kick off the conversations by asking the 
interviewees to briefly describe the Norwegian music environment as they saw it. All the 
interviewees seemed to agree that, in the case of Norwegian rights holders, Norway is 
thriving. Kindem states that: 
 
We are in an exciting time for Norwegian music. For the last three to four years, we 
see that Norwegian music also performs very well internationally, which does affect 
the numbers at TONO. We absolutely do see that income from abroad, it is increasing. 
In addition, we see that there is an influx of members to TONO, so it seems that there 
are a lot of young people wanting to live off their music. ... that the position of 
Norwegian music is strengthened throughout these last few years is evident. 
 
Grøndahl echoes this by saying that the current situation for rights holders is good. Hofseth 





Norwegian rights holders have good coverage ... The degree of protection and 
collection in the Norwegian market, and the tariffs, are very high. So, if you were to 
operate as a national player in a national market, then Norway is a good market to be 
in, in my opinion. 
 
He also notes that there are some challenges with regards to Norway being a small music 
importing country, which makes for a partially lacking infrastructure when it comes to 
establishing a career-base, but also emphasizes that this is very much the case for many other 
countries, and that in comparison to other European countries, Norway is a good place to be 
for rights holders. 
 
The Norwegian model 
Kindem praises the Norwegian model for facilitating cultural diversity: 
 
Norway has a diverse music environment and a pretty experimental music scene for 
being such a small country. The combination of collective management and interest 
organisations who are mainly performing the cultural policy work, and hopefully a 
good [governmental] cultural policy, makes it so that we have a pretty good and 
strong music environment in Norway. … Is it important to have a diverse music 
environment? We think so. If it is important that we have a diverse music environment, 
that we have a … that many voices are being heard, not only those who are at the top 
of the hit lists.  
 
CMOs 
When asked to comment on the Norwegian CMOs, several interviewees made the comparison 
between TONO/Gramo and CMOs abroad. Kindem argues that TONO is one of the most 
modern societies in the world, where rights holders are concerned. Hofseth also commends 
the Norwegian CMOs in this regard: 
 
I think there are a lot of positives when it comes to TONO and Gramo; they are, 






Hofseth does however provide several criticisms of the Norwegian CMOs. He touches on a 
handful of topics, one of which is the collection of digital revenue, and points to the 
governance structures as underlying issues: 
 
I think that in particular TONO should be more on the ball with regards to the 
collection of digital revenue from other places, be more proactive, especially on behalf 
of those rights holders that have a catalogue which is relevant internationally. That 
they should build services and be more proactive in order to collect those types of 
incomes. And I would argue that one of the reasons as to why this is not happening, 
lies paradoxically in the governance structures. … those who sit on the board of 
TONO, they often have a "back country" [constituency]; they represent an 
organisation which has a cultural policy interest in TONO, and that makes it so that 
TONO is being stopped from being as digital as it should be. 
 
He adds to this by saying that: 
 
There are members of the board in TONO who are not capable of "balancing their 
hats". In one instant, they want what is best for TONO, and in the next they want what 
is best for the organisation they represent. So, it demands a very particular type of 
person, and those kinds of people are hard to find. 
 
Hofseth brings up another criticism in relation to TONO’s distribution policies, that are based 
on established customs and old board decisions. He then goes on to provide several examples 
of schemes that do not function as intended and has not been revised: 
 
And this does not look good. This is hard to explain, both to TONOs own members, but 
especially to sister societies and to the general public. It weakens TONOs credibility 
considerably, it weakens TONOs ability to be a strong player, and a unifying player in 
the Norwegian market. It weakens their reputation. It cannot stand the light of day. 









When asked about the future and the development of digital tools, Hofseth has this to say: 
 
I think that TONO is a little "ostrich in the sand", you know, when it comes to how 
digital the reality is about to become. And then they must build good digital tools 
themselves, both on the back-office side and on the front-office side75. They have to 
have good solutions that enable them to do business more efficiently and more 
scalable; and those solutions won't come as long as the battle is about small money 
and cross-subsidization of distribution. … TONO has the potential to become a really 
good and dynamic … but there is a lack of courage. There is a lack of effort, and the 
focus lies elsewhere. There has been a lot of focus on back-office solutions with 
societies in Europe, and very little on front-office solutions. … today, only 30 percent 
of concerts are being reported on. It should be easier to report works, and it should be 
easier to report works correctly … as long as you are spending dimes on getting works 
reported, then you are forced into spending dollars on the back-office side in order to 
rectify the damages … it is not hard to develop such tools. But there is no desire to do 
so. There is no courage to do so, and the focus lies elsewhere. … I think it [the 
Directive] is going to help, because it draws attention to it. I welcome the Directive, 
but I don't think it goes far enough. That's my personal opinion. 
 
Sommerstad recognises the potential for improvement when it comes to administrational 
costs, and asserts Gramo’s view on the matter: 
 
We have as an objective to find the optimal solution. … we have a goal of, and 
probably have a potential for improvement, to redistribute funds more efficiently. 
Read: that the administrational costs become as low as possible. … we are on the ball 





                                               
75 With back-office is meant the centre in which the product development and administrative work of a business 






Grøndahl provides a more specific example on how administrational costs can be diminished, 
as he believes that the Norwegian CMOs should cooperate more closely76: 
 
Gramo has been in contact with TONO, and we will continue to be in contact, 
considering that we should have a closer cooperation with the collection of other 
public performance. In what type of model it can be, we will see, but we have that as a 
plan, and we are going to continue with that, because it is of our opinion that it could 
be beneficial for the rights holders. … We have that in our strategic plan for 2018 to 
2020 that we should merge the market divisions and create a separate company in 




There seems to be no doubt as to the relevance and importance of the work performed by the 
interest organisations. Kindem points to a steady flow of rights holders interested in signing a 
membership with NOPA – a flow which is especially based on those who are already 
shareholders in TONO: 
 
I believe that rights holders have the need to not stand completely alone, and that they 
therefore seek towards organisations such as NOPA, because we know that there is 
quite a bit of competence there. We have positions on the board of TONO too, which 
means that we can have a little bit of control with regards to where the money goes. 
So, it is a pleasing development for us. 
 
Kindem highlights in particular the cultural policy work that the interest organisations do as 
very positive and exemplifies this with their role in the "artist rebellion" of 201777. She also 
emphasises their importance in an environment prone to complexity, uncertainty and change, 
as well as the importance of the voice of the artist: 
 
I am thinking that how the situation is now, with a new copyright law and the 
implementation of a CRM Directive, the network and competence that resides within 
the interest organisations is needed. … What is desirable for both TONO and NOPA is 
                                               
76 The specifics of this can be found in the full interview at the bottom of this thesis, under Appendix. 





to have active composers and lyricists in board positions. … it is not desirable for us 
to have organisations that almost have professional cultural policy makers in board 
positions. … because we think it's very important with the artist's voice in the public 
space. There are enough organisations who have lawyers to speak for them. 
 
Sommerstad echoes Kindem in stating the importance of the role the interest organisations 
have in safeguarding the interests of individual members through cultural policy work. 
Grøndahl provides a practical example that draws attention to the fundamental merits of 
having such safeguards in place: 
 
I think it [the Norwegian model] works very well, and it is very important that we have 
these basic organisations [interest organisations] ... It is a very well-functioning 
model, and when we contribute in other countries, it can be for example countries that 
have yet to get started with collecting revenue, where we are asked to assist in a 
country, then we will always recommend that these basic organisations are 
established first, that represent potential members to this, you know, typically a 
musician's association, or an IFPI, or a FONO, and so on.  
 
Sommerstad explains some of the challenges that interest organisations face, and points out 
two in particular: 
 
For GramArts part … the challenge is perhaps engaging the members. It is ... 
financing, how we are financed, if we are going to be financed like this in the future 
and so forth. … And then it's of course the fact that collective funds, they might 
diminish, and how are we to be financed then? Many interest organisations will be 
financed through the national budget … but we are not. … Gramo works towards 
redistributing as much of the money as possible, you know. That is the aim of Gramo. 
So, you can say that in Gramo we work against the existence of GramArt. … So, if we 
get really good at redistributing funds, then the financial foundation disappears. 
 
Sommerstad adds to this by describing the challenging relationship between Gramo and 






It is a kind of contrasting relationship, that we work for, and that is in the interest of 
our members too, that as much as possible goes out … the better they become in 
Gramo, the less funding we shall have in GramArt. There is definitely a contradiction 
there … and you have to be aware of it … but it is one that you just have to deal with 
in a good way. It is clear that it is a challenge, as long as I've been at GramArt, we've 
been talking about it. … as a GramArt representative in Gramo, you are supposed to 
safeguard the interests of the members, but at the same time safeguard the interests of 
Gramo. So, in a way you are working against the funding existence, but our attitude 
towards it is … that we can't do anything else and then we have to eventually face the 
challenges as they come. You know, we are not a for-profit organisation, ergo our 
goal is in a way to have zero equity. 
 
Kindem voices similar concerns with regards to the contrasting purposes of CMOs and 
interest organisations, but argues that there can be divided opinions on the matter of 
distribution: 
 
But if there is an interest in collecting and distributing the most amount of money 
possible to the rights holders, without considering cultural policy, then I can see that 
there can be divided opinions on what is the right thing to do. 
 
When it comes to financing the interest organisations, Grøndahl thinks that collective funds 
are a good way to accomplish this: 
 
And this money, I think they are a very nice way to organise, for example, the 
organisational environment, e.g. MFO, Norsk Artistforbund and GramArt, and also be 
able to support projects. And the projects must after the preliminary work be to the 
best for Norwegian performing arts. So, it's a pretty wide definition, but I think it 
works really well. It makes it so that for example GramArt can run an organisation 









He is however unsure of what the future model of financing will look like, and how it will be 
affected by the Directive: 
 
It is totally dependent on what is agreed upon when the CRM Directive comes; this is 
one of the big question marks that is going to present itself, what opportunities are 
there going to be for generating such funds. In many countries there is heavy 
resistance, they are of the opinion that the money that we haven't been able to 
distribute or pay out individually should be put on top, or in other words be 
distributed one more time, and paid out to those who have already been paid, so that 
they get a little more, the ones that we have already identified. It is one of the 
questions that we are most unsure of, and- maybe Gramo isn't that concerned with it, 
but that the organisations around us are very concerned with how the future model 
will be. That there will be some changes to it, that is a reality. … There will come non-
discrimination rules and a lot of different things, here we have in a way rewarded 
Norwegian organisations and Norwegian performers primarily, when we have 
distributed these funds. It may be that there will be changes when it comes to that. … 
One of the points can be that, for example, it is not allowed to only give organisational 
support to Norwegian organisations. I am very uncertain about this, because it has 
been solved a little differently in the various countries. … If you ask the organisations, 
then the Gramo-organisations … would want that we transition into a kind of TONO-
model, where you have predictability because a percentage of the gross collected 
revenue can be distributed as cultural funds, or collective funds. The challenge with 
taking it off the top is obviously that … let's say the cost percentage of Gramo is 18 
percent, and then you reserve 10 percent more, then that is 28 percent of the total 
income of Gramo that does not reach the individual distribution to the rights holders. 
And if these 10 percent only accrue to Norwegian rights holders, then the foreigners 
will be able to dispute that, and I think that they might do that. But we will see. 
 
Hofseth believes that the European model of deducting 10 percent as cultural funds will likely 
persist in the long run, because the French, German and other central European societies are 
very interested in keeping it that way, seen as they have very little repertoire that moves 






Kindem agrees with Grøndahl that there are challenges with the TONO-model of distributing 
cultural funds from a percentage of the gross collected revenue:  
 
It is clear that collective management is being challenged by a global digital market ... 
we see now that it is challenged, considering that TONO sets aside a share of its 
income for the interest organisations. This is something that is being scrutinised, both 
through reciprocal agreements with other societies, but also in general in an 
international perspective. … we can adjust it down, and this should be harmonised 
with other countries too, and especially countries that we are cooperating with, and 
we also regulate it through reciprocal agreements. But that we can continue like we 
have done for 90 years, it is not as easy as that. It means that it is demanding for us, 
but we are trying to closely follow up on this from month to month. 
 
She goes on to provide a hypothetical example of how a future model of financing might 
look: 
 
It can be imagined a model where the interest organisations can perhaps receive 
support from the national budget, or through Norsk Kulturråd78 for example. It is 
something we should look at. 
 
 
7.4.2 The Directive 
When it comes to the Directive, Kindem believes that TONO is already more or less in 
compliance with it, and points to changes in the governance structures of TONO that have 
long been made: 
 
I believe that we have already, through the way that TONO is being run, implemented 
most of what is in the Directive. … We are the Norwegian society that has had a 
general assembly for many years. We have employee representatives on the board, 
and there is a balance between free seats and the interest organisations and so forth, 
so I believe that we are just about running [TONO] the way the Directive intended. 
 
                                               





Hofseth agrees with this. He welcomes the Directive as a positive, but would have liked to see 
more radical changes proportionate to the disruptiveness of digitalisation: 
 
I think, from my experience from conversations with the Ministry and legislator, that it 
[the Directive] is not going to have any consequences. … But I would argue that from 
what we know today, and with the rate that the market is changing, that there should 
be more radical changes than there will be. … I think it is a positive thing because it is 
of my opinion that these reforms are needed. And they are needed even more in 
Greece, Portugal and Italy than in Norway. But we need them here too, because it 
needs to be viewed in context of digitalisation, and it [digitalisation] moves so much 
faster than it seems from the board room of TONO. … We carried out these reforms 
early on in TONO, and at that point we were far ahead. Now it is a mixture of 
representative democracy and open democracy, and that is probably going to be 
enough for the CRM-Directive. 
 
Grøndahl believes that the Directive won’t make a big difference for Gramo, and provides a 
couple of examples of the effects that the Directive has already had on Gramo: 
 
We have only ordinary members. We have no- earlier, it is correct when you say that 
we distinguished between ordinary and affiliated members … but now we only have 
ordinary members. And this was because we saw that CRM would, when it comes, that 
it will require that we only have one class of members. But what can be topical is, if 
you consider CRM and this way of election, can be that – and we are most likely going 
to – that we will have to open up for electronic voting for the general assembly. … 
What the Ministry [of Culture] is saying, is that they are going to cooperate closely 
with the organisations prior to making a lot of these regulations, and they have 
informed that we are to be a part of forming a part of these regulations where there is 
no requirement within the CRM-Directive that change take place. So, we do not 
believe that CRM is going to make a big difference for Gramo like it is today and what 
comes next. … Gramo has up until last year, we have deducted 10 percent in 
administrational fees at payment for non-ordinary members – and now I am back to 
the old membership description – we have removed that too now, because it would 
look discriminating with regards to CRM, and we see that- well, I have always meant 





discussion that has come up now that we have seen that CRM will lead to it having to 
be removed, the 10 percent fee, so we have now removed that from the distribution 
that we are going to have now in May, which is for 2017. 
 
Governance 
When it comes to the issue of how the Norwegian CMOs are governed, Hofseth brings up 
several points. He is particularly concerned with the way the board of directors is organised in 
TONO and the effect this has on TONO and the development of digital tools: 
 
It is of my opinion that this representative way of organising, where you are elected to 
sit on TONOs board as a representative of an "owner organisation" - or well, quote-
unquote – as a representative for an interest organisation. This cannot continue, 
because those board members are representing that organisation more than they are 
representing TONO. So, TONO is not getting the board that they deserve, and thus 
they can't evolve quickly enough. … It's this cross-subsidisation, this mixing of 
cultural policy and distribution that TONO does; it has to stop, in my opinion, in order 
for TONO to become more attractive, and more valuable for its members. But there is 
resistance towards separating these two areas, because some of the owners are unsure 
about or feel that they don't want to be left with cultural policy funds, with grants, they 
want to have access to the distribution, because they see it as being safer; and this 
makes it so that reforms take too long and are too late. … With an ever improvement 
of digital tools, both on the input-side, that concerts can be reported more precisely, 
and that we can monitor the market more precisely, this kind of practice cannot 
continue. But because you want that practice to continue, you refuse to develop the 
tools that make it so that there can be a better and more transparent market. … What 
the CRM Directive is most concerned about is governance and transparency, 
accountability, governance, and it's these problems TONO has. It's these [problems] 
that stand in the way of developing the necessary tools. The CRM Directive also points 
to that, that there is a connection between governance and what can be done. You 
have to anchor such strategies in a board of directors, and then it has to be a board 
which is concerned with the welfare of TONO – not with cultural policy agendas. So, 






Hofseth goes on to present his views on what should be done to secure the position of the 
CMOs in the new digital and more competitive landscape: 
 
One course of action is that TONO exposes itself to a real democracy, and that also 
Gramo does so. It will be noisy, and it will be difficult, at least to begin with, but it will 
eventually make it so that the members feel a closeness, and that they will be engaged. 
What they do now is that they get involved with their interest organisation, and the 
interest organisations are also shutting TONO out from having a direct contact with 
their members, TONO should work much closer with their members, because the 
competition for members is going to be a challenge in a European context, it already 
is. These new young ones who sell their music internationally, Alan Walker and Kygo 
etc., they are shopping for the best deal, you know. And if you don't have a 
relationship with the organisation, if you can't use "soft-power" to have kind of 
intimacy and access, then it becomes hard. They are being stopped from doing this, 
because the owner organisations, or interest organisations, are saying "that intimacy, 
educating members, providing service, providing information on how they can move 
forward as members, we are the ones who take care of that." And it is TONO who 
should be taking care of that. Then TONO would have become a much more dynamic 
organisation, with an engaged democracy. … and this is also what really underlies the 
CRM Directive, but it does not go that far. 
 
Sommerstad disagrees with Hofseth when it comes to the intentions and relevance of the 
Directive with regards to Norwegian CMOs and argues that they are run within the demands 
of the Directive: 
 
I am thinking that Gramo at least, I think also TONO, are … have always, as far as I 
know, been running [their business] reasonably within the, sort of, demands that 
comes with the CRM Directive. … You should know that the CRM Directive … one 
part of it is of course: one market. … when it comes to the other part of the CRM 
Directive, to get democratic and transparent CMOs, then this is the type of regulation 
that in great part was made in the EU because there were some CMOs in other 
countries … that weren't transparent at all, and where there have been a few cases of 
corruption and so on. … so those regulations, they are in a way made to make sure 





been fairly transparent and democratic … always. So, it probably wasn't the Nordic 
CMOs that came to mind when that part of the Directive was made, to put it like that. 
 
Transparency 
Sommerstad believes the Norwegian systems are fairly transparent for rights holders: 
 
As a songwriter it is reasonably transparent. You can kind of see where the money is 
coming from. … As a rights holder I feel that the systems are fairly transparent in 
Norway. … When it comes to transparency, we feel that the CMOs are within the 
requirements [of the Directive]. 
 
Multi-territorial licensing 
Kindem has this to say about the multi-territorial licensing system that the EU is pushing for: 
 
It is cross-border licensing, multi-territorial licensing, that we are heading towards, 
whether we want it or not. We could wish that there was one society in each country, 
then we could manage rights for each other and exchange that; of course, that would 
have been a simple model, but it is now being challenged. 
 
Competition 
Kindem explains that the strengthened position of Norwegian music has sparked the interest 
of other societies. She also describes the current state of competition in Norway, and expects 
more of it in the future: 
 
"What is going on here? How can they have such a big, vivid and diverse music 
environment?" This also means that foreign societies are actively seeking out 
Norwegian rights holders in the hopes of getting them on their roster. It really is a 
rather new situation. … The situation regarding competition now makes it so that 
every society wants to be the best, so maybe something must be kept as a kind of trade 
secret too. … We do see some competition, but what TONO has can almost be 
considered as a monopoly. We do have companies like for example Epidemic Sound, 
which is trying to establish itself in Norway, and we just have to expect that there are 
others who would like to establish themselves in Norway and are going to get 





class. Simply put. But we do also think that being a non-profit company is something 
that speaks to our advantage, rather than there being shareholders who are taking a 
profit regularly. 
 
Kindem adds to this by describing the advantages of maintaining a big catalogue: 
 
We have a big catalogue ... which is built up through 90 years. So, having a big 
catalogue makes it so that one can go one single place in order to license most of the 
repertoire. So, keeping the catalogue together is something we want. It is not certain 
that we will be able to, but we want to. 
 
Hofseth expands on this by describing a hypothetical scenario where being non-profit and 
managing a big catalogue might not prove to be such an advantage after all: 
 
This area is kind of up for grabs. If an international player with a mind on profits 
enters here and represents 10 rights holders, instead of 30 thousand like TONO does, 
then it is clear that they can do a really clean slate. If Google or, well, a for-profit 
company jumps in and represents Bruce Springsteen, Madonna, Elton John blah blah 
blah, the 10 biggest artists, then it is obvious that they would be able to gain a lot of 
money in the market, easily. They could knock on the door of TONO and say "you 
know what, we know that this many listened to this song by Elton John, we know that 
this many saw that concert with Bruce Springsteen, and here is the bill. This is what 
you owe us." It is not unthinkable that something like this happens, that the rights 
holders assign their rights to an agent or a company that thinks profits; and that 
company can then take 5 percent of the income, or two percent of the income. That is 
much lower than the commission that TONO has on 14 percent. And in addition to 
that, 10 percent of cultural funds are being deducted, so in reality it is much higher. 
And they are deducted from the gross collected revenues. So, TONO has in principle a 
commission which is closer to 20-25 percent, and the Norwegian Composers’ Fund, 
and then you add and then you add … so it is obvious that the difference between 25 
percent and two or two and a half percent is pretty big when you are making big 







Sommerstad agrees that TONO might see more competition, but is more doubtful when it 
comes to Gramo: 
 
For TONO's part, there might be more competition, perhaps. This might happen in the 
Gramo-area as well, that there are other CMOs from abroad that will claim that they 
too can [unintelligible word] remuneration for the use of music in Norway, based on 
deals or based on compulsory license. I don't know how this is going to be exactly. … I 
don't quite see how it affects Gramo per today.79 
 
Technology 
When it comes to the subject of technology, Kindem states that modern technology challenges 
the Norwegian model: 
 
Modern technology, which makes it so that we in the future will be able to monitor the 
use of music much more precisely, does challenge the Norwegian model, where we 
have collective management with licensing deals for a collected catalogue, you know, 
for Norwegian music and the repertoire we manage through reciprocal agreements. 
So, it is clear that, in the future, when monitoring can be done more precisely, you can 
measure directly what is being used, which challenges these collective agreements. We 
do see that. But if we run [our business] well and give back to the rights holders as 
much as possible from what we collect, then it can be an alternative to other more 
commercial models. 
 
Hofseth agrees that there are major challenges to digitalisation, and that there is a need for 
new tools in order to fill the gap created by the diminishing importance of blanket licensing: 
 
Things are happening in other markets that is going to be of import in Europe, in Asia, 
in America and … these blanket licenses are less and less in use. People want to have 
licensing of some repertoire to use in a particular context. … I don't think it [blanket 
licensing] is going to disappear completely, as long as we have a public broadcaster 
and university sector and so on, but I think there are fewer and fewer areas in the 
digital where they are relevant. … So, here you need to create new tools. And this is 
                                               
79 This is an area very much subject to change and uncertainty, as is exemplified in an article published through 





squeezing them, you know, with regards to how the organisation is made up, what 
tools they have developed and how it stands in the market. So, TONO and Gramo are 
becoming a little – now, I am saying a little [emphasis added] - anachronistic. They 
are kind of remnants of an old offline age. That's what I'm afraid of. 
 
Hofseth thinks that the way the use of music is monitored and reported on today is lacklustre, 
as opposed to what is possible with current technology. He exemplifies this by pointing at the 
readily available numbers from Norwegian radio stations:  
 
What I mean, personally, is that it should at least be looked at … look at bringing in a 
parameter such as actual listeners and viewers. You know, because we have all those 
numbers. … the statistics on music usage and monitoring of radio stations is in full 
swing. It is no secret how many is listening to a song on P1 and how many is listening 
to a song on P2, it is not hard to figure out, at any time. … That you no longer play 
around with the money, and that the cultural policy agenda is on top, but that you 
actually try to have a distribution that reflects what is actually going on in the market. 
… because TONO could have done better with regards to reflecting the market. … 
they have put that parameter aside, they don't use it in the distribution. They only use 
potential, possible, because you reach so and so many, and then it isn't TONO’s job to 










In this chapter, the findings from the interview analysis and document analysis will be 
summarised, discussed and linked together with the theoretical frameworks in chapters two 
through four. The foundation for the discussion is primarily the findings from the interviews, 
whose results will be compared to the secondary sources and examined in order for 
similarities and differences to be drawn. The secondary sources are the results from the 
document analysis, and finally the theoretical frameworks. 
 
 
8.1 The case of Norway 
The results of the interviews describe the Norwegian music environment as a good place to be 
for rights holders, especially when compared to similar territories in Europe. There is a high 
degree of protection and collection in the market, and the tariffs are very high. Norwegian 
music also performs very well internationally, evidenced by the recent TONO press release80. 
This is a testament to a well-functioning model that bodes well for the future. 
 
Norway has a diverse music environment and a pretty experimental music scene for being 
such a small country. This is, according to Kindem, all thanks to the combination of collective 
management and the cultural policy work of the interest organisations. Cultural diversity 
seems to be a focal point for the Norwegian organisations as a whole, and the Norwegian 
model promotes it. Cultural diversity is also mentioned in Recital 3 of the Directive, which 
states that the CMOs play, and should continue to play, an important role as promoters of the 
diversity of cultural expressions, as well as in Recital 44, which states that aggregating 
different music repertoires for multi-territorial licensing facilitates the licensing process and, 
by making all repertoires accessible to the market for multi-territorial licensing, enhances 
cultural diversity. The Directive does also indirectly affect cultural diversity through Article 
30(4), which makes it so that CMOs requested to represent another CMO must include the 




                                               






The analysis of the interviews suggests that the Norwegian CMOs are internationally on a 
very high level, and amongst the most modern societies in the world. The strengthened 
position of Norwegian music over the last few years has also affected the numbers at TONO, 
whose income has been steadily growing over the last several years, aided by an increase in 
money coming in from abroad. In addition to that, TONO has experienced an influx of new 




There is a wide consensus between the interviewees that the Norwegian CMOs are being run 
in a way that is more or less in compliance with the demands of the Directive, and that the 
implementation of the Directive won’t have any big consequences for the way they operate. 
This is also evident from the presentation of the Norwegian CMOs in chapter 2 as well as in 
the findings from the document analysis. Apart from a handful of practical changes to be 
made when the Directive comes, for example that the CMOs likely will have to open up for 
electronic voting at the general assembly, the biggest reforms have already been implemented, 
especially with regards to governance structures. One example of this is the way Gramo used 
to distinguish between ordinary and affiliated members; now they only have ordinary 
members, which is an indirect effect of the non-discrimination rules introduced by the 
Directive81. Another example is the 10 percent in administrational fees at payment for non-
ordinary members – which again refers to the old membership description – that Gramo had 
up until last year. This was removed because it would look discriminating with regards to the 
Directive. 
 
TONO has also been through some changes in this regard, but this was many years ago, and 
at this point they were far ahead of other societies. TONO has had a general assembly for a 
very long time82. They also have employee representatives on the board, and there is a 
balance between free seats and the seats occupied by representatives from the interest 
organisations, as can also be seen in chapter four on TONO. This balance is a requirement of 
Article 9(2) of the Directive. 
                                               
81 See: Article 6(2-3), Article 8(9), Recitals 21 & 23. 





In spite of the above, Hofseth believes that the reforms introduced by the Directive are still 
needed and welcomes the Directive as a positive but argues that there should be more radical 
changes; changes that are more in line with the rate that the market is changing due to 
digitalisation, as can be seen in chapter 1.2. He points to the main issues addressed by the 
Directive – governance and transparency – and argues that these are in fact the problems that 
TONO has. However, the Directive does not go that far as to address these issues head on, as 
is also pointed out by Sommerstad. 
 
The interview results do however introduce several points of contention when it comes to how 
the Norwegian CMOs are governed, despite of them being outside of the direct scope of the 
Directive. The biggest critique in this regard is provided by Hofseth, who explains how the 
representative model of TONO and Gramo is hindering their development in relation to 
digitalisation. He refers in particular to TONO when he describes how the agendas of those 
who are elected to sit on the board of directors are in stark contrast to what is actually needed 
for TONO to succeed in an ever increasingly digital industry. This is because many of the 
board members are representing an interest organisation with a cultural policy interest in 
TONO, an interest which might be stopping them from becoming as digital as they need to be. 
These board members are, according to Hofseth, representing their respective interest 
organisations more than they are representing TONO, making it so that TONO is not getting 
the board it deserves and needs in order to adapt to market changes fast enough.  
 
 
8.2.2 Information and transparency 
Transparency is one of those words that are easy to understand but at the same time hard to 
define. Herein, we have decided to discuss two aspects of it separately, the first being a wider 
understanding of it referring to the general transparency of CMOs and the systems of rights 
management. It is also important to understand that transparency is not necessarily a synonym 
for absolute truth, and that in many cases it is easy to simply label something as transparent 
without being able to actually confirm the veracity of it. With this in mind, the results from 
the interview analysis indicate that the Norwegian systems of collecting and distributing 
revenue are fairly transparent, especially when compared to some CMOs and systems in other 
territories. This is not to say that transparency should not be a focus of the Norwegian CMOs, 
but rather that they should have little to no trouble abiding by the regulations of the Directive. 





on statutes and distribution policies, all amounts distributed are fairly easy to understand and 
keep track of. It is however harder to gain a complete picture of amounts collected, and to 
know what the figures from annual reports specifically entail.  
 
The second aspect of transparency is a consistent theme throughout most of the Directive, and 
it primarily deals with the precise, efficient and transparent sharing of information and 
reporting. The interesting part here is that it is a prerequisite for facilitating multi-territorial 
licensing and an attempt to solve the issues related to databases with inaccurate information, a 
topic which is problematized in chapter three under Data and the GRD and chapter one under 
CMOs and licensing. This is also addressed in Recitals 41 and 42, which states that CMOs 
should hold and maintain databases containing data that allows for the identification of works, 
rights and rights holders that the CMO is authorised to represent and of the territories covered 
by the authorisation. CMOs should take measures to protect the accuracy and integrity of the 
data, and they are required to update their databases continuously and without undue delay. 
An important point is that they must establish easily accessible procedures that enable online 
service providers, rights holders and other CMOs to inform them of any inaccuracy that the 
databases may contain in respect of works they own or control.  
 
Articles 6(5), 13(3-6) and 26(1) follows through on the points above. Furthermore, Articles 
19-22 specify a minimum of information that a CMO should make available through RRAs, 
to rights holders and other CMOs upon request, on whose behalf the CMO manages rights, to 
the public, and regarding annual transparency reports. 
 
These are steps taken towards a more efficient, accurate and transparent environment of rights 
management. Considering the heavy focus of the Directive on transparency, it could result in 
CMOs being heavily regulated in this regard. The same cannot be said for IMEs, who are to a 
greater degree left out of the Directive. Therefore, it could prove beneficial in terms of 
transparency to have traditional CMOs that are owned by members continue to be strong 
players in the field. 
 
In terms of information, these are steps taken away from the idea of centrally controlled 
databases such as the GRD initiative. The requirements of the Directive do tackle the issues of 
correcting bad data, and they deal with the lack of will towards sharing information to this 





with the CMOs. In this way, we can see a clear foundation for correcting bad data, but what 
the Directive fails to consider is how the data is recorded into the databases in the first place, 
seen as there is no mention of measures aimed at preventing such errors from occurring. 
However, seen as the CMOs are responsible for maintaining the databases, this is necessarily 
something they will be forced to consider in order to effectively do so. This is also pointed out 
by Hofseth, who explains how a bad system of reporting and logging data makes for a lot of 
work correcting consequent errors. 
 
 
8.2.3 Multi-territorial licensing 
We are heading towards multi-territorial licensing, as Kindem says, whether we like it or not. 
A model where there was one society in each country managing rights for each other would 
perhaps have been simpler in some ways – but it is now being challenged.  
 
Recital 40 of the Directive states that the facilitation of multi-territorial licensing is important 
in order to provide for a more efficient licensing process. To this end, a set of rules is 
provided, prescribing basic conditions for the provision by CMOs of multi-territorial 
collective licensing. Recital 40 also states that a CMO is able to request another organisation 
to represent its repertoire on a multi-territorial basis, if the CMO cannot or does not wish to 
fulfil the multi-territorial licensing requirements for online rights itself.  
 
This will essentially allow online music service providers such as Spotify and Apple Music to 
request and be granted licenses much more efficiently than is possible with how the scheme is 
today. It fixes a lot of the problems described in chapter three on multi-territorial, cross border 
licensing, and it simplifies the licensing system in general. This is good, especially for users. 
An improvement of the system is also beneficial for CMOs, and therefore the rights holders, 
in particular because it makes it easier for rights holders to disseminate their music as widely 
as possible. Considering the focus of the Directive on fairness and non-discriminatory 
practices, it is hard to see an instance where rights holders are being denied the management 
of their repertoire, so the transition to a multi-territorial licensing system should have no 
negative effect on rights holders in this regard. 
 
What could be an issue down the line, is that multi-territorial licensing might weaken smaller 





are able to make licensing deals directly with the major record labels in order to manage the 
most lucrative catalogue across multiple territories, possibly spanning all of Europe. The 
consequence of this is that smaller national CMOs are left with the remaining less lucrative 
catalogue, affecting administration costs and their overall economy. 
 
 
8.2.4 Technology and progress 
Digitalisation has already taken the world by storm, and now it is in the process of conquering 
the realm of rights management. Kindem states that modern technology, which in the future 
will make it so that CMOs are able to monitor the use of music in a much more precise way, 
is challenging the Norwegian model of collective management with licensing deals for a 
collected catalogue, for Norwegian music and the repertoire managed through RRAs, where 
blanket licensing has been a widely used solution83. 
 
Hofseth argues that this future is already here, that TONO should start building good digital 
tools and develop solutions that enable them to do business more efficiently and scalable. He 
thinks in particular that the way the use of music is monitored and reported on today is 
lacklustre, as opposed to what is possible with current technology. Hofseth reveals that only 
30 percent of concerts are being reported on, which is such a low number that it should raise a 
few red flags as to the reason why this is not being prioritised. This means that either it is a 
more difficult problem to tackle than is being portrayed, or there is a lack of willingness to 
rectify the situation. According to Hofseth, developing the necessary tools for the job is not 
actually difficult, which leaves us with the latter option. It is difficult to gauge the complexity 
and amount of work that would lie behind such a solution, but TONO should try to find that 
solution. 
 
With what is possible with current technology, Hofseth believes that TONO could have done 
a better job at reflecting what is actually going on in the market, through more precise 
reporting, as is discussed above, and monitoring based on parameters such as actual listeners 
and viewers instead of potential and possible. This would lead to a more precise individual 
distribution and more money going directly to the correct rights holders. It would however 
also mean that there is less money in the system available to use for other schemes intended to 
                                               





benefit the rights holders; although, this might not be such a bad thing, considering that 
Hofseth provides examples of distribution policies, many of which are based on established 
customs and old board decisions that no longer function as intended. Couple that with the 
mixing of cultural policy and distribution, which lies at the centre of Hofseth’s argument, and 
you have a distribution that might not reflect the market in an adequately precise way. 
 
Another important topic presented in the interviews is the issue of administrational costs. 
Sommerstad recognises the potential for improvement in this regard and reiterates that this is 
always a top priority of Gramo. Grøndahl adds to this by introducing a specific solution that 
the CMOs might adopt to that end, namely through a more closely-knit cooperation between 
Gramo and TONO when it comes to the collection of other public performance. This is an 
option that the Norwegian CMOs should consider, one that would likely reduce 
administrational costs. At this point there are no specific plans to make this happen but going 
down this road could eventually also lead to a scenario where the different rights are licenced 
together, which would further simplify the licensing process for both the CMOs and the 
users84. It could also make it so that the Norwegian CMOs are a stronger and more unifying 





What the Norwegian CMOs have can almost be considered as natural monopolies, due to 
concessions given by the Ministry of Culture85. However, from what can be taken from the 
interviews, there is an expectation of a more competitive environment coming to Norway than 
there currently is, at least in the case of TONO. Kindem considers this to be a consequence of 
the strengthened position of Norwegian music, which is causing foreign societies to actively 
seek out Norwegian rights holders in the hopes of getting them on their roster. This is also 
facilitated by the Directive, specifically Article 5(2-8), which lays down the rights of rights 
holders. There is also the expectation that there will be more and more players who would 
like to establish themselves in Norway and are going to get concession to practice in Norway. 
                                               
84 This solution has already been adopted by several societies in other European countries, the most recent 
example being the joint venture to create one single company to administer the licensing of public performance 
by PPL and PRS for music in the UK (PRS for Music, 2018). 






Hofseth takes this a step further and provides a hypothetical where a big for-profit 
independent management entity, as defined in Article 3 and Recital 16 of the Directive, enters 
the market and represents the 10 biggest rights holders, as opposed to the 30 thousand that 
TONO represents. In this scenario, the IME is able to collect a lot of money with a very small 
management fee compared to that of TONO86. If this were to happen, it would weaken the 
bargaining position of TONO, and make it so that a decent amount of money would likely 
stop going through TONO, which would affect the overall economy of TONO and inevitably 
the rights holders. 
 
The above scenario would not however put TONO out of business. Someone must necessarily 
manage the rights on behalf of the remaining 30 thousand. But it would definitely create a 
great divide between the rights holders deemed financially “worth it” by the big IME and 
those deemed not, both in terms of service and distribution. This would accentuate the already 
top-heavy music industry and be a detriment to smaller and middle-class rights holders as 
well as cultural diversity in general87. It would also widen the gap between national and 
international repertoire, a consequence proposed by the KEA for European Affairs88 
 
One way to combat this could be by securing the collection of digital revenue on behalf of 
rights holders that have an internationally relevant catalogue. Hofseth believes that the best 
way of doing this is to be proactive and build services that cater towards collecting these types 
of incomes and holding on to those particular rights holders. He also argues that TONO needs 
to become a lot more hands-on when it comes to dealing with the rights holders, and that the 
work performed by the interest organisations should to a much greater degree fall under the 
job description of TONO. The competition for members has already become a challenge in a 
European context, and Hofseth argues that without a more personal relationship with TONO, 
the rights holders will have no quarrel with taking their business elsewhere. Considering the 
nature of traditional CMOs and the various criteria coming from national legislature such as 
laws on cultural diversity, e.g. the law on fees to the Norwegian Composers’ Fund89, and 
                                               
86 This is because of the obvious fact that managing 30 thousand rights holders demands more work than 
managing 10, as well as the fact that the IME could choose to not deduct 10 percent in cultural funds – because 
why would they - thus ending up with a commission much lower than TONO could ever hope to achieve. 
87 See: Hesmondhalgh (2013), p. 14. 
88 See: Arguments against competition, p. 25. 





European legislature, e.g. Article 5(2) on the rights of rights holders, it is hard to see how they 
will ever be able to compete with IMEs on price. Therefore, it might be that they will have to 
pursue other avenues of service, as illustrated by CISAC in chapter three under CMOs in the 
digital era, in order to secure lucrative rights holders. 
 
 
8.3 Interest organisations 
The results of the interview analysis clearly show that the work the various interest 
organisations perform is both relevant and important for rights holders and the Norwegian 
music environment in general. This is substantiated by the steady flow of rights holders 
interested in signing a membership with NOPA. It is in particular the cultural policy work of 
the interest organisations that stands out as a facilitator of cultural diversity and for 
safeguarding the interests of individual members. The competence found within the 
organisations can also be very helpful to rights holders in an environment prone to 
complexity, uncertainty and change. Finally, the interest organisations are able to give 
strength to the voice of the artists and creators in the public space, and thus amplify their 
influence over various aspects of the music scene, be they social, political, educational or 
otherwise. 
 
In the current system, the interest organisations seem to be doing good, and they are able to 
maintain their strong position within the Norwegian model. It is in particular the TONO-
model of distributing a percentage of the gross collected revenue as cultural funds that favours 
the interest organisations and provides them with a stable and predictable way of being 
financed. Several of the interviewees do however point out the challenges connected with 
taking funds off the top. The main issue with this is the fact that this is a part of the 
distribution that does not reach the individual distribution to the rights holders. Another issue 
is that this is an arrangement that has to be agreed upon through RRAs with other societies, 
which is a requirement of the Directive through Article 15(1). This is also an arrangement that 
is being regulated and scrutinised both through reciprocal agreements and in general from an 
international perspective. Kindem states that this can be adjusted down and argues that this is 
something that should be harmonised with other countries that TONO is cooperating with, 
and that it is unlikely that TONO will be able to continue in this regard like they have done 





So, with this in mind, the absolute biggest challenge facing the interest organisations moving 
forward is how they are to be financed. With the prospect of diminishing collective funds 
making its way to the organisations – also in part due to an ever-increasing precision of 
individual distribution in the CMOs – the financial foundation could be in danger of 
disappearing. This is especially true for the interest organisations that are currently financed 
through collective funds coming from Gramo, who would lose their funding completely in a 
scenario where Gramo manages to distribute all collected revenues individually. The 
requirements in the Directive concerning accuracy and efficiency also substantiates this. 
 
Grøndahl explains how this is one of the big question marks where the interest organisations 
are concerned, and also with regards to how the Directive might affect things once 
implemented. He mentions that the way Norwegian interest organisations and performers are 
rewarded primarily from the distribution of cultural funds might be construed as 
discriminatory in relation to the Directive. This however is unclear from the document 
analysis, and the resolution of this issue will most likely depend entirely on the interpretation 
and implementation of the Directive in Norway90. 
 
Another challenge is how to deal with the contrasting existence and purposes of the 
Norwegian CMOs and the interest organisations. The principal purpose of both TONO and 
Gramo is to redistribute as much of the money as possible to individual rights holders, which, 
if achieved, works against the existence of the interest organisations. Sommerstad describes 
this as a black and white reality that GramArt will just have to deal with when the time 
comes, and the purpose and aim of maximum individual distribution is also clearly stated in 
the statutes of GramArt. This seems more ambiguous where NOPA is concerned, with 
Kindem arguing that there can be divided opinions on the matters of individual versus 
collective distribution, seen as the cultural policy work and the services the interest 
organisations provide to their members is widely regarded to be important to rights holders 
overall. Either way, with an increased precision on the part of the CMOs’ distribution follows 
a decreased basis for funding for the interest organisations. 
 
 
                                               





There were several mentions in the interviews of a possible future model of financing through 
support from the national budget, or through Arts Council Norway. This is also something 
that the interest organisations are looking at, alongside other possible alternatives, but whether 
or not the state is willing to bail out these organisations is a matter for the future. As it stands, 
and as long as the existence of collective funds is deemed to be inevitable, using them to 
finance the interest organisations seems to be a good solution that benefits the rights holders 
and the Norwegian music scene as a whole. If, however, the interest organisations were to 
disappear from the Norwegian music environment, it would be a great loss for both rights 









This study sought to describe the effects, both direct and indirect, of the implementation of 
the Directive on the Norwegian music scene, as well as providing a description of the 
circumstances surrounding the field of rights management and general music milieu in 
Norway. The focus of the thesis was on Norway as a case and in particular the Norwegian 
organisational environment. Additionally, the thesis attempted to present some views on the 
future of rights management and music in Norway. The main findings of the study are 
presented below. 
 
Norway is a good place to be for rights holders, and Norwegian music performs very well 
internationally. Norway also has a diverse music environment and a pretty experimental 
music scene, facilitated by a well-functioning Norwegian model and cultural policy work. The 
Directive does not particularly deal with the matter of cultural diversity except to say that the 
CMOs have, and should continue to have, an important role to play in promoting the diversity 
of cultural expression. In Norway however, the cultural policy work is mainly performed by 
the interest organisations. 
 
The Norwegian CMOs are internationally on a high level. The economy of TONO is good, 
and a growing one at that, which is also aided by an increased income from abroad. TONO 
has also experienced an influx of new members, which goes to show that there are a lot of 
young people wanting to live off their music. 
 
When it comes to the way the Norwegian CMOs are governed, they are more or less in 
compliance with the demands of the Directive, and it won't have any notable consequences 
for the way they operate, apart from a handful of practical changes that will have to be made. 
The biggest reforms introduced by the Directive have already been implemented by them. 
Keeping in mind the fact that TONO and Gramo are of the most modern CMOs in the world, 
and that they are already in line with new EU regulation, the Directive would have had to 
introduce much more radical changes than it does in order to truly address the challenges 






Regardless, there are challenges relating to governance structures. In TONO, one of these is 
the representative model of governance which could be a hindrance to the digital development 
of the CMO, due to the agendas of those who are elected to sit on the board of directors. 
 
The Norwegian systems for rights management and the Norwegian CMOs are fairly 
transparent, and they should have little to no trouble abiding by the regulations of the 
Directive. Transparency in the Directive primarily deals with the precise, efficient and 
transparent sharing of information and reporting, which is introduced as a prerequisite for 
multi-territorial licensing. This is also yet another attempt to solve the problems with 
databases. It does directly deal with the problem of correcting bad data found inside 
databases, but it does not tackle the underlying problem of the creation of bad data. This is 
something the CMOs and the industry will have to figure out on their own. 
 
We are heading towards multi-territorial licensing, and the Directive is doing its very best to 
facilitate this. The proposed system should simplify the licensing process considerably. This 
seems to be a good development, especially for users and rights holders controlling lucrative 
catalogues, but less so for smaller rights holders. Multi-territorial licensing might also end up 
weakening smaller national CMOs and conversely strengthen the bigger CMOs as well as big 
commercial IMEs, and in the process widen the gap between the most lucrative rights holders 
and the rest, as well as between national and international Anglo-American repertoire. Taking 
it one step further, one can imagine a possible future where multi-territorial licensing causes 
smaller national CMOs to disappear, to be replaced by bigger pan-European licensing hubs. 
 
The Norwegian model is challenged by technology, specifically the part of it that promotes 
accuracy and precision. A lot of what is argued in the interviews boils down to technology 
and the development of digital tools, and the interview analysis suggests that with what is 
possible with current technology, the monitoring and reporting of the use of music is 
lacklustre. The reason for why this is the case is likely to be a lack of will in TONO towards 
developing the necessary digital tools to this end. It is also possible that there is a desire 
within TONO for the monitoring, reporting and distribution to remain inaccurate, seen as it 
provides TONO with more freedom to prioritise other models and principles of distribution 
over maximum individual distribution. The results from the interviews also illustrate that 
there can be divided opinions on the subject of collective funds, since both individual and 






When it comes to the issue of administrational costs, a closer cooperation between TONO and 
Gramo would likely reduce these. It might also lead to a stronger and more unified Norwegian 
field of rights management, and it could be the start of a possible future where the different 
rights are licensed collectively. 
 
Competition has already become a challenge in a European context. From the interviews, 
there is an expectation of more competition coming to Norway. The biggest threat in this 
regard is that big commercial IMEs might start challenging TONO on certain areas, and they 
will most likely be able to beat the traditional CMOs on price, which would draw in 
commercially successful rights holders. This scenario heavily benefits said rights holders, and 
is to the detriment of smaller ones, which would potentially lead to a very noticeable class 
divide. One way for TONO to combat this could be to implement measures tailored to retain 
successful Norwegian rights holders on their roster, and that they also begin performing some 
of the functions that the interest organisations are currently doing in order to better service 
their members. 
 
The work that the Norwegian interest organisations do is both relevant and important for 
Norwegian rights holders and cultural diversity in Norway. The organisations are doing good 
in the Norwegian model, and it is especially the TONO-model that makes it so that they are 
able to operate the way they do. The absolute biggest challenge for the interest organisations 
is how they are to be financed in the future. There is a prospect of diminishing collective 
funds making its way to the organisations, and the financial foundation could be in danger of 
disappearing. This is especially true for the interest organisations affiliated with Gramo. One 
alternative solution to this is that they get financed through the state budget or Arts Council 
Norway instead of through the CMOs. Another, specific to the Gramo-organisations, is that 
they transition into a TONO-type model, which seems to be the most stable and predictable 
from the perspective of the interest organisations. What seems clear is that it would be a great 
loss to the rights holders, cultural diversity and the music environment in general if the 
interest organisations were forced to cease operations, unless the CMOs are willing and able 
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Interview 1: Ingrid Kindem 
 
KINDEM: -nå, så dere er jo også litt tidlig ute, i forhold til å få noen klare svar da. Men jeg 
skal svare så godt jeg kan, og prøve så godt jeg kan med å serve dere med informasjon 
iallefall. Kanskje vi må ta det i flere omganger, jeg vet ikke når dere har frist for levering av 
oppgaven? 
 
MATS: Det er i slutten av Mai. 
 
KINDEM: Åja! Men da kan det hende at det er kommet mer på plass. Dette her som dere 
berører, det går jo også litt inn i behandlingen av åndsverkloven, og det siste jeg vet om den er 
at den skal behandles i stortinget 15 mai. Den er utsatt den behandlingen fra 24. April til 5. 
Mai. Og så får man se om CRM-direktivet griper inn i loven, og så foreløpig ikke, men det 
vet jo kulturdepartementet mer om. Vi får jo ikke ut all informasjonen fra de, i forhold til 
status i disse sakene nå. Men vi henger på de da. Men, er dere to som skriver oppgaven, er det 
slik? 
 
ESPEN: Ja, eg og sitte her, Espen heite eg. 
 
KINDEM: Ja, hei Espen! Nei, det er jo et veldig spennende tema, jeg synes det er så bra at 
noen tar tak i det også. Så det blir spennende å se hva dere ender opp med, og i og med at jeg 
er et av intervjuobjektene nå, så vil jeg gjerne ha sitatsjekk på det, fordi det er et komplekst 
tema. Jeg vil nødig komme med feilinformasjon da, for det kan jo hende dere spør meg om 
noe som jeg kanskje måtte dobbeltsjekke eller, ja, for at det ikke bare skal bli synsing, men at 
det skal ha rot i fakta. 
 
MATS: Ja, men da går heilt fint, det ordna vi. 
 






MATS: Ja, me har jo sendt over slik i forhold til intervjuformat og tema og sånn så eg veit 
ikkje, ska me gå gjennom da ein gong til eller? Såg alt greit ut? 
 
 
KINDEM: Du, jeg fikk sett litt på det - ikke så veldig mye, for det er veldig travle dager for 
meg - men nå tok jeg opp den mailen deres, så da har jeg de punktene foran meg; og så har 
jeg skrevet noen stikkord på noen av de. Så vi kan jo i grunnen holde oss til det dere sendte på 
mail. Jeg synes den disposisjonen så veldig fin ut jeg, med fire overordnede temaer. Det var 
en fin oppbygging i det, tenker jeg - nå vet ikke jeg hvor mye dere vet om dette temaet på 
forhånd? 
 
MATS: Nei altså, vi har jo satt oss litt inn i det, men vi er ingen ekspertar på området, det er 
vi ikkje ... Så, vi kan jo berre gå i gang med første spørsmål; om du kan sei litt om korleis du 
tenke situasjonen er for norske rettigheitshavara i dag? 
 
KINDEM: ja … vi har jo forvaltningsorganisasjoner som TONO og GRAMO, òg som for så 
vidt er ganske, hva skal vi si, gamle selskap. TONO er jo 90 år gammelt nå i 2019. Det betyr 
at vi har bygget det selskapet gjennom lang tid. Det er jo et non-profit-selskap, det vil si, det 
er ikke et kommersielt selskap, men det eies av medlemmene og styres av medlemmene, som 
er komponister og tekstforfattere til musikkverk. Når vi sier tekstforfattere til musikkverk så 
er de jo ikke romanforfattere, det skal være tekst knyttet til musikkverk. Og så er det 
musikkforlaget i tillegg. Det vil si, slik åndsverkloven omtaler rettighetshaverne i TONO, er 
jo de opphavere nå - det som er opphavsmann er blitt opphavere, og musikkforlag. Det er det, 
det er vi som eier TONO. 
 
TONO skal jo forvalte rettighetene da … både for rettighetshavere som har medlemskap i 
TONO, det vil si er individuelt tilknyttet TONO gjennom å signere en kontrakt, en 
forvaltningskontrakt, og så forvalter også TONO musikken til rettighetshavere, som er 
tilknyttet tilsvarende selskap faktisk over hele verden … og da har jo TONO avtaler med 
disse selskapene i hvert enkelt land. Det betyr at vi har bygget opp og forvalter en veldig stor 
katalog med musikk. Det betyr at det blir enkelt å forholde seg til TONO fordi du har 







Så dét er jo veldig bra med TONO da, og det at det er et non-profit-selskap betyr jo det at det 
vi får inn skal i størst mulig grad ut igjen til rettighetshaverne. Det er ikke aksjeeiere inni dette 
selskapet som skal tjene penger på denne modellen. Det skal gå tilbake igjen til de som skaper 
musikken.  
 
Ja, og de innkasserer jo vederlag fra kringkasting eller annen offentlig fremføring av musikk 
… og så legger vi jo til rette for bruk av musikk i samfunnet, slik at vi tar jo en andel av den 
inntekten vi har, til å sørge for at vi har et grunnlag til å skape nye musikkverk. Vi må jo 
tenke på denne næringskjeden da, og sørge for at repertoaret hele tiden blir oppdatert … det er 
jo viktig. 
 
ESPEN: Eg lure litt på om du kan utdjupe litt om situasjonen for rettigheitshavarar spesielt, 
om det har forbedra seg i løpet av dei siste åra, eller om det har forverra seg, eller om du trur 
den kjem til å bli beire? 
 
KINDEM: Ja, vi er jo inne i en litt spennende tid for norsk musikk, for i løpet av de siste tre 
fire årene så ser vi at norsk musikk gjør det også veldig bra internasjonalt; og det påvirker jo 
tallene i TONO. Helt klart, så vi ser at inntektene fra avregning i utlandet, den øker. Dette er 
jo en veldig spennende situasjon, men så ser vi samtidig at tilstrømningen av medlemmer til 
TONO øker også, i veldig veldig stor grad, så det virker som om veldig mange unge 
mennesker ønsker å leve av sin musikk. De ønsker forvaltningskontrakt med TONO, og det er 
klart at da skal jo også det beløpet som kommer inn til TONO fordeles på flere. Men at 
posisjonen til norsk musikk nå er styrket gjennom de siste få årene, det er tydelig, og det gjør 
jo også sitt til at andre selskap er nysgjerrige på Norge. Hva skjer her, og hvordan kan de ha et 
såpass stort og levende og mangfoldig musikkmiljø? Det betyr også at utenlandske selskap 
oppsøker norske rettighetshavere i håp om å få de inn i sin stall. Det er jo en ny, ganske ny 
situasjon.  
 
Så, det er vanskelig å si noe generelt om rettighetshaverne, det er jo klart at de 
rettighetshaverne som har musikk i bruk hele tiden gjør det veldig veldig veldig bra, og de 
som før kanskje hadde mesteparten av sine inntekter gjennom salg av plater, de taper jo da. 
Det fysiske plateselskapet har jo selvfølgelig påvirket veldig mange av de norske 





selger litt vinyl, men markedet her for fysiske produkter er jo nesten på et nullnivå … mens i 
England og Tyskland og Frankrike og så videre, så har de faktisk et fysisk salg enda.  
 
Så vi møtte jo den digitale utviklingen først, og dét er nok ganske spesielt for særlig de 
skandinaviske rettighetshaverne. 
 
MATS: Mm. Eg tenkte me skulle spørja litt om situasjonen for interesseorganisasjonar slik 
som NOPA og, ja, komponistforbundet … det er jo kanskje en del av den samme utviklingen, 
men om du har noko å sei om det? 
 
KINDEM: Ja, jeg kan jo først og fremst svare for NOPA. Det vi ser er at det er en veldig 
interesse fra rettighetshaverne i å melde seg inn i NOPA. Man ser jo det at tilstrømmingen er 
jevn, og den baserer seg faktisk i særlig grad på de som er andelshavere i TONO. Det syns vi 
er veldig bra da, at de som tjener penger inn til TONO oppsøker gruppeforeningene. Dette 
betyr at vi også er relevante for rettighetshavere i dag. Jeg tror rettighetshavere har behov for 
å ikke stå helt alene, og derfor søker seg til en organisasjon som NOPA, for der vet vi at det er 
en del kompetanse, og vi har jo styreplasser også i TONO sant, og da kan vi ha litt kontroll 
med pengestrømmen. Så det er en gledelig utvikling for oss.  
 
Så vi synes selv at det ikke er mange tegn på at vår posisjon er svekket - men jeg tror også det 
handler mye om at det er en spesiell situasjon nå i forhold til åndsverkloven. Den forrige 
loven kom jo i 1961. Vi skulle få en ny lov i fjor. Den behandlingen ble utsatt, rett og slett 
fordi rettighetshaverne gjorde opprør mot det utkastet som forelå til behandling i stortinget, og 
i den fasen så tror jeg også at rettighetshavere har sett at gruppeforeningene arbeider veldig 
godt politisk. De prøver å sikre en god kulturpolitikk i Norge, så jeg tror kanskje at 
oppmerksomheten vi får og tilstrømningen av medlemmer har også forankring i det.  
 
Og kunstmusikken, det må nesten styreleder i NKF svare på, Jørgen Kalstrøm, men jeg regner 
med at dere kanskje intervjuer han også? 
 
ESPEN: Det kan fort hende vi kjem til å gjer. 
 
MATS: Ja. Skal vi sjå, vi har jo vært litt inne på det men, ka tenke du om det som vi har kalt 





vederlagsbyråa på toppen, og så har ein interesseorganisasjonar og ein har kulturstøtte, 
kulturelle midlar og forskjellig, som ein del av det? Du har jo vært litt inne på det men, har du 
nokre tankar omkring den modellen som vi har i Norge? 
 
KINDEM: Ja, jeg må jo si at Norge har et mangfoldig musikkmiljø og en ganske 
eksperimentell musikkscene til å være et såpass lite land. Så den kombinasjonen av kollektiv 
forvaltning og gruppeforeninger som i hovedsak utfører det kulturpolitiske arbeidet, og en 
forhåpentligvis god kulturpolitikk, gjør at vi har et ganske godt og sterkt musikkmiljø i Norge. 
Men det er klart at den kollektive forvaltningen er utfordret gjennom et globalt digitalt 
marked.  
 
Vi kommer jo tilbake til dette med konkurransen da, både nasjonalt og internasjonalt, så vi 
kan jo si mer om det der, men vi ser jo nå at den kollektive forvaltningen blir utfordret, og i 
og med at TONO setter av en andel gjennom sine vedtekter til gruppeforeningene, så er jo 
dette noe som er under lupen, både gjennom gjensidighetsavtaler med andre selskap, men 
også sånn generelt i et internasjonalt perspektiv.  
 
Det er jo lisensiering over landegrensene ikke sant, multi-territorial lisensiering, som vi går 
mot, enten vi ønsker det eller ikke. Vi kunne jo ønske oss at det var étt selskap i hvert land, 
heh, så kunne vi forvaltet rettigheter for hverandre og utvekslet det - det er klart at det hadde 
vært en enkel modell, men den utfordres nå. Og det beste vi kan gjøre er å prøve å finne gode 
forretningsmodeller og ha selskaper som tåler innsyn, og som er styrt så godt som overhodet 
mulig.  
 
ESPEN: Ja … du snakka litt om masse forskjellige ting her egentlig. Du snakka litt om 




ESPEN: Då har vi jo … TONO for eksempel har masse reglar og rettningslinjer for korleis 
disse midlane skal fordelast. Ka tenke du om den modellen? Har du noke du vil påpeike som 






KINDEM: Ja, altså … distribusjon av midlene våre er jo forankret i vedtektene, det kan jo 
dere også finne på TONOs websider, og jeg vil si at vi prøver å være så åpne som mulig i 
forhold til hvordan vi distribuerer midlene våre. Men, konkurransesituasjonen også gjør jo nå 
sitt til at alle selskapene vil være best, ikke sant, så kanskje noe må beholdes som en slags 
forretningshemmelighet også.  
 
Så det er jo egentlig en ny situasjon, men slik det er i dag så står jo vedtektene på våre 
websider, så alle kan se hvordan vi fordeler midlene der. Den store fordelingsplanen skal jo 
vedtas på årsmøtet, og den kan bare endres gjennom vedtektsendring. Det betyr at vi for hvert 
år må se på vedtektene i TONO, for å se om vi bør gjøre justeringer for å stå sterkere som 
selskap, og i forhold til behovet til medlemmene våre. Og nå vil jo også CRM-direktivet 
kanskje utfordre våre vedtekter, slik at vi må justere de, etter krav som kommer gjennom et 
direktiv.  
 
Men vi har jo distribusjonsmodeller som sier noe om kulturelle midler, som da brukes til å 
finansiere organisasjonene, og det står jo i paragraf 58. Der står det spesifikt hvor mye som 
går til organisasjonene, og det er jo, jeg vil si, alltid under lupen. Er det en rettferdig 
fordeling, er det rettferdig i forhold til antall medlemmer i foreningene … det diskuterer vi 
fortløpende.  
 
Mens distribusjonen, du kan si, det som går til gruppeforeningene, er jo også forankret i 
gjennsidighetsavtalene vi har med selskaper fra andre land. De vet også det at opptil 1/10 av 
avregningen skal gå til stipender, eller det som vi kaller kulturelle midler.  
 
Men vi kan justere det ned, og dette bør jo harmoniseres også med andre land, og hvertfall 
land vi samarbeider med, og det regulerer vi også gjennom gjensidighetsavtaler. Men at vi 
kan fortsette slik vi har gjort i 90 år, så enkelt som det er det ikke. Men, det betyr at det er 
krevende for oss, men vi prøver egentlig å følge dette veldig tett fra måned til måned vil jeg 
si.  
 
Og vi samarbeider jo også godt med de nordiske landene; vi har jo både nordisk nettverk og 
europeiske nettverk og verdensomspennende nettverk, og det er klart at vi utveksler 
kompetanse også om de forskjellige modellene oss imellom, slik at vi egentlig ligger litt foran 





syns vi er veldig godt i rute, og jeg vil påstå at TONO er et av de mest moderne drevne 
selskapene i verden, i forhold til rettighetshavere.  
 
MATS: mm. Men, vi tenkte litt på, for du var jo inne på det i stad at veldig mange av dei som 
er andelshavarar i TONO, søker seg óg til gruppeforeningar- 
 
KINDEM: -Ja, i hvertfall NOPA. Fordi, det ligger i kriteriene for å bli medlem i NOPA, at du 
må vise til inntjening, mens komponistforeningen har en annen måte å ta opp medlemmer på. 
De utviser mer skjønn i forhold til hva slags type musikk du lager. Mens i NOPA, så er det 
slik at du må vise til inntjening i TONO, og da er det regler i forhold til det, som er linket til 
dette vi kaller G, eller statens grunnbeløp. Dette er også omtalt i NOPAs vedtekter. Du må 
vise til inntjening der, enten du er tekstforfatter eller komponist, og da baserer vi opptaket i 
NOPA på det. Mens nå ser vi også det at veldig mange av de som søker medlemskap er 
andelshavere i TONO, det vil si at de har stemmerett i TONO og har høyere inntjening enn 
det vi egentlig forlanger for å bli medlem av NOPA.  
 
MATS: Ja, men kan det tenkast at det kan finnast ei interessekonflikt, altså med tanke på 
setting av retningslinger og forvaltning av midlar i TONO, når så mange er medlemmar i 
NOPA samtidig som dei er andelshavarar i TONO? 
 
KINDEM: Ja, tenker du da at det går for mye til gruppeforeningene av inntektene til TONO, 
er det det du tenker på?  
 
ESPEN: Ja, egentlig, at det er styret som bestemmer kor pengane skal gå, ikkje sant? Og då er 
det sjølvsagt vanskelig- 
 
KINDEM: -ja, i NOPA så, viss vi ser på NOPA så har vi jo delt det inn i to potter. Det ene er 
til prosjekter ikke sant, det kan være songwriting camps og så videre, som veldig mange kan 
ta del i, og mesteparten av det vi får fra TONO bruker vi jo på musikkpolitisk arbeide. Og så 
har vi også noen stipendordninger i NOPA, som foreløpig er forbeholdt medlemmer. Det er 
en ordning som vi har under lupen. Men vi er også opptatt av at det må være ordninger som 






Men, jeg forstår spørsmålet, og … jeg tenker slik situasjonen er nå, med en åndsverklov som 
skal på plass, og implementering av et CRM-direktiv, så trenger man det nettverket og den 
kompetansen som ligger i gruppeforeningene. Det er veldig tydelig akkurat disse årene her. 
Men viss man har som interesse at det skal komme mest mulig penger inn til TONO og 
fordeles mest mulig ut til rettighetshaverne, uten å ta hensyn til kulturpolitikk, så ser jeg jo det 
at det kan kanskje være delte meninger om hva som er riktig å gjøre da.  
 
Jeg tror jo den kombinasjonen med en god kulturpolitikk gjør at det kan være et fint samspill, 
kanskje særlig i Norge, fordi Norge er et lite land. Vi har bare fem millioner innbyggere. Så at 
vi har foreninger som sikrer det kulturpolitiske arbeide, eller det musikkpolitiske arbeide, tror 
jeg er bra. Men, så kan man jo si, det kan jeg mene som er styreleder in NOPA òg styreleder i 
TONO … jeg forstår jo det. Vi som er tillitsvalgte i NOPA får jo indirekte vårt honorar 
gjennom TONO, så det er forståelig at spørsmålet stilles.  
 
MATS: Ja … eg lure på om vi skal gå vidare til å snakke litt om- 
 
KINDEM: -jeg kan komme med et innspill til også! Man kan jo også tenke seg en modell der 
gruppeforeningene kan kanskje motta støtte over statsbudsjettet, eller gjennom Norsk 
Kulturråd for eksempel. Det er jo noe vi bør se på. Og ellers kan vi se på dette med 
medlemskontigent, det bidrar jo også inn til NOPAs økonomi da. Så du kan si sånn helt 
generelt, så dekker jo medlemskontigenten det som går ut igjen til stipender til NOPAs 
medlemmer. Så vi prøver egentlig å se litt nøye på hvordan vi bruker pengene, og at vi hele 
tiden kan forsvare det vi gjør. Våre regnskaper ligger jo åpent også, slik at alle, det vil si 
hvem som helst, kan gå inn og etterse hva vi bruker midlene til.  
 
ESPEN: Ja … eg lure på, den alternative modellen som du snakka om no, er det noke du kom 
på no, som di eiga meining, eller er det noko dokke snakka om ellers, innad? 
 
KINDEM: Dette er noe vi snakker om i styret i NOPA, for å se på mulige inntektskilder, og 
det er jo rett og slett fordi det er helt vanlig i enten alle selskap eller foreninger, hvor man må 
se litt på status, og man må se litt på framtiden, og se på de muligheter som ligger der. Men vi 
har ikke besluttet noe der, men at vi analyserer mulighetene, det gjør vi. Og vi prøver også å 
søke støtte til de prosjektene vi gjør, for rett å slett å utnytte de mulighetene som ligger, ikke 





retter seg mot filmkomponister for eksempel, det har vi fått delfinansiert gjennom blant annet 
nordisk kulturfond. Så, det er jo viktig å si i denne sammenheng.  
 
MATS: Eg lure på om vi skal gå litt vidare til å snakke om konkurranse. Som vi har vore inne 
på, så er det på en måte ingen reell konkurranse nasjonalt mellom vederlagsbyrå i Norge, så 
ka tenker du- 
 
KINDEM: -Ja, vi ser jo egentlig noe konkurranse, men det er jo nesten å betrakte som et 
monopol det TONO har. Men vi har jo selskap som for eksempel epidemic sound, som prøver 
å etablere seg i Norge, og vi må bare forvente at det er andre selskaper som har lyst å etablere 
seg i Norge, og kommer til å få konsesjon til å drive i Norge. Så det beste vi kan gjøre er å 
prøve å være best i klassen. Rett og slett. Men vi synes jo også det at det er et non-profitt-
selskap er noe som taler til vår fordel, framfor at det er aksjeeiere som skal fordele et utbytte, 
og ta ut utbytte med gjevne mellomrom.  
 
ESPEN: Så, den naturlige fordelen som TONO har, den tenker du er liksom litt rettferdiggjort 
da, på grunn av at det er et non-profitt? 
 
KINDEM: Ja, jeg tenker det, og det drives jo også av rettighetshaverne. Når vi ser på 
styresammensetningen, så er jo det i tråd med det som kommer i CRM-direktivet. Vi har hatt 
generalforsamling i mange år, og vi har en styresammensetning som er balansert, vil jeg 
påstå. Det er jo ikke bare folk som kommer fra gruppeforeningene som sitter i styret lenger 
heller, vi har jo ansatte-representanter, og vi har folk som sitter på fri plass. Så det er bare å 
møte opp på TONOs generalforsamling, og dersom du er andelshaver, kan du påvirke 
hvordan styret er sammensatt. Det mener jeg er bra. 
 
Og dessuten har vi jo en stor katalog, som jeg nevnte tidligere, som er bygget oppigjennom 90 
år. Så, det å ha en stor katalog, gjør jo det at man kan gå ét sted for å lisensiere mesteparten av 
repertoaret. Så det å holde katalogen samlet, det er jo noe vi ønsker oss. Det er ikke sikkert vi 
får til det … men vi ønsker oss det.  
 
ESPEN: Då har vi jo snakka litt om nasjonal konkurranse da … men når det kjem til 






KINDEM: Ja … et globalt digitalt marked utfordrer jo konkurransesituasjonen, i veldig sterk 
grad. Man trenger jo ikke å være fysisk til stede i et land for å inngå lisensavtaler for musikk 
distribuert på nett, det vil si inngå lisensavtaler med aktører som Spotify, Tidal, iTunes, 
YouTube, evt. Facebook osv. Så det utfordrer oss, selvfølgelig. Og moderne teknologi, som 
gjør at vi i framtiden kan monitorere bruken av musikk mye mer presist, utfordrer jo også den 
norske modellen da, hvor vi har kollektiv forvaltning med lisensavtaler for en samlet katalog, 
ikke sant, for norsk musikk og det repertoaret som vi forvalter gjennom gjennsidighetsavtaler. 
Så det er klart når monitoreringen i framtiden kan gjøres mer presist, at du kan måle direkte 
hva som er brukt, så utfordrer jo det disse kollektive avtalene. Vi ser jo det. Men viss vi drives 
godt, og gir tilbake til rettighetshaverne så mye som mulig av det vi får inn, så kan jo det være 
et alternativ til andre mer kommersielle modeller. 
 
ESPEN: Ja … så du tenker at det går ann å utfordre på presisheit og … har du nokre andre 
stikkord enn det?  
 
KINDEM: Ja, presis avregning, innsyn - det vil si transparens, at vi redegjør for midlene og er 
veldig åpne om det. Det gjelder jo også det vi gir til gruppeforeningene. Jeg tror det er veldig 
viktig å være åpne om det, å kunne redegjøre for det. Og viss vi kan sikre en bærekraftig 
forretningsmodell, og ha et arbeide hele tiden som gjør at forretningsmodellen er bærekraftig, 
så kan vi forsvare det vi gjør. Og det er jo veldig viktig da. Og så må vi jo tenke oss å være - 
er det viktig å ha et mangfoldig musikkmiljø? Vi mener jo det. Hvis det er viktig at vi har et 
mangfoldig musikkmiljø, at vi har et … ja,  at mange stemmer blir hørt, ikke bare de som til 
enhver tid ligger øverst på hitlistene.  
 
Og vi ser jo det, hvis man ser på et felt som musikk rettet mot barn og unge, for eksempel, så 
ser vi det at det kan ta lang tid å etablere det. Det er musikk som må vokse gjennom tid, og 
kanskje er du avhengig av TV-serier eller tegnefilmer for at det skal nå ut til publikummet, 
ikke sant. Og filmmusikken óg, tar det jo tid både å produsere, og - til at man ser om det 
selges til mange andre land. Men det, når jeg nevner musikk rettet mot barn og unge, så ser vi 
jo eksempler på at vi har Egner, vi har Prøysen, vi må ha mye Egner og Prøysener, vi har 
Kaptein Sabeltann, vi har TV-serier som Elias for eksempel, vi har Jul i Blåfjell. Flere av 
disse TV-seriene òg gjør det jo veldig bra internasjonalt. Jeg mener Elias har solgt i over 120 
land. Det er klart at det er, det har også solgt i det Kinesiske markedet nå. Og derfor så tenker 






Når vi ser også på TV-serier, så er det et betydelig antall norske TV-serier nå som er solgt til 
andre land, det gjelder både Frikjent, det gjelder Nobel for eksempel … og der er det jo veldig 
mye norsk musikk. Skam er jo også en TV-serie nå som vekker betydelig interesse. Det er 
allerede solgt til Facebook, og det blir spennende å se om musikken følger TV-serien. 
Manuset i Skam er jo bygget rundt musikken, og sangtekstene. Så det er en veldig spennende 
utvikling, og derfor så tenker vi at det er også viktig å tenke i lange linjer i hvordan vi 
forvalter rettigheter. 
 
MATS: Har du nokre meir tankar omkring det naturlige monopolet for norske CMOar, som 
TONO? For eksempel sett i forhold til den amerikanske modellen, der det er konkurranse og 
fleire vederlagsbyrå som forvaltar rettar? 
 
KINDEM: Ja … den europeiske lovgivningen er jo annerledes enn den amerikanske. Vi har jo 
også dette med de moralske rettighetene, eller de ideelle rettighetene, som står veldig sterkt. 
Retten til å bli navngitt, den er viktig. Om du ønsker å overlate de økonomiske rettighetene til 
forlag eller andre, det er jo forsåvidt helt greit - men de ideelle rettighetene er jo noe som er 
spesielt for europeisk lovgivning. 
 
Så, det er jo også mange amerikanske låtskrivere som gjerne skulle hatt en modell som vi har 
i europa. Jeg tror med tanke på det markedet vi har i Norge, så er den norske modellen god. 
For oss. Og med innsyn og transparens i modellene, så er det godt også for de norske 
rettighetshaverne som opererer i et internasjonalt marked. Så det er viktig for oss å 
samarbeide med selskap som også driver på en god måte. 
 
ESPEN: Ja, eg trur det egentlig er greit på det temaet der. Då har vi et tema til, og det er rett 
og slett CRM-direktivet. Det er jo veldig mykje som skjer, og vi er ikkje komt så veldig langt, 
men ka tenke du egentlig om implementeringa av ditte direktivet i Norge? 
 
KINDEM: Jeg tror at vi allerede, gjennom måten TONO er drevet på, har implementert det 
meste av det som ligger i det direktivet.  
 
Nå er jo status for det at EØS-kommiteen har besluttet å innlemme direktivet. Det ble jo gjort 





proposisjon, der stortinget blir bedt om å ta stilling til spørsmålet. Status for dette nå er at 
kulturdepartementet skal utarbeide et føringsnotat som skal på høring da, ikke sant, med 
forslag til gjennomføring av direktiv i norsk rett. Direktivet skal jo også implementeres - det 
er kulturdepartementet som har hovedansvaret for dette da, slik er det i Norge. Vi har også 
dette regelrådet på Hønefoss, som generelt ser på implementering av EU-direktiv til norsk 
rett, slik at det skal bli en god og forenklet implementering. De må vel også se på dette. 
 
Og jeg tenker, når vi ser det som kommer på høring fra kulturdepartementet, så vil vi justere 
det vi trenger i TONO slik at det kan implementeres på en god måte. Det at vi har 
generalforsamling i TONO, og har hatt det i veldig mange år, og er åpne i forhold til bruk av 
midler, gjør at vi langt på vei har implementert direktivet - og så får vi se på dette med 
elektroniske fullmakter og så videre, men vi har et veldig godt samarbeid med de andre 
nordiske landene, vi følger tett implementeringen i de landene. De er jo medlem av EU - vi er 
jo et EØS-land, som gjør at vi har mer tid på oss i forhold til implementeringen. 
 
ESPEN: Tenker du at, med tanke på at dei andre nordiske landa ligger et hakk foran oss- 
 
KINDEM: -nei, det tenker jeg ikke. Vi er jo det norske selskapet som har hatt 
generalforsamling i mange år. Vi har jo ansatte-representanter i styret, og det er en balanse 
mellom frie seter og gruppeforeningene og så videre, så … jeg tror vi langt på vei driver slik 
hensikten med direktivet var ment.  
 
Altså, det direktivet skal gjøre da, er å harmonisere regler om bedre forvaltning, det man 
kaller good governance. Og så er det dette med økt åpenhet og innsyn, det man kaller i 
direktivet for transparency, i forvaltningsorganisasjonene. Og så er det også strenge krav til 
rettighetsorganisasjonenes rapportering og åpenhet om forvaltning. Så, det er jo 
kontrollrutiner, at det skal være på plass også, og at forvaltningen skal bli mest mulig effektiv. 
Ikke sant, og så er det jo en ting til òg da: direktivet skal legge til rette for å forenkle dette 
multi-territoriell lisensiering av musikkverk.  
 







KINDEM: Ja, slik vi leser direktivet per i dag, så er vi det. Men det gjenstår å se hva 
kulturdepartementet legger ut til høring. Så det er vanskelig for oss å si noe om dette, det blir 
egentlig gjetning. Så jeg tror heller vi får komme tilbake til det. Men det er jo delt opp i fem 
hovedavsnitt da, så det går jo ann å lese om det. Vi følger jo jevnt dette, det ligger jo 
dokumenter om dette på regjeringen.no, slik at man kan følge behandlingen av direktivet. Så 
vi følger med der, og vi følger også med det som skjer i EU. Vi har hatt møte med de norske 
delegatene der nede, som også følger med i det som skjer der.  
 
ESPEN: Det høres veldig ut som du meina at ditte kjem ikkje til å bli noke problem i alle fall. 
Og det er jo bra. 
 
KINDEM: Neeei, vi ser ikke det foreløpig. Vi er godt i rute, og de justeringene vi eventuelt 
måtte gjøre, de er vi helt rede til å gjøre. Så, når vi kan forvente direktivet, det spørs vel om 
det kommer noe om det før sommeren. Så vi bare venter. Venter og ser. 
 
Men vi har jo dialog med kulturdepatementet om dette. Og så er det jo det at det til slutt også 
skal ha stortingets samtykke - og når vi ser hvor hardt de jobber med åndsverkloven nå, så blir 
det neste CRM-direktivet. Det jobbes jo også på nordisk nivå, politisk, ikke sant. Så, det er 
vel egentlig det jeg kan si om dette per idag da. 
 
MATS: Ja, eg lurte litt på om du trur direktivet kjem til å ha noko å sei for gruppeforeningane, 
på den måten systemet er i Norge i dag? 
 
KINDEM: Neei, det er jo flere som har sagt det at direktivet omhandler gruppeforeningene. 
Slik vi fordeler midler i TONO, så er jo det forankret i gjensidighetsavtaler. Og viss 
gruppeforeningene blir berørt gjennom direktivet på noe vis, når vi får den høringen, så må vi 
bare justere det da. Det er jo ikke vanskeligere enn det - og samtidig er det, slik jeg nevnte i 
sted, at vi ser også på andre modeller for drift av gruppeforeningene. Det kan være måten vi 
tar inn medlemskontigent på, eller det kan være driftstøtte også. Så der er det kanskje at noe 
fades ut, og andre fades inn igjen. Men vi har det på agendaen hele tiden. 
 
ESPEN: Ja … eg er egentlig fornøgd eg, ka du tenker? 
 






KINDEM: Ja, jeg kan jo tillegge, i forhold til gruppeforeningene da, så ser vi jo det at NOPA 
for eksempel har jo et veldig stort tillitsvalgtapparat. Det er jo over 80 tillitsvalgte som er 
fordelt på over 160 verv i norsk musikkliv, og det er klart at det er veldig omfattende - og det 
er jo også noe vi kan se på. Det går jo også midler til disse tillitsvalgte, det er klart at 
tillitsvalgte skal jo også ha betalt for å bruke tiden sin på dette. Og der kan vi se, kanskje kan 
vi effektivisere det eller forenkle det … burde mer av dette være statens ansvar for eksempel? 
Men det er noe vi ikke har konkludert med, men jeg har bare lyst å formidle at vi ser jo på det.  
 
Og det er jo det vi bruker veldig mye av pengene vi får overført fra TONO til òg, ikke sant. 
Det går jo til honorering av tillitsvalgte, så jeg går jo inn for at det er kanskje det du mente i 
sted med at det kan være en interessekonflikt da. Vi ser jo styret òg, styret sitt honorar sant, 
og styrelederens honorar er jo en direkte følge av det som er overført fra TONO, og det er helt 
fint at det settes under lupen. Men nivået på de honorarene, det er jo regulert gjennom TONO. 
Gruppeforeningene følger jo reguleringene i TONO, og nivået på styrehonorarene er jo et 
utslag av en lang historikk. Så det peker jo flere tiår tilbake. 
 
Men jeg kan jo si at vi har faktisk dette med honorarer til styret og tillitsvalgte, vi har en egen 
komité som ser på det nå. Ja, rett og slett fordi det kom opp på generalforsamlingen i fjor, at 
det var ønskelig å gjøre en vurdering av det, og da har vi folk som ikke er tillitsvalgte i NOPA 
som ser spesielt på det nå.  
 
ESPEN: Jaha, var det en spesiell grunn til at det kom opp i fjor, eller? 
 
KINDEM: Nei, det var ett av våre medlemmer som stilte det spørsmålet, og det er jo viktig å 
fange opp det medlemmene spør om. Så det tenker vi, vi er jo til for medlemmene. Hvis 
medlemmene har ønske om at styret skal ta tak i problemstillinger, så skal jo selvfølgelig 
styret gjøre det. Og det ble besluttet da på generalforsamlingen at vi setter ned et utvalg som 
ser på dette, og det arbeidet er godt i gang. Jeg har faktisk hatt møte, eller jeg fikk en 
oppdatering idag da, og ble spurt om hva jeg tenkte om honorarnivået. 
 






KINDEM: Ja, det må jo behandles igjen på årsmøtet da. Det var et spørsmål fra årsmøtet i 
fjor, og da må vi svare på det i år. Og da må det ligge en eventuell vedtektsendring, eller - 
dette med lønn til tillitsvalgte, det er jo alltid en sak på årsmøtet. Så det er bare helt regulær 
behandling. Så hvis vi gjør noe drastiske nedjusteringer der, eller - det er vel mere det, jeg tror 
ikke det blir noe oppjusteringer - så blir det gjort på førstkommende årsmøte. Men det er vel 
etter at dere da har levert denne oppgaven. 
 
ESPEN: Ja, det blir vel det. 
 
KINDEM: Men viss dere ser på TONOs og NOPAs websider, så ser dere jo vedtektene der, 
og dere kan sammenligne - så kan dere se hvordan dette henger sammen.  
 
ESPEN: Ja, det blir interessant å sjå. Ja … ønske du en debriefing på det vi har gått igjennom, 
eller … er det greit for deg? 
 
KINDEM: Neeei, det er greit for m- eller, jeg kan si noe generelt da, om TONO og NOPA, 
for jeg hører jo på spørsmålene deres at dere har tenkt litt på dette med lønn til de som er i 
styret, eller interessekonflikt og så videre … fordi det som er ønskelig for både TONO og 
NOPA, det er å ha aktive komponister og tekstforfattere i styreverv. Omfanget av saker styret 
skal behandle - det gjelder både TONO og NOPA, det vil si både CRM-direktivet òg 
åndsverkloven - det å stå seg i et internasjonalt landskap óg, det er uhyre krevende. Det er 
veldig annerledes enn det var for ti år siden. Kanskje fem år siden også. Som jeg nevnte 
innledningsvis om åndsverkloven, den forrige ble behandlet i 1961, og det tar veldig mye tid. 
Det er ikke noe ønskelig for oss å ha organisasjoner som nesten har profesjonelle 
kulturpolitikere i verv. Vi ønsker fortsatt at det skal være komponister og tekstforfattere som 
er aktive, og det er nettopp derfor vi ser ekstra på dette nå, fordi vi tror det er veldig viktig 
med kunstnerstemmen i det offentlige rom. Det er nok av organisasjoner som har jurister til å 
tale for seg, og det ser vi et eksempel på nå i arbeidet med åndsverkloven. Vi tror det 
kunstneropprøret vi hadde i fjor, som fikk parkert behandlingen av åndsverkloven slik at vi 
kunne få en bedre åndsverklov i forhold til rettighetshaverne, det hang på at det var 
troverdighet i hvem som uttalte seg i den saken. Og vi så også at veldig mange av NOPAs og 
GramArts medlemmer, de gjorde den kampanjen sammen. De tok jo dette inn på sine egne 





de. Det syns jeg var veldig flott å se, det at behandlingen av en åndsverklov får over 900 tusen 
treff, det er eksepsjonelt i et land med litt over fem millioner mennesker. 
 
ESPEN: Ja, det er ganske spesielt faktisk … 
 
KINDEM: Ja. Og det handler litt om det samholdet vi har bygget, både i musikkfeltet, men 
også med andre kunstnerorganisasjoner i kunstnernettverket. Slik at vi har jo bygget nettverk 
nå gjennom mange år, slik at vi samordner aktiviteter, samordner ikke minst kunnskap, slik at 
vi får gode rammevilkår rundt norsk kulturliv og ikke minst norsk musikkliv da, som vi først 
og fremst er opptatt av. 
 
Så ser vi jo også at musikkfeltet møtte jo de utfordringene med et globalt digitalt marked, 
møtte jo det først. Filmbransjen ligger jo mange år etter, og så ser du det slår fullt ut i media 
generelt. Avisene ikke sant, papiravisene er jo i ferd med å forsvinne. Bloggerne overtar 
annonsemarkedet, i forhold til den, jeg holdt på å si, den seriøse journalistikken. Så nå ser vi 
at det er flere andre felt som er berørt av et globalt digitalt marked. Og så kommer 3D-
printerne, som gjør at alt som forefinnes som en digital oppskrift, kan jo kopieres, eventuelt 
også printes ut hvor som helst; og det utfordrer e-handel generelt. 
 
Nå har ikke vi kommet inn på e-handelsdirektivet her, men heh, det berører jo også vår 
situasjon. 
 
MATS: Ja, eg trur kanskje vi skal holde det utenfor, så det ikkje blir alt for masse. 
 
KINDEM: Ja … men det er jo som dere innledet med også, at dette er komplekst materiale, så 
jeg håper at jeg har vært presis nok da. Men jeg vil gjerne sikre det gjennom en runde to … 
det er veldig travle dager for meg, sånn rent personlig også; så jeg flyr fra det ene møtet til det 
andre.  
 
ESPEN: Ja, men det kan vi sjå på.  
 
MATS: Det kan vi prøve å få til ja; eit oppfølgingsintervju, og selvfølgelig sitatsjekk på alt 






KINDEM: Ja. Og jeg tenker også dere bør intervjue leder i musikkforleggerne, lederne av 
gruppeforeningene generelt, og kanskje også se litt på GRAMO og GramArt. 
 
MATS: GRAMO og GramArt har vi sånn delvis avtale med. Men dei andre er heilt klart 
interessante ja.  
 
KINDEM: Ja. Det kan godt hende at dere vil få noen andre betraktninger. Nå svarte jo jeg 
delvis i kraft av å være styreleder i TONO, men når jeg omhandler NOPA så er det jo med 
“styreleder-i-NOPA-hatten” på. Sånn at det er vel kanskje den sammenblandingen jeg har lyst 
å se litt ekstra på da. For dere er jo inne på noe her, ikke sant, med hvilken hatt har man på 
seg, og nå har jeg jo begge de hattene på døgnet rundt. Og jeg ser at det er noe man må 
vurdere fortløpende. 
 
ESPEN: Det er klart, viss det er noke som du har sagt som du ønske å spesifisere at det kjem 
frå den og den hatten da, for å sei det sånn, så er det heilt greit. 
 
KINDEM: Ja, det er mulig vi må rydde litt i det. Men det er jo helt vanlig med sitatsjekk, så 
jeg hadde bare lyst til å bidra med det jeg vet ihvertfall, for jeg syns det er utrolig viktig at 
denne oppgaven blir skrevet. 
 
MATS: Ja, men det er bra. Vi set veldig stor pris på at du tar deg tid.  
 
KINDEM: Ja, det skulle bare mangle. Men har dere veileder på oppgaven eller? 
 
MATS: Ja, me har Daniel Nordgaard. 
 
KINDEM: Jada, akkurat. Ja, han er jo kjempedyktig. Det er jo veldig mange dyktige folk på 
Agder altså. Jeg må bare si det. Og NOPAs og TONOs tidligere styreleder Bendik Hofseth er 
jo også der, han har jo veldig mye kunnskap om dette da; men særlig TONO, i og med at han 
gikk av som styreleder i TONO først nå til sommeren, men det er jo lenge siden han var 
styreleder i NOPA. Det har jo vært en i mellom der som har vært styreleder i syv år. Så jeg vil 
jo si at kanskje NOPAs arbeide har forandret seg veldig siden Hofseth var styreleder der. Slik 






MATS: Ja, nei men, eg lure på om vi berre skal takke for intervjuet, hvis ikkje det er noko 
meir du ønske å tilføre, sånn utenom dei tinga vi har snakka om? Det har jo vore ganske fritt 
og fint det her. 
 
ESPEN: Vi har jo hatt 4 tema her, og du kan jo berre tilføye noke til dei viss det er noko du 
kjeme på; ellers er det jo åpent for å snakke om andre ting òg; utanfor temaa, viss det er noko 
du tenker er viktig. 
 
KINDEM: Ja, absolutt, dere må bare ta kontakt med meg igjen, og jeg følger jo med på 
regjeringen sine sider om behandling av direktivet og om det påvirker oss, og det kan dere jo 
også oppsøke selv. Jeg vet ikke om dere har de linkene jeg, men det er jo veldig nyttig. 
 
Neimen fint, da sier vi takk til alle parter så langt, og så lykke til med oppgaven! Da hører jeg 
fra dere igjen. 
 











Interview 2: Bendik Hofseth 
 
MATS: -og så gjer me sjølvsagt opptak av- 
 
HOFSETH: -ja, det er bra det, med backup og greier. 
 
MATS: Ja, me trenge da, så ikkje me får sånn roundtable-situasjon. 
 
HOFSETH: Ja, hehehe. 
 
MATS: Men ja, vi kan eigentleg berre begynde. Eg veit ikkje om du veit noke om prosjektet 
anna en … 
 
HOFSETH: -nei, ikke nok.  
 
ESPEN: Vi får introdusere litt da. 
 
MATS: Ja, for det er på en måte todelt, men det henge sammen. Det er både at me ser på 
forvaltning av norske musikkrettigheitar og korleis det er organisert med TONO og GRAMO 
og interesseorganisasjonar, og så er det då CRM-direktivet som me då gjer ein 
dokumentanalyse på. 
 
HOFSETH: Åja, så spennende, 
 
MATS: Ja, så får vi prøve å sjå om det får nokre konsekvensar eller endringar.  
 
ESPEN: Ja, så det e på ein måte Norge som ein case da- 
 
HOFSETH: -i forhold til CRM ja, mm. 
 
MATS: Så e det jo semi-strukturert og frisnakk er heilt topp. 
 
ESPEN: Ja, det er berre å seie akkurat det du vil - vi er egentlig mest interresert i ka du 






HOFSETH: Og dette er anonymt og ikke sitert hvis ikke jeg vil? 
 
ESPEN: Ja, det får bli opp til deg da. Hvis det er noke du ikkje vil ha sagt eller noke sånt, så 
får du berre seie ifrå om det.  
 
MATS: Ja, då får vi begynne med første spørsmålet, som er litt - om du kan seie noko om ka 
du tenker om situasjonen for norske rettigheitshavarar i dag?  
 
HOFSETH: I forhold til andre rettighetshavere i andre land, eller? 
 
ESPEN: Ja, det òg egentlig men sånn generelt, ka du tenker om- 
 
HOFSETH: Nei, altså, som dere har hørt om gjennom studiet her da, så er jo norske 
rettighetshavere ganske godt dekket, men det er jo utfordinger i TONO og GRAMO, og det er 
utfordringer i forhold til at Norge er et lite musikkimporterende land, som gjør at det er delvis 
mangelfull infrastruktur i forhold til det å ha en karrierebase her. Men dette gjelder jo mange 
andre land også. Det er ikke bare Norge som er i den situasjonen. Så, i forhold til andre 
europeiske land, så er Norge et bra sted å være for rettighetshavere. Beskyttelsen og 
innhentningsgraden i det norske markedet og tariffene er jo veldig høye. Så det … hvis man 
først skal operere som nasjonal aktør i et nasjonalt marked, så er Norge et bra marked å være 
i, mener jeg. 
 
MATS: Ja. Vi kan følge opp med situasjonen for vederlagsbyrå, som TONO og GRAMO, 
korleis e egentlig situasjonen for dei?  
 
HOFSETH: For rettighetshaverne der?  
 
MATS: Ja, men òg for dei som organisasjonar- 
 
HOFSETH: -som selskaper, ja … i forhold til CRM-Direktivet, eller generelt? 
 






HOFSETH: Jeg synes at det er veldig mye bra med TONO og GRAMO, de er internasjonalt 
på et veldig høyt nivå. Men det er allikevel ting å gjøre der, som jeg nevnte tidligere da. Ting, 
stener å snu og … 
 
ESPEN: Har du noken eksempel på det? 
 
HOFSETH: Ja, jeg mener jo spesielt at TONO burde være mer på ballen, i forhold til det å 
hente inn digitale inntekter fra andre steder, være mer proaktive, særlig på vegne av de 
rettighetshaverne som har en katalog som er relevant internasjonalt da. At de burde bygge ut 
tjenester og være mer proaktive for å hente inn sånne typer inntekter. Og jeg mener at en av 
grunnene til at det ikke skjer, ligger paradoksalt nok i styringsstrukturene. 
Styringsstrukturene, og dette kommer vi inn på i CRM-Direktivet, men … CRM-Direktivet 
går ikke langt nok da, til å fange opp den norske situasjonen. Men de som sitter som 
styremedlemmer i TONO, de har ofte et “bakland”, de representerer en organisasjon som har 
en kulturpolitisk interesse av TONO, og det gjør at TONO stoppes fra å bli så digitalt som det 
burde blitt.  
 
ESPEN: Når du seie at CRM-Direktivet ikkje går langt nok, ka spesifikt meinar du då?  
 
HOFSETH: Nei jeg tror, det av min erfaring ut i fra de samtalene som har vært med 
Departementet og lovgiver, er at det ikke kommer til å få noe konsekvenser. Når jeg var 
styreleder i TONO så gjorde vi jo en adopsjon, vi lagde en kvasi-åpen generalforsamling, som 
velger styremedlemmer og som er mer representativ. Men jeg mener at ut ifra det vi vet i dag, 
og ut ifra den takten som markedet endrer seg i, så burde det vært mer radikale endringer enn 
det blir. 
 
ESPEN: Heilt spesifikt, ka slags endringar då? 
 
HOFSETH: Jeg mener at denne representative organiseringen, hvor man velges inn i TONOs 
styre som representant for en “eierorganisasjon”, eller ja, i gåseøyne … som representant for 
en interesseorganisasjon da. Den kan ikke fortsette, fordi de styremedlemmene representerer 
mer den organisasjonen enn de representerer TONO. Så, TONO får ikke det styret de 






ESPEN: Mm … fordi at dei andre organisasjonane har andre agenda? 
 
HOFSETH: De har spesifikke interesser. Mm. 
 
ESPEN: Så du meina at det kanskje er en interessekonflikt der? 
 
HOFSETH: Det er det absolutt. Fordi det det digitale fordrer er at du ser på musikk som likt. 
Ikke sant, du kan ikke legge inn faktorer eller vekting av ulike repertoar i en digital 
sammenheng; du kan gjøre det innen distribusjon, men du kan ikke gjøre det i en … det er 
denne kryss-subsidieringen, det er denne sammenblandingen av kulturpolitikk og avregning 
som TONO gjør; den må slutte, mener jeg, for at TONO skal bli mer attraktivt, og mer 
verdifullt for medlemmene. Men det er motstand mot å skille de to områdene, fordi noen av 
eierne er usikre på eller føler at de vil ikke sitte med kulturpolitiske midler, med stipender, de 
vil sitte med tilgang til avregningen, fordi det oppfatter de som sikrere - og det gjør at 
reformene tar for lang tid, og reformene kommer for seint. 
 
MATS: Ja … så du er inne på litt sånn som at speletid på P2 er meir verdt- 
 
HOFSETH: -det kan man jo godt gjøre i distribusjon, men jeg er mer opptatt av for eksempel 
konsertsiden da, at for eksempel musikkhøyskolen får 2.6 millioner i utbetaling, når de betaler 
inn 30 tusen kroner i vederlag. Og så ser man på hva som faktisk spilles på musikkhøyskolen, 
det skulle jo være da en beskyttet arena, eller en subsidiert arena for samtidsmusikk, men det 
er ikke samtidsmusikk som spilles på musikkhøyskolen. Det er frijazz. Så den ordningen 
treffer ikke. Men motvilligheten mot å endre en sånn ordning, og heller si, “vet du hva, det 
hadde vært mye bedre om den samtidskomponisten fikk et substansielt stipend fra TONO, 
heller enn at vi lager en kvasi-ordning so ikke treffer”. Den viljen til å bruke sunn fornuft, og 
for å se at det ville være i TONOs beste faktisk at vi gjorde reformer her; for dette er ikke bra 
for omdømmet til TONO. Ikke sant, i et markedsperspektiv.  
 
Sånne eksempler er det mange av, og da setter man seg bare på sin høye hest og sier “nei, 
disse reformene får du ikke gjennom, for jeg kan ikke gå tilbake til mitt bakland og fortelle 






Hvis vi kunne skilt, ikke sant, med konvergens av kringkasting, og med stadig bedre digitale 
verktøy, både på input-siden, altså at man kan rapportere konserter mer nøyaktig, og at vi kan 
monitorere markedet mer nøyaktig, så kan ikke sånn praksis fortsette. Men fordi man vil at 
den praksisen skal fortsette, så nekter man å utvikle de verktøyene som gjør at man kan få et 
bedre og mer transparent marked, gjennomskinnelig marked. 
 
ESPEN: Har du noken, kanskje idéar om korleis det ideelt sett burde være? 
 
HOFSETH: Ett grep er jo at TONO utsetter seg selv for et reelt demokrati da, og at også 
GRAMO gjør det. Det vil bli bråkete, og det vil bli vanskelig, hvertfall til å begynne med, 
men det vil gjøre at medlemmene føler etterhvert en nærhet, og at de vil engasjere seg. Det de 
gjør nå er at de engasjerer seg i gruppeforeningen eller i organisasjonen sin, og 
gruppeforeningene stenger også TONO fra å ha direkte tilgang til medlemmene, TONO burde 
jo jobbe mye tettere mot medlemmene, fordi konkurransen om medlemmene kommer til å bli 
en utfordring i europeisk sammenheng, ganske snart, det er det jo allerede. Disse nye unge 
som selger musikk internasjonalt, Alan Walker og Kygo og de, de shopper beste deal, ikke 
sant. Og hvis man ikke da har et forhold til organisasjonen, hvis ikke man ikke bruke “soft-
power” for å liksom ha intimitet og tilgang, så blir det vanskelig. Det stoppes de fra å gjøre, 
fordi eierorganisasjonene, eller gruppeforeningene sier “den nærheten, det å kurse 
medlemmer, det å gi de service, det å gi de informasjon om hvordan de kan nå fram som 
medlemmer, den er det vi som tar oss av.” Og den er det TONO som burde tatt seg av. Og da 
ville TONO blitt en mye mer dynamisk organisasjon, med et engasjert demokrati. Det 
kommer til å ta litt tid, men jeg mener at man burde gjort den øvelsen, og det er det egentlig 
som ligger til grunn for CRM-Direktivet óg, men de går ikke så langt da.  
 
ESPEN: Men, hvis eg var en interesseorganisasjon, så ville eg kanskje sagt at det er på en 
måte det samme, at eg gjer mitt på vegne av TONO, og TONO er meg, og dei andre 
organisasjonane. Så eg ser ikkje heilt forskjellen? 
 
HOFSETH: Forskjellen er at det sitter styremedlemmer i TONO som ikke klarer å balansere 
hattene. I det ene øyeblikket så vil de TONOs beste, og i det neste så vil de organisasjonen de 
representerer sitt beste. Så det krever helt spesielle mennesker, og de menneskene er 






MATS: Ja, for du har jo på en måte svart på det, men vi har jo et tema som me kallar “den 
norske modellen”, som jo er med to store vederlagsbyrå og interesseorganisasjonar, 
kulturstøtte og kulturelle midlar. Du var jo inne på korleis modellen egentlig fungerar idag. 
 
ESPEN: Ja, og når du snakkar om kulturstøtte og stipend osv., trur du det er en ting som kjem 
til å fungere i framtida?  
 
HOFSETH: Jeg tror kanskje ikke vi får noe valg. Hvis vi skal overleve så tenker jeg at det må 
bli sånn, for vi skal kunne skalere, viss vi skal kunne … jeg tror at TONO er litt sånn strutsen 
i sanda liksom, i forhold til hvor digital virkeligheten er i ferd med å bli. Og da må de bygge 
gode digitale verktøy selv, både på backoffice-siden og frontoffice-siden. De må ha gode 
løsninger som gjør at de kan drive mer effektivt og mer skalerbart; og de løsningene kommer 
ikke så lenge striden står om småpenger og kryss-subsidiering av avregning. 
 
ESPEN: Når det kjem til sånne  … metodane for å digitalisere måten å hente pengar på 
[VERKTØY], korleis trur du TONO ligge ann i forhold til andre organisasjonar i utlandet? 
 
HOFSETH: TONO har mulighet for å bli et kjempegodt og dynamisk … men det mangler litt 
mot. Det mangler litt innsats, og fokuset er et annet sted. Det har vært veldig mye fokus på 
back-office løsninger hos selskaper i Europa, og veldig lite på front-office løsninger. Med 
front-office løsninger mener jeg da både digitale løsninger rettet mot medlemmene, men også 
mot de som lisensierer musikk, altså kundene. Hvis medlemmene hadde hatt en applikasjon 
som var enkel, hvor din repertoarliste lå, så kunne det tatt to minutter å sende en anmeldelse 
fra konserter, i dag er det bare 30% av konsertene som anmeldes. Det burde vært enklere å 
anmelde verk, og det burde vært enklere å anmelde verk riktig, sånn at man slipper å få … 
altså, du kan si, så lenge man bruker småpenger på å få anmeldt verk inn, så er man nødt til å 
bruke store penger på back-office siden for å rette opp skaden når den først er gjort. Sånne 
eksempler er det mange av … det mangler verktøy for å gå inn på YouTube internasjonalt, og 
se hvor norske verk brukes, det er ikke veldig vanskelig å utvikle sånne verktøy. Men det er 
det ikke vilje til. Det er ikke mot til det. Og det er fokus et annet sted. 
 
ESPEN: Men, det ligge jo litt i CRM-Direktivet at dei skal pushe litt på at dei skal utvikle 






HOFSETH: Ja, jeg tror det kommer til å hjelpe, for det sette oppmerksomhet på det. Jeg 
ønsker direktivet velkommen, men jeg synes ikke det går langt nok. Det er min personlige 
mening.  
 
ESPEN: Er det spesielt for det punktet, eller er det andre punkt óg du tenker dei burde gått 
lenger med? 
 
HOFSETH: Det jeg prøvde å argumentere for nå er at, det CRM-Direktivet er mest opptatt av 
er jo styringsformer og transparens, accountability, governance, og det er de problemene 
TONO har. Det er de som står i veien for å utvikle de verktøyene som trengs. Det peker jo 
CRM-Direktivet på òg, at det er en sammenheng mellom styring og hva man kan få gjort da. 
Du må forankre sånne strategier i et styre, og da må det styre være et styre som er opptatt av 
TONOs ve og vel; ikke av kulturpolitiske agendaer.  Så dette er en kritikk av den 
representative modellen da, som både GRAMO og TONO har. 
 
ESPEN: Ja. Ka du tenker vi skal gå vidare med MATS? Vi har jo hoppa litt fram og tilbake 
her, men. 
 
MATS: Kanskje vi skal gå litt til distribusjon? Ja, du har jo vore litt inne på det og men. 
Distribusjonsmodellane i TONO og GRAMO - om du har nokre tankar omkring dei er, og 
korleis det blir bestemt i vedtekter og årsmøte? 
 
ESPEN: Synes du det er bra nok, eller syns du det er forbedringspotensiale, når det kjem til 
accuracy og korleis det blir bestemt, og kem som bestemme det osv.? 
 
HOFSETH: Ja, det er jo veldig mange små stener da, eller små tuer, som kan velte store lass, 
som ligger i - nå kjenner jeg TONO best, jeg kjenner ikke GRAMO så godt - som ligger inne i 
TONOs avregninger, som er basert på hevd, og som er basert på gamle styreavgjørelser, “ja vi 
gjør det sånn, vi tar penger derifra, og så legger vi det over der”, for eksempel som du nevnte 
med P2, at P2 har like mye penger som P1, det er jo ikke noe fornuft i det. Du kan 
argumentere for det, du kan si at “jo, det er potensielt like mange lyttere og seere”, men det 
handler ikke om det, det handler om at der var det en del mangfoldsrepertoar. Og jeg mener at 
det mangfoldsrepertoaret, fordi nå er det nesten ikke noe musikk i P2 ikke sant. Der er 





å treffe da, med den ordningen. Man ønsket å treffe jazzmusikk og samtidsmusikk og sånn, 
men pengene går jo til sibelius sine arvinger og, ikke sant, det går til andre, óg til pop-musikk, 
for det spilles masse pop-musikk på P2. Så ordningen treffer ikke sånn som den var tenkt, 
men den er ikke revidert. Og dette ser ikke bra ut. Dette er vanskelig å forklare, både til 
TONOs egne medlemmer, men ikke minst til søsterselskaper og til allmennheten da. Det 
svekker TONOs kredibilitet betydelig, det svekker TONOs evne til å være en sterk aktør, og 
en samlende aktør i det norske markedet. Det svekker omdømmet. Det tåler ikke dagens lys. 
Og med dagen mener jeg i dag. 
 
MATS: Så, du tenker kanskje at istadenfor å differansiere mellom … sånn som man gjer idag, 
skulle ein heller hatt éin sats for lik type offentlig framføring? 
 
HOFSETH: Ja, det jeg mener personlig er at man bør se på det hvertfall, om ikke eksekvere, 
er jo å se på å bringe inn et parameter som faktiske lyttere og seere da. Ikke sant, for alle de 
tallene har man jo. At man ikke lenger leker med pengene, og at den kulturpolitiske agendaen 
står øverst, men at man faktisk prøver å ha en avregning som gjenspeiler det som faktisk skjer 
i markedet. Det tror jeg er viktig, og at man så heller justerer det utenfor avregningen. At man 
justerer det i form av kulturpolitiske midler eller stipender, fordi TONO kunne ha gjort bedre i 
forhold til det å gjenspeile markedet. 
 
ESPEN: Det her burde vi kanskje ha visst, men all den statistikken som dei bruka til å 
bestemme det her, e den tilgjengelig?  
 
HOFSETH: Nei, ikke offentlig tilgjengelig, men statistikken om musikkbruk og monitorering 
av radiostasjoner, det er jo i full gang. Det er jo ikke noen hemmelighet, hvor mange som 
hører på en sang på P1 og hvor mange som hører på en sang på P2, det er jo ikke noe 
vanskelig å finne ut, til enhver tid.  
 
ESPEN: Men det dei velger å bruke- 
 
HOFSETH: Ja, de har lagt det parameteret til side, de bruker det ikke i avregningen. De 
bruker bare potensielle, mulige, fordi man når fram til så og så mange, og da er det ikke 
TONOs jobb å si noe om hvem som skrur på radioapparatet på hvilken stasjon, sier TONO. 






ESPEN: Skal vi gå til neste tema, konkurranse? Det er jo ingen reell konkurranse nasjonalt i 
Norge. Trur du det kjem til å forandre seg? Det er jo noken små aktørar som prøva seg. 
 
HOFSETH: Ja altså, dette området er jo litt sånn “up for grabs”. Hvis en internasjonal aktør 
som tenker profitt går inn her og representerer 10 rettighetshavere, ikke 30 tusen som TONO 
gjør, så er det klart at de kan gjøre en kjempe clean slate. Hvis Google eller, ja, et for-profitt-
selskap hopper inn og representerer Bruce Springsteen, Madonna, Elton John blablabla, de 10 
største artistene, så er det klart at de ville kunne hente masse penger i markedet, på en enkel 
måte. De kunne banke på døra til TONO og si “vet du hva, vi vet at så mange hørte denne 
sangen med Elton John, vi vet at så mange hørte den konserten med Bruce Springsteen, og her 
er regningen. Dette skylder dere oss.” Det er ikke noe utenkelig at noe sånt skjer, at 
rettighetshaverne overdrar rettighetene til en agent eller et selskap som tenker profitt; og det 
selskapet kan jo da ha 5% av inntektene, eller 2% av inntektene. Det er mye lavere enn den 
kommisjonen som TONO har på 14%. Og i tillegg til det så trekkes det 10% kulturelle midler, 
så i realiteten så er det høyere. Og de trekkes på bruttoavregning. Så, TONO har i prinsippet 
en kommisjon som er nærmere 20-25% da, og norsk komponistfond, og så legger du til og 
legger til … så det er klart at forskjellen på 25% og 2%/2.5% er ganske stor når du tjener store 
penger i det norske markedet. Så det er ikke så vanskelig å se for seg at det kan skje ting her. 
 
ESPEN: Den modellen med kulturelle midlar som du snakka om, 10%, den er jo ganske 
forankra i det europeiske systemet da, med alle avtalar som alle organisasjonane har, men trur 
du den kjem til å holde framover? Hvis det skjer det du sei no, at for eksempel Google 
bestemmer seg for å innta markedet? 
 
HOFSETH: Ja, jeg tror den kommer til å holde, og det er fordi Franske og Tyske og 
sentraleuropeiske selskaper er veldig veldig opptatt av dette, og de er veldig avhengige av den 
inntekten, du kan tenke Tyskland, som er et enormt marked, men som har veldig lite reportoar 
som går utenfor den tyskspråklige sonen da, de er veldig interessert i å trekke 10%. Problemet 
med TONO er jo at TONO trekker mer enn 10%, for vi har også loven om norsk 
komponistfond. Så da trekker du først halvannen prosent av brutto inntjening, og så kommer 
utgiftene, så trekker du 10% på distribusjonen. Så TONO opererer i en gråsone, i forhold til 






ESPEN: Det og er vel forankra i avtala reknar eg med? 
 
HOFSETH: Det er lov. Og det er også det TONO gjemmer seg bak, de sier at dette er en lov, 
som kommer på 60-tallet, som departementet har påtvunget de, så de kan ikke gjøre noe med 
det, men i forhold til regelverket, det internasjonale regelverket, så tar de jo da halvannen 
prosent av brutto, som i realiteten da er, ja, mer da.  
 
ESPEN: Men det kan jo, for eksempel, GEMA eller kem som helst, dei kan jo sei nei til det? I 
avtalane? 
 
HOFSETH: Nei, det kan de ikke. Så det trekkes mer enn 10%. 
 
ESPEN: Koffor kan ikkje dei det? 
 
HOFSETH: Jo, fordi TONO hevder at det er en annen affære enn CISAC-10%ene. Men hvis 
det blir en rettssak om det, hvis det blir problematisert, hvis GEMA går inn og sier “vi vil ha 
bare 10%, og ikke de fondspengene, for det er også en del av de pengene som blir igjen i 
Norge” … for hvis det skal bli igjen 10% totalt, ikke sant, da ville TONO miste mye 
kulturelle midler. 
 
ESPEN: Ja … e det noke meir du vil sei rundt konkurranse, internasjonalt, nasjonalt? 
 
HOFSETH: Nei, det er interessant det der, og det er jo åpent, EU har jo basket med det lenge, 
ikke sant. Er det naturlige monopoler, er det hensiktsmessig at det er monopoler i markedene? 
Det er jo på en måte gode argumenter for, fordi det gjør lisensieringen veldig mye enklere for 
brukerne. Men forleggerne har jo problematisert det, og på online-området så er det jo nå 
fragmentering av rettigheter, så TONO har veldig lite rettigheter på online-området; 
forleggerne har trukket ut, PRS har trukket ut, STIM, det svenske selskapet, og disse har 
trukket ut rettighetene. Så når TONO går til Spotify for å framforhandle en avtale i Norge, så 
er de jo nokså “wing-clipped” ikke sant, de er jo bare en av mange, og de har ikke det mest 
attraktive repertoaret. Det er et problem. Hvordan dette løses er jo, i vårt tilfelle i Norge, 
Brüssel-avhengig da. 
 






ESPEN: Har du tid til kjapt å snakke litt om Direktivet? 
 
HOFSETH: Ja ja. 
 
ESPEN: Eg lure på ka du tenker om implementering av Direktivet i Norge? Trur du det blir 
fullstendig implementert? 
 
HOFSETH: Nei, det tror - eller, jo, det kommer til å bli implementert, men det kommer ikke 
til å medføre noen krav fra departementet om endringer, som det har gjort i Sverige. Der har 
det jo fått konsekvenser. Det er det jeg har hørt ihvertfall, så får vi se. 
 
ESPEN: Ja, det e jo berre synsing sjølvsagt, men du trur altså det kjem til å bli annerledes enn 
det har blitt i Sverige osv.? 
 
HOFSETH: Ja, både i Sverige og Danmark, og også i Finnland, så har de vert hardere da. 
Men vi gjorde jo disse reformene som sagt tidlig i TONO, og da var vi langt framme. Nå er 
det en blanding av representativt demokrati og åpent demokrati, og det holder nok for CRM-
Direktivet. 
 
ESPEN: Så TONO kjem til å sei at det er bra nok- 
 
HOFSETH: Ja, departementet kommer til å si at det er bra nok, det som TONO har. Og da 
tror jeg ikke politikerne kommer til å interessere seg for det. 
 
MATS: Så det kjem sånn i praksis ikkje til å ha noke særlige følger … 
 
HOFSETH: Nei, jeg tror ikke det. 
 
ESPEN: Ja … men då har vi vel egentlig ikkje meir spørsmål enn det. 
 
MATS: Nei, men vi kan jo berre ta, sjøl om du har vore inne på det, om du kan trekke fram 






HOFSETH: Ja, altså, jeg synes jo det er positivt jeg da, fordi jeg mener at disse reformene 
trengs. Og de trengs enda mer i Hellas, Portugal og Italia enn i Norge. Men vi trenger de her 
óg, fordi det må sees i sammenheng med digitaliseringen, og den går mye mye raskere enn det 
virker som fra styrerommet til TONO altså. Det skjer ting i andre markeder som kommer til å 
få betydning i Europa, i Asia, Amerika og … så, hvor på en måte, disse avtalelisensene, eller 
blanket licensing er mindre og mindre i bruk da. Folk vil ha lisensiering av noe repertoar til å 
bruke i en spesiell sammenheng. 
 
ESPEN: Trur du det kjem til å forsvinne heilt? 
 
HOFSETH: Jeg tror ikke det kommer til å forsvinne helt, så lenge vi har en 
allmennkringkaster og universitetssektor og sånne ting da. Men jeg tror det er færre og færre 
områder på det digitale hvor de er relevante. Du trenger ikke avtalelisens hvis du har en 
website, hvor du skal spille din egen musikk for eksempel. Så her må man lage nye verktøy 
da. Og dette presser på, ikke sant, i forhold til hvordan organisasjonen er satt sammen, hvilke 
verktøy de har utviklet og hvor den står i markedet. Så TONO og GRAMO er i ferd med å bli 
litt … nå sier jeg litt anakronistiske. De er litt sånn etterlevninger av en gammel offline tid da. 
Det er det jeg er redd for.  
 
Jeg synes det er veldig spennende at dere gjør denne oppgaven da. Jeg håper dere kan klare å 
finne ut litt i Sverige, om hva som har skjedd der, for der har jo Direktivet hatt effekt. Det har 
skjedd ting i STIM, og jeg tror også de andre selskapene som er direkte … en konsekvens av 
dette, jeg vet ikke om dere følger med på nobelspris-bråket som er nå? Med Svenske 
Akademiet? Svenskene har veldig veldig konservative styringsformer, og veldig ofte lukkede 
organisasjoner, som ikke er så åpne og lette å få innsyn i da. Det er interessant å se Nobelpris 
og akademi-diskusjonen, de har jo også verdi for milliarder, eiendommer … det er en svær 
organisasjon. Også i forbindelse med den #metoo-greia så har det skjedd ting med noen 
medlemmer, og det er en styreleder som beskytter, og alt skal være lukka og alt skal være 
hemmelig. Litt sånn har STIM fungert óg. De har ikke villet fortelle andre om sin disposisjon 
og sin strategi og hva de gjør. De har konkurrert uten å dele informasjon, og det har jo ikke 
vært en Nordisk tradisjon i det hele tatt, vi har samarbeidet og vært åpne med hverandre, for å 
utvikle i takt da. Så det er jo derfor Direktivet kommer, for å tvinge selskapene til å 






MATS: Ja, det er jo interessant. For en oppleve jo sånn som TONO som rimelig åpne, iallefall 
med hensikt til årsrapportart og forskjellig. Det meste kjem fram, sjøl om det er ikkje alt en 
forstår i rekneskapi.  
 















ESPEN: Er du klar for å begynne då? 
 
SOMMERSTAD: Hva sier du? 
 
ESPEN: Er du klar for å begynne? 
 










MATS: Ja. Då skal me… Det står jo ein del info der om kva prosjektet handlar om og … kva 




MATS: So eg lurer på, viss det er greitt for deg, so går me berre i gang med det første 
spørsmålet me har? 
 
SOMMERSTAD: Sett i gang! 
 
MATS: Ja. Då lurer me på om du kan sei litt om kva du tenker om situasjonen for norske 






SOMMERSTAD: Eeh. Tenker dere nå på.. Altså, for det er… Rettighetshavere er både 
selskap da, utøvere og, og låtskrivere. 
 
MATS: Mhm.   
 
SOMMERSTAD: Du tenker på alle dem? 
 
ESPEN: Ja, generelt alle sammen egentlig. 
 
SOMMERSTAD: Ja… Jeg må bare spørre også: Spør dere meg som GramArt-representant, 
som artist eller Gramo-representant, eller hva? 
 
MATS: Ja, altså. Det er vel først og fremst GramArt… 
 
SOMMERSTAD: Ja. Okei. Ja. Men, sånn som artist-representant... 
 
MATS: Men du har jo litt… Du har jo litt bredde, so… 
 
SOMMERSTAD: Ja. Nei, altså … Situasjonen for rettighetshavere … Altså, i forhold til 
vederlagsbyråene så ser jeg på en måte ikke sånn store problemer, at det har skjedd noen 
endringer … Vi har jo, sånn generelt i bransjen så snakker man om såkalt value-gap og sånn, 
og der er jo vederlagsbyråene.. Altså, TONO, for eksempel, har jo en avtale med Google, 
altså Youtube, for eksempel, men ikke med noen andre, så de er jo litt sentrale der, men… 
Men der er det jo ikke så veldig mye som kommer inn i forhold til kanskje hva man mener at 
man har krav på da. Så, sånn som Youtube, som verdens største musikkanal… 
 
Men i forhold til vederlagsbyråene så, så klarer ikke jeg tenke på sånn veldig store endringer, 
store problemer egentlig. Dere kan kanskje spesifisere? Hvis det er noe spesifikt dere tenker 
på? 
 
ESPEN: Nei, vi tenker egentlig ikkje so veldig spesifikt om noko. Egentlig mest ute etter kva 






SOMMERSTAD: -i forhold til CRM-direktivet og åpenhet og transparens og sånn for 
eksempel, så … Som låtskriver så er det i rimelig grad transparent. Man på en måte ser hvor 





SOMMERSTAD: Altså, da tenker jeg på utenlandsinntekter. Innlandsinntekter så kommer det 




SOMMERSTAD: I den grad vi klarer å rapportere all mulig bruk da. Det er en del bruk som 
blir rapportert ganske spesifikt, for eksempel NRK - det gjelder både Gramo og TONO - hvor 
man ser liksom antall spilleminutter, hvilken kanal og alt mulig. Og så… Men selvfølgelig 
[UFORSTÅELEGE ORD] det som vi kaller for annen offentlig fremføring, som er på en 
måte spilling i frisørsalonger og sånn, så bruker de helt andre nøkler… eller da bruker de 




SOMMERSTAD: Det er i, er i endring altså, men som rettighetshaver så føler jeg vel at 
systemene er rimelig transparente i Norge. 
 
ESPEN: Ja. Du snakka jo litt om dissa nøklane som du nettopp nevnte. Har du noko meir å 
seia om dei? 
 
SOMMERSTAD: Altså … Når jeg sa nøklene så mente jeg på en måte rapporteringen - 
hvordan de er brukt, og den informasjonen du får fra vederlagsbyråene eller... og… 
forvaltningsorganisasjonen. Vederlagsbyrået Gramo, forvaltningsorganisasjonen TONO. 
 






SOMMERSTAD: Og den er transparent og sånn … Og så er det fordelingsnøkler som de 
sitter med. Altså , både TONO og Gramo har… I TONO så er det fordelt etter hva de selv 




SOMMERSTAD: Sånn i forhold til de avtalene man inngår da, internt blant låtskrivere og 
kanskje også … med tredjeparter som publishingselskaper. Det er på en måte hvertfall… Det 
er vi som legger inn på en måte. Eller, eller publishingselskapet da med mindre vi … sier at 
det ikke er reelt. Men, Gramo så er det en litt annen nøkkel for der har man sånn poengtabell, 
som den kalles, som er litt sånn komplisert å forklare. 
 
Men den, på en måte, ser på antall artister på en innspilling. Og hvilken type artist du er - om 
du er hovedartist eller om du er innleid musiker, for eksempel. Den er nok ikke så transparent, 
men… Rett og slett for, fordi poengfordelinga er litt forskjellig, men det er ikke sånn veldig 





SOMMERSTAD: Jeg har ihvertfall ikke reagert noe på det før. 
 
ESPEN: Nei. Du synst den fungerar greit? 
 
SOMMERSTAD: Ja. Den er [UFORSTÅLEGE ORD], den gjør. Den er nok litt 
[UFORSTÅELEG ORD] på en tid hvor man har ivaretatt sånne filharmonikere og session-
musikere, på en måte. Slik at de får noe mer … vederlag enn man ville fått hvis man hadde 
hatt en ren sånn prosentfordeling, på en måte.  
 
ESPEN: Ja, skjønnar. 
 
SOMMERSTAD: Eller at man hadde … Dette er litt sånn komplisert å gå inn på, tror jeg. Jeg 
har hvertfall, altså sånn personlig forhold til poengtabellen i Gramo så syns jeg den i og for 






ESPEN: Mhm. Men du snakka litt om at det var i endring? 
 
SOMMERSTAD: Jeg er jo, er jo både [UFORSTÅELEGE ORD] og så noen ganger er jeg 
session-musiker. 
 
ESPEN: Men du snakka litt om at det var i endring, det systemet? 
 
SOMMERSTAD: Nei ... Ja. Nei, rapporteringen. Ikke poengsystemet- 
 
ESPEN: Ja, okey. 
 
SOMMERSTAD: -per i dag. Rapporteringen er i endring fordi Gramos, og TONOs, mål er på 
en måte å få inn penger for det som blir spilt, og sende pengene videre til den rettighetshaver 
som er brukt. Og så har vel … Og så er det sånn at man får jo aldri helt korrekte data, og da 
[UFORSTÅELEGE ORD] at da måtte man i gåseøyne [UFORSTÅELEGE ORD] og 
antageligvis hørt på hva de spiller - hver dag. NRK rapporterer faktisk hva de spiller hver dag 
på minuttbasis, sånn tre minutter med “Supergirl” av [UFORSTÅELEG NAMN] liksom til 
Gramo, mens en frisørsalong ikke rapporterer sånn. Men der … har vi allerede inngått, eller 
Gramo da, har inngått avtale med, med lokalradioer, sånn at rapporteringer, bedre 
rapportering skal komme derfra. Og så ser man også på om man kan få inn informasjon om 
hva slags kilder for eksempel en frisørsalong bruker. Og hvis en frisørsalong for eksempel 
bruker NRK og P4, så kan man … Og noen andre bruker Spotify, så kan man på en måte … i 
steden for å kreve rapportering da, som blir for mye stor arbeidsbyrde for en sånn frisørsalong 
som betaler 2000 i året, men så kan man kanskje bruke andre … annen statistikk da, for å 




SOMMERSTAD: Man liksom ser at, okey, disse, så og så mange frisørsalonger bruker den 
og den spillelisten i fra Spotify da forholder vi oss til den spillelisten fra Spotify og fordeler. 
Slik at de aktørene som er på den spillelisten, de dataene har vi i Gramos database. Så da får 





TONO jobber med det, men det er på en måte målet - at, er du spilt så skal du også få pengene 
dine. Og det er ikke alltid tilfellet hvis du ikke blir spilt på NRK.  
 
Det er, det er mulig for dere å snakke med Gramo om. 
 




MATS: Mhm. Me lurte litt på … sånn situasjonen for interesseorganisasjonar, sånn som 
Gramart som du representerar - kva tenker du om det? I dagens landskap… 
 
SOMMERSTAD: Nei, jeg syns jo interesseorganisasjoner, både GramArt og de andre 
utøverorganisasjonene er på en måte viktige… men da særlig politisk, for det er 
interesseorganisasjonene som jobber politisk, mens disse forvaltningsorganisasjonene, TONO 
og Gramo, jobber ikke så mye politisk. Det er mer - de skal ha inn penger og så skal de 
fordele penger. Så det er liksom interesseorganisasjonene som ivaretar på en måte de enkelt 
… medlemmenes interesser da, så jeg syns det er viktig rolle de har. For GramArts del så er 
det jo … Ja, hva skal jeg si ... Altså, utfordringa er kanskje engasjement hos medlemmene. 
Det er … finansiering - hvordan vi er finansiert, om vi skal være finansiert sånn i fremtiden 
og så videre. Det er jo ikke … Det er jo ikke profittorganisasjoner, altså som tjener penger på 
noe. Så det … Vi er jo avhengige av en finansieringskilde, som da i GramArt-sammenheng er 
fra det vi kaller for kollektive midler, som egentlig er forfalte vederlagsmidler. Altså, altså 
penger som ikke har blitt, vært mulig å fordele til utøvere. Det blir alltid liggende penger i et 




SOMMERSTAD: Eller det er for små penger til at man fordeler til rettighetshaveren eller 
sånne ting. Og da ... Og da bruker man det på kollektive formål da, som det vi mener er til 
beste for alle, på en måte. Og ett av de formålene er jo GramArt. 
 
Og sånn finansieres GramArt, og det vil alltid være en utfordring - både sånn politisk: er det 





populærmusikere. Og så er det jo selvfølgelig det at de kollektive midlene, de kan jo bli 
mindre i fremtiden, og hvordan skal vi finansieres da? Så det er jo sånn kanskje … en 
utfordring som interesseorganisasjoner som GramArt har da. Altså finansieringsbiten. Vi er 
ikke … Mange interesseorganisasjoner vil jo være finansierte gjennom statsbudsjettet og 
[UFORSTÅELEG ORD] støtteordninger, men det er ikke vi.  
 
ESPEN: Nei. Og det er ikkje, det er ikkje snakk om at det blir heller? 
 
SOMMERSTAD: Jo, det kan hende fordi at grunnen til at vi ikke er statsfinansiert - jeg tror vi 
var det en gang i tiden - men når Gramo oppsto, og GramArt for den del, så visste jo alle at 
det blir en del midler som ikke lar seg fordele, så var meningen at type GramArt skulle 




SOMMERSTAD: Så det har liksom vært en [UFORSTÅELEG ORD], men så jobber jo 
Gramo for at man skal få, man skal få fordelt så mye som mulig av pengene, ikke sant. Det er 
jo målet til Gramo. Så du kan si at i Gramo så jobber vi mot GramArts eksistens. 
 
Så hvis vi blir skikkelig flinke på å fordele midler, så … så faller jo finansieringsgrunnlaget 
bort. Så da må man jo eventuelt tilbake [UFORSTÅELEGE ORD] da: om ikke staten, eller 
skattebetalerne skal betale eller finansiere interesseorganisasjonen sånn som andre 
interesseorganisasjoner blir finansiert. Men … men bakgrunnen for den finansieringen er 
fordi departementet, Kulturdepartementet, og alle aktørene i bransjen visste at det vil bli 
kollektive midler og det er en fin måte å finansiere grunnorganisasjoner på, altså 
interesseorganisasjoner.  
 




ESPEN: Har du nokre tankar om, rundt det samspelet mellom Gramo og 
interesseorganisasjonar som GramArt? Du seier jo sjølv at viss Gramo har som mål å bli så 








ESPEN: Og … Ja, kva tenker du om det? At det kanskje er ein liten sånn klinsj der da? 
 
SOMMERSTAD: Ja, ja, men det er det. Og den må man være bevisst. For det er en utfordring 
det med finansiering, og samtidig så skal man på en måte, som GramArt-representant i 
Gramo, så skal man på en måte ivareta interessene til medlemmene, men samtidig så skal man 
ivareta interessen til Gramo. Så sånn en måte så jobber man liksom mot 
finansieringseksistensen da, men … men holdningen vår til det er på en måte at… vi kan ikke 
gjøre noe annet og så må vi eventuelt ta de utfordringene som kommer etterhvert da som de 
oppstår. Derfor har GramArt blant annet en … ikke sant, vi er jo ikke en profittorganisasjon, 
ergo så er på en måte målet vårt vill vært å ikke ha noen kroner - altså null på egenkapitalen. 
 
Men så har vi en buffer - opparbeidet en buffer sånn tilfelle det skjer noe voldsomt så vi ikke 




SOMMERSTAD: Så det er sånn vi håndterer det, men ja, det er en … det er et sånt slags 
motsetningsforhold - at vi jobber for, og det er jo interessen til våre medlemmer òg, at mest 
mulig går ut [FORSTYRRELSE PÅ LINJA] de som har blitt spilt, samtidig som at da blir det 
… jo flinkere de blir i Gramo, jo mindre finansiering skal vi ha i GramArt. Det er helt klart en 
motsetning der, men den må man på en måte prøve å takle på en god måte da.  
 
ESPEN: Mhm.  
 
SOMMERSTAD: Men den … det er helt klart en utfordring sånn, så lenge jeg har vært i 
GramArt så har vi alltid snakket om det.  
 
ESPEN: Ja. Så det er alltid eit tema på ein måte?  
 






ESPEN: Mhm. Hem… Når det kjem til Gramo då, kanskje: har du nokre tankar rundt 
prosessen med bestemmelsa om distribusjonsmodellar og sånn … årsmøtet?  
 
SOMMERSTAD: Hva tenker du på da? 
 
ESPEN: Nei, berre om du har noko du tenker på rundt den modellen i seg sjølv? Om du synst 
det er bra eller dårlig eller? No blir det jo … CRM-direktivet går jo litt inn på det: korleis det 
skal være og… 
 
SOMMERSTAD: Jaa … Altså når det gjelder CRM-direktivet så har den på en måte to sider - 
den går på… altså [UFORSTÅELEG ORD] government, altså hvordan 
forvaltningsorganisasjoner er drevet, at de skal være transparente og… eeh, hva skal jeg si… 
altså medlemmenes stemmerett og sånne ting - hvem er det som bestemmer i 
forvaltningsorganisasjonen og så videre. Og der tenker jeg at Gramo i alle fall, jeg tror også 
TONO, er … har alltid, så langt meg bekjent, drevet sånn rimelig innenfor de, de på en måte 
kravene som kommer med CRM-direktivet. Det er noen endringer i, vi har gjort i Gramo. For 
eksempel så er det vel … så blir det, det er ikke, men det blir på en måte et [UFORSTÅELEG 
ORD] krav om at man kan… være til stede på generalforsamling gjennom internett. Vi er ikke 
der ennå i Garmo… vi har ikke [UFORSTÅELEGE ORD]. Det er sånn vi på en måte jobber 
mot da. At vi på et eller annet tidspunkt så, så skal alle kunne være til stede fra der de er. Eh 
… Den måten man på en måte håndterer det på per i dag det er ved fullmakter. At alle 
organisasjonene, i alle fall, sender ut e-poster og ringer til sine medlemmer og sier at … du 
må sende fullmakt til den du mener kan representere deg på generalforsamlingen sånn at du i 




SOMMERSTAD: Per i dag er det håndtert med fullmakter, men selvfølgelig … det aller beste 




SOMMERSTAD: Samtidig så er jo generalforsamling … det er jo sånn… det er ikke alle som 






ESPEN: Nei, det er jo klart. 
 
SOMMERSTAD: [UFORSTÅELEGE ORD] viktig, ikke sant. Man på en måte ha litt sånn 
respekt for valget medlemmene gjør. Man må i hvert fall legge til rette for at flest mulig skal 
kunne være til stede. Og på sikt så er Gramo også nødt til å ha en sånn digital- eller 




SOMMERSTAD: Men, eeh … Ja, og så har vi endret også noe i forhold til hvem som kan bli 
medlemmer for vi hadde - det kan du snakka med Gramo om - sånn derre tilsluttet medlem og 





SOMMERSTAD: Oooog … Der har vi gjort noen endringer som du kan snakke med Gramo 
om i forhold til stemmereglene og alt sånt noe, hvem som kan komme på generalforsamling 
og stemme, for der er litt sånn endringer på gang da, og det handler om litt om CRM-
direktivet. 
[Om medlemstyper i GRAMO] 
 
MATS: Ja.  
 
SOMMERSTAD: Mhm. Når det gjelder sånn transparens og sånn så føler vi at 
forvaltningsorganisasjonene er innenfor de kravene. Den andre delen av CRM-direktivet det 
går på at … man skal kunne ha sånne one-stop klareringssteder gjennom 
forvaltningsorganisasjoner. Det har ikke noe særlig å si for Gramo, men det har noe å si i 










ESPEN: Ja … Skal vi gå, skal vi gå til dét eller? 
 




MATS: Eeh … for det er jo… sånn sett, for det er jo ingen reell konkurranse for Gramo eller 
TONO sånn som det er i Norge i dag, tradisjonelt sett. Kva tenker du om konkurranse og 
eventuelt - tenker litt meir internasjonalt på det digitale - at ein opnar opp for meir 
konkurranse på det feltet med vederlagsbyrå og den type ting?  
 
SOMMERSTAD: Ja … Når det gjelder Gramo så … Gramo er på en måte oppnevnt til å 
kreve inn penger på vegner av en tvangslisens, altså en lovbestemmelse, og den 
lovbestemmelsen har egentlig ikke så mye med rettighetshaverne å gjøre fordi den begrenser 
nemlig rettighetshavernes enerett. Fordi en tvangslisens sier noe om hvordan brukerne av 
lydopptak kan få lov til å bruke musikken, og så har man tvangslisens i Norge - 45b - som sier 
at bruker av musikk kan spille innspilt musikk offentlig … og via kringkasting, altså radio, 




SOMMERSTAD: Det er lovbestemt. Så det er en brukerrettighet på en måte. Men, så står det 
også i den tvangslisensen at rettighetshaverne skal ha betalt. Og det er derfor Gramo 
eksisterer, fordi at Gramo sørger da for at rettighetshaverne får betalt ...  
 
 
... for den bruken som, som er… som er basert på den tvangslisensen da. Eeh.. Det er ikke alle 
land som har en sånn tvangslisens, men … USA har det blant annet ... enkelte områder, og det 
er mange land som har det, så jeg tror ikke det - jeg ser ikke helt at det blir noe konkurranse 
på det området nødvendigvis. For TONO sin del så, så kan det jo bli mer konkurranse, 
kanskje. Det kan jo hende at det skjer på Gramo-området også, at det er andre 





[UFORSTÅELEG ORD] vederlag for bruk av musikk i Norge … basert på avtaler eller basert 








SOMMERSTAD: Men, men grunnen til dette her er jo på grunn at EU, som vi er en del av 
gjennom EØS på dette området, ønsker jo ett digitalt marked og at det skal liksom, ja … Og 
hele EØS er på en måte ett marked. Og per i dag så er det problem for rettighetshaverne … 
Nei, ikke for rettighetshaverne, men brukerne at man må på en måte klarere fra land til land - 
dette er liksom TONO-området da … eeh… og det må det skje en stopper for. Og akkurat 




SOMMERSTAD: Men det er nok … det er nok ikke usannsynlig at en del penger kanskje vil 
gå … ikke vil gå gjennom TONO, mer enn det som gjøres per i dag. Men da går det mest sånn 
… TONO-bruk da, det går gjennom TONO, og så går det til en annen 
forvaltningsorganisasjon eller direkte til publishere eller sånn, men … Ja, det er kanskje noe 
du bør snakke med TONO om, hvordan de ser på den konkurransesituasjonen. For Gramo så 




SOMMERSTAD: [UFORSTÅELEG SETNING] 
 
MATS: Nei. Eg lurte litt på - for GramArt sin del … eh… og den typen konkurranse, altso… 
Kva tenker du om det? No har det jo vore ei sak lenge med for eksempel Norsk Artistforbund 








MATS: Det var vel òg ein uttalelse som … eg hugsar ikkje kor eg las han, som gikk på at 
representasjonen i frå GramArt var so stor i Gramo-styret at dei meinte kanskje det var ein av 
fleire grunnar - til at det blei holdt igjen peng. Er det noko stor konkurranse? 
 
SOMMERSTAD: Ja ... ja ... Det, det er jo ikke riktig. 
 
MATS: Nei, nei. 
 
SOMMERSTAD: Nesten, dette må faktisk … Det vil jeg at du skal snakka med Gramo om 




SOMMERSTAD: Eh.. Altså den … Man har helt klare regler i Gramos fordelingsreglement, 
hvordan disse kollektive midlene blir fordelt. Og de har fått sin da ... rettmessige andel, og 





SOMMERSTAD: -av alt som skal sendes inn for å motta det vederlaget. Da ... og da fikk de 
det, heh. Så, så … så det er ikke riktig, for å si det rett ut. Og man får … det man får det er på 
en måte … Interesseorganisasjonene får på en måte den andelen som sine medlemmer 
representerer i Gramo. Så Gramo … nei, unnskyld, GramArt har … GramArt sin 
medlemsbase utgjør noe sånt som 80% av vederlaget som fordeles i Gramo - på den norske 




SOMMERSTAD: Mens MFO har 15% og NA er jeg ikke helt … usikker på. Eehm … Så 
man får på en måte det vederlaget, altså de kollektive midlene som, som speiler den 








SOMMERSTAD: Og det er uavhengig av … egentlig … det er egentlig uavhengig av 
representanter i styret fordi representanter i styret blir valgt gjennom generalforsamlingen og 
antall stemmer på generalforsamlingen og da er det et alminnelig flertall … flertallsprinsipp 
på utøversiden. Og GramArt pleier å ha flest fullmakter, og det betyr at GramArt i teorien 




SOMMERSTAD: -og bare sittet med GramArt-representanter, men det gjør vi ikke fordi 
MFO er jo selvfølgelig viktig i … eh ... for sine medlemmer, ikke sant, at de er representert i 
Gramo og sånt. Så man har liksom hatt en praksis på at det er flere interesseorganisasjoner 
uavhengig av om man har flertall eller ikke - at man på en måte velger inn også en 












ESPEN: Vi har snakka litt om det, men … kan først begynne med kva du tenker om 
implementeringa av direktivet i Norge: trur du det blir sånn som det har blitt i Sverige, eller 
trur du det blir… trur du det blir fullstendig implementert? 
 
SOMMERSTAD: Det blir fullstendig implementert, men … jeg vet ikke helt hvordan 
Kulturdepartementet kommer til å skrive forslaget. Jeg tror de kommer til å tenke at veldig 
mye er på plass allerede. Eh … kanskje blir det en slags sånn der henvisningslov til, til 





med norsk lov. Jeg er ikke helt sikker på hvordan implementeringen blir … eh… det er jeg 
ikke. Jeg kjenner ikke til hvordan det er gjort i Sverige, egentlig.  
 
ESPEN: Nei. Trur … for du snakka litt om… 
 
SOMMERSTAD: [UFORSTÅELEGE ORD] vi må, vi må følge det. 
 
ESPEN: Ja, ja. 
 
SOMMERSTAD: Altså, norsk lov må være i henhold til det direktivet. Det er helt, helt klart.  
 




ESPEN: -den styringsforma som Gramo og for så vidt TONO òg har no med representativt 
demokrati, på ein måte. Du … trur du det kjem til å holde liksom for direktivet? Er det nok? 
 
SOMMERSTAD: Nei, altså vi må gjøre visse endringer. Det som jeg nevnte ikke sant med 




SOMMERSTAD: Så, det betyr at alle som er medlemmer i Gramo kan, kan komme på 




SOMMERSTAD: Hvis man ellers … følger, følger de på en måte kriteriene som ligger til 
grunn da.  
 







SOMMERSTAD: Eh … Den endringen har jo en praktisk konsekvens … eehm… ut over det 
… Nei, jeg ... Nei, jeg ser ikke [UFORSTÅELEG ORD] ut per i dag, ikke som jeg kommer på 
i alle fall. At det vil ha veldig mye å si for interesseorganisasjoner [UFORSTÅELEG ORD]. 
Altså det man ser på interesseorganisasjoner i dag da er kanskje en økt grad av samarbeid 
mellom interesseorganisasjoner i ulike land. Man ivaretar på en måte sine medlemmers 
interesser i det landet, og man er på en måte ... eeh … nærmest seg selv på en måte, så jeg tror 
vel interesseorganisasjoner i stor grad vil på en måte … eh… opprettholdes, på en måte, i de 
enkelte land, og så vil det være en større samarbeid mellom interesseorganisasjoner, i alle fall 
på utøversiden - eller det ser man jo egentlig på produsentsiden også – eh … fordi EU er ett 
marked og sånne ting, og at det kanskje bare er et … Det har vel vært, og kommer vel til å 
bare øke, et sånt fruktbart samarbeid da mellom interesseorganisasjoner for å ivareta 





SOMMERSTAD: -ikke fastansatte musikere, sånn filharmonimusikere og sånn, men 
selvstendige næringsdrivende musikere - ofte innenfor populær, populærmusikken da, ikke 
sant. Eh … og da er det naturlig for oss å samarbeide om interessesaker med andre lignende 
organisasjoner i andre land. Politisk blant annet, ikke minst mellom, eller gjennom 
lobbyorganer i EU. Der har vi allerede en lobbyorganisasjon, men den, den gjelder både 
selvstendig næringsdrivende og fastansatte utøvere ganske generelt som heter AEPO. 
[UFORSTÅELEG SETNING]. Så der har vi liksom et lobbyorgan hvor, hvor også GramArt 
og MFO … eh … er til stede … er medlemmer og er til stede på en måte i EU-organer og 
lobbyerer da når det … Sånn med det CRM-direktivet så var jeg i Brüssel flere ganger for å 
diskutere og lobbyere i forhold til det direktivet. Da går man sammen med mange andre 
interesseorganisasjoner i alle EU-land, og så prøver å finne felles kampsaker da sånn at man 
har størst mulig grad for å lykkes med lobbyeringen. 
 
ESPEN: Ja … Mhm. Er du … Føler du at du er fornøgd med det som har skjedd da med dei 
reformane som kjem og for så vidt har blitt gjennomført i Norge?  
 
SOMMERSTAD: Eeh … Ja, egentlig. Altså, dere skal vite at det CRM-direktivet det er i 





om den ene delen med TONO blir påvirket og sånn. Når det gjelder andre delen av CRM-
direktivet for å få demokratiske og transparente forvaltningsorganisasjoner, så er det sånn 
type reglement som i veldig stor grad ble laget i EU fordi det var en del 
forvaltningsorganisasjoner i andre land … Altså, les litt sånn … ja, sørpå, som hadde litt sånn 
familiedrevne forvaltningsorganisasjoner som ikke var transparente i det hele tatt, og hvor det 
… eh … Det har vel vært litt sånne korrupsjonssaker og sånne ting. Man ønsket på en måte å 
regulere det markedet i mye større grad, så det … det reglementet det … det er på en måte 
laget for å sørge for at alle forvaltningsorganisasjoner er transparente, og så mener vi, i hvert 




SOMMERSTAD: Så, det var nok ikke … det var ikke forvaltningsorganisasjonene i Norden 




SOMMERSTAD: Så … men dette påvirker oss i noen grad, og … i den grad det påvirker oss 
så må vi da gjøre de endringer som er påkrevet. Men, det er ikke så mye, tror jeg … eller, vet 
jeg.  
 
ESPEN: Mhm. Eg trur vi begynner å nærme oss fornøgde eg med intervjuet. 
 
SOMMERSTAD: Ja, det går jo an å ringe på igjen også hvis man kommer på sånn 




SOMMERSTAD: -og sånne ting. 
 
ESPEN: Er det noko ting du ønsker å nevne ellers? Nokre andre ting vi, du føler vi burde 






SOMMERSTAD: Jeg er mest spent på den der … eeh … forvaltningen av ... Nei, jeg er 
egentlig mest spent på hva dere får ut av den der forvaltning av norske musikkrettar … 




SOMMERSTAD: Den gleder jeg meg til å lese. Eh … vi har et slags mål om å finne den 
optimale løsningen [UFORSTÅELEGE ORD] den optimale løsningen. Eh … så … Nei, det 
eneste jeg tenker umiddelbart er på en måte at vi har et mål om, og kan nok ha et 
forbedringspotensiale på å fordele midler mer effektivt. Altså les: at 








SOMMERSTAD: Uansett hva … i alle pengesummer. Vi må bli så lave … der har man et 
forbedringspotensiale… som at vi bør jobbe mot. Eh … noe annet jeg tenkte på da?  
 
ESPEN: Føler du at TONO, nei, Gramo er på, er på ballen når det kjem til det eller føler du 
… ? 
 
SOMMERSTAD: Ja, vi er på ballen, men man kan alltid bli bedre. Men vi er på ballen med 
det, helt klart. Så det vi kunne … det er… ta nå da, så har vi implementering av et helt nytt 
databasesystem, og det har jo kostet masse penger. Ikke sant, så sånne kostnader har man jo 
med jevne mellomrom, ikke sant, og det er jo … det blir da en transaksjonskostnad når man 
krever inn og fordeler midler videre. Eh … så man har har alltid sånne problemstillinger i 
forhold til hva man skal investere i. Eh … man investerer jo også i rettstvister … og 
utredninger. Vi har blant annet en forpliktelse til å finne ut, eller - vi fordeler … vi krever inn 
og fordeler i Gramo pengene bare for offentlig bruk av musikk, ikke privat bruk av musikk. 
Og da blir det jo noen ganger diskusjon, juridisk diskusjon, om hva er offentlig og ikke 






ESPEN og MATS: Ja. 
 
SOMMERSTAD: Og da blir man på en måte … Eller vi har, vi er i konflikt med NRK for 
eksempel da om hvor, hva som er rimelig vederlag … for bruken deres. Og da må man 
kanskje ta en tvist i rettsapparatet eller sistnevnte tilfelle i en nemnd. Og det koster penger, og 
det blir også en transaksjonskostnad for medlemmene, ikke sant, eller for de som får midler til 
slutt. Men sånne tvister må man jo ta, så blir det sånn vurdering om hvilke kamper skal man ta 
for å finne ut hva som er grensen for det offentlige rom, og hva skal man ikke ta. Så det er jo 
sånne vurderinger vi må ta fortløpende … eh … også i forhold til en kostnadsside da. Så … 
Men det er en sånn, det er ikke noe endringer der på en måte, det er en sånn problemstilling 






MATS: Ja. Nei, men eg trur me er fornøgde med det me har fått ut av det.  
 
SOMMERSTAD: Ja, bra. Når dere er ferdig så mottar jeg gjerne oppgaven. Så hvis dere skal 
bruke navnet mitt så må jeg vite hva jeg sier i oppgaven, sånn at jeg kan liksom korrigere hvis 
jeg mener noe annet enn det jeg klarte å formidle nå.  
 
ESPEN: Ja, ja. Det er heilt innafor. 
 
SOMMERSTAD: Ja, sånn at det blir korrekt og at jeg kan stå inne for eventuelle sitater. 
 
MATS: Mhm. Jammen det skal du få motta. 
 
SOMMERSTAD: Mhm. Supert. Veldig bra.  
 
MATS: Ja. Nei men då … 
 






SOMMERSTAD: Bare hyggelig, og så ønsker jeg dere lykke til. Det blir spennende. 
 
MATS: Takk for det.  
 
SOMMERSTAD: Takk. Ha det fint. 
 
MATS: Då får du ha det bra. Hei.             








Interview 4: Martin Grøndahl 
 
GRØNDAHL: -jess, da er jeg med. 
 
MATS: Ja, vi ska berre få satt igang opptaket av samtalen, så e me klar. 
 
ESPEN: Ja, hei forresten. 
 
GRØNDAHL: Hei, hei hei. 
 
ESPEN: Vi e to her, så det e Espen og Mats. 
 
GRØNDAHL: Ja. Det er et veldig sentralt GRAMO-spørsmål, er det noen grunn til at dere 
har valgt dette som tema? Har dere noe relasjon til GRAMO eller, kjenner dere GRAMO 
spesielt fra før, eller TONO eller? 
 
ESPEN: Neei, egentlig ikkje noke spesielt, sånn sett. 
 
MATS: Nei, altso, eg e jo medlem av TONO og GRAMO, men ikkje noke stort medlem som 
har fått store utbetalingar akkurat.  
 
GRØNDAHL: Nei … nei, altså, det var bare positivt ment, det var ikke noe … jeg bare tenkte 
at noen er interessert i GRAMO/TONO-modellen og er opptatt av det som gjelder oss sånn … 
det er ikke så ofte at vi opplever. Det hender at folk er bortom oss i litt sånne perifere 
sammenhenger, sånn i forbindelse med skriving av, ja, noen ganger doktorgrad og noen 
ganger mastergrad eller også i forbindelse med noe skriving til [UFORSTÅELIG ORD], men 
jeg bare lurte på om dere hadde en spesiell relasjon, som en slags innledende bemerkning. 
 
ESPEN: Nei, det e nok kun akademisk interesse det e snakk om egentlig. 
 
GRØNDAHL: Ja, flott. 
 
MATS: Ja, eg veit ikkje, vi har jo … du har jo fått sett litt igjennom den e-posten eg sendte 






GRØNDAHL: Ja, det har jeg. 
 
MATS: Ja, så vi kan vel egentlig berre gå rett på første spørsmål, og det er som me skreiv at 
jo meir fri prat me får, jo bedre e det egentlig for oss. 
 
GRØNDAHL: Ja, det skjønner jeg. 
 
MATS: Så, me startar med et spørsmål som … me lure litt på om du kan seia noko om korleis 
situasjonen er, eller ka du tenke om situasjonen for norske rettigheitshavarar idag? 
 
GRØNDAHL: Det blir … altså, jeg sender jo denne virksomheten da primært sett med 
GRAMO-øyne. Og en del av de tankene man gjør seg om en del av de sammenligningene og 
de måtene å eventuelt kunne samarbeide på, som kan være alternativer til den type modell 
som vi har idag, med to helt separate organisasjoner. De vil jo være hentet som en inspirasjon 
fra utenlandske tilsvarende selskaper som GRAMO og TONO. Mens sånn som for de norske 
rettighetshaverne, så fungerer både TONO og GRAMO godt, veldig mange av TONOs 
medlemmer er også GRAMO-medlemmer, og vice versa. Sånn at det er mange 
dobbeltmedlemmer, men det er naturligvis også mange som kun er medlem av den ene 
organisasjonen. Vi kjører to helt separate administrasjoner, to helt separate 
organisasjonsoppsett, altså med egen administrasjon for vært enkelt sted, og TONO … dere 
kjenner godt til rettighetsbildet som vi forvalter og som TONO forvalter? 
 
MATS: Ja, det har me satt oss inn i.  
 
GRØNDAHL: Sånn at dere vet at opphavsmannen, eller TONO-medlemmene har mange 
flere rettigheter enn det en utøver eller produsent har når det gjelder vederlagsretten som 




GRØNDAHL: Men altså, selv om TONO forvalter mange flere rettigheter, så forvalter jo 
GRAMO og TONO helt parallelle rettigheter når det gjelder fremføring. Og vi forvalter jo 





kringkasting på TV - og for annen offentlig framføring. Og denne type rett forvalter også 
TONO. Begge de to rettighetene har også opphavsmannen, sånn at det er to separate 
innkrevingsløp, da tenker jeg på forhandlinger, eventuelt saker og med diskusjon om 
størrelsen på hvor mye som skal betales. Tvistemodellen er forskjellige, så det er kanskje 
hensiktsmessig at det er to forskjellige løp, men hvis man skal sånn overall si noe om 
utgangspunktet deres, “hva er situasjonen for rettighetshaverne”, så vil jeg si at 
rettighetshavernes situasjon i Norge er god. Men, nå har jeg liksom, nå skjønte dere kanskje 
litt på innledningen, at nå syns jeg at GRAMO og TONO i større grad burde vært samkjørte 
og samordnet på mange flere punkter enn det man er idag. Og det vil jo vise seg, hvis man 
kan være mer kostnadseffektiv, ved et nærmere samarbeid på en del av områdene, så vil jo det 
komme rettighetshaverne til gode.  
 
ESPEN: Mm. Når du snakka om samkjørtheit, e det meir spesifikt sånn at dokke tenke på en 
sammenslåing av et slag, eller e det meir samarbeid det e snakk om? 
 
GRØNDAHL: Nei altså, det første jeg kan beskrive er det samarbeidet vi har. Når det gjelder 
annen offentlig framføring, altså de rettighetene der hvor vi krever inn vederlag for musikk 
brukt i butikker, treningssentere, i serveringssteder, i hoteller osv. osv. Der har vi to 
utegående konsulenter, kontrollører, som reiser rundt og besøker steder som ikke svarer når vi 
spør om de bruker musikk, eller hvis de tilhører en bransje hvor vi synes at det er rart at de 
ikke bruker musikk. Disse to, de kjører helt fra nord til sør og dekker Norge, og kjører innom 
da alt som fins av restauranter og hoteller hvor vi ikke har avtale, og hører og rett og slett 
informerer om ordningen, om de rettighetene som er og hvem pengene går til. Når disse to, 
som er ansatt i GRAMO, de jobber helt paralellt for TONO, så hvis de går inn i en pub - hvor 
er det dere bor hen? 
 
MATS: I Kristiansand no. 
 
GRØNDAHL: Dere bor i Kristiansand. Hvis det åpner en ny pub i Kristiansand, som får brev 
fra GRAMO og TONO og ikke svarer, så vil ved neste gang én av de to er i Kristiansand, så 
vil de stikke innom den pubben. Og så vil, hvis pubben bruker musikk, så vil de tegne avtale 
på vegne av begge to. Og den kostnaden som er for å drive disse to, den deler GRAMO og 
TONO, med en halvpart på hver. I tillegg så har vi en utveksling av kundedata, det har vi 





kjører for å identifisere musikkbrukere, de vil også komme TONO til gode, og vice versa. Det 
er den formen for samarbeid som foregår. Mens, hvis man skal sammenligne, hvis man skal 
se på … og da skal jeg dra dette litt ut til hva man ha oppnådd i andre land, der finnes det litt 
forskjellige modeller. Den mest ekstreme modellen er jo at GRAMO og TONO, de fusjonerer 
ikke som foreninger, men vi fusj- TONO er ikke en forening, GRAMO er en forening, TONO 
er et samvirkelag - det spiller ikke noen rolle, men man kan godt flytte sammen, og få 
synergieffekter av det. I noen land så har de gjort det, at de faktisk flytter helt sammen, 
samarbeider på alle områder med det lokale TONO-selskapet. Eller, det som har vært mer 
vanlig, det er at man skiller ut det som heter markedsavdelingene - altså de som henvender 
seg til alle brukere av musikk i annen offentlig framføring - i de to organisasjonene, laver et 
eget selskap eller en egen organisasjon som bare skal drive med det på vegne av begge to. 
Sånn at det blir én faktura, det blir én type jobb som i dag gjøres helt likt på to forskjellige 
steder. Det er akkurat startet opp i England, der har de lavet et, flyttet … der sitter både PRS 
og PPL, som er to … PPL er GRAMO og PRS er TONO i England. Der har de lavet et nytt 
selskap som de kalte så enkelt som PPL/PRS; flyttet det til Leicester, ansatt 200 mennesker, 
og de skal bare kreve inn for annen offentlig framføring. Så da har jo naturligvis alle de 
funksjonene blitt borte i de to selskapene. Og så stilles det veldig strenge krav til effektivitet, 
altså kostnadskontroll er det jeg tenker på da, altså hvor mye penger av det innkrevede er det 
man bruker i prosent, og det blir vi målt etter hele tiden og vi bruker så lite som mulig, og det 
kommer jo rettighetshaverne til gode; vi skal være så effektive og kostnadseffektive som 
mulig for at det skal være mest mulig penger igjen til utbetaling til den enkelte 
rettighetshaver. Og akkurat det samme kravet har naturligvis TONO. 
 
Det har som sagt engelskmennene begynt med, det er et tilsvarende oppsett i Holland som er 
veldig velfungerende, det er et tilsvarende oppsett i Finnland som ikke er så velfungerende. 
Det er litt vanskelig å si hvorfor det ikke er velfungerende, men de har i hvert fall ikke klart å 
få noen kostnadseffekt utav det enda. Sånn at, det kan være en annen type alternativ form, og 
da går det jo igjen på at man vil kunne spare penger, og ha mere igjen til å betale ut til 
rettighetshaverne. Hvis man bruker den modellen. 
 
En tredje modell, det er litt sånn som de gjør i Danmark, da er det den ene som gjør jobben for 
begge to; altså, der er det KODA som er TONO i Danmark, som krever inn for annen 
offentlig framføring for begge to, og så overføres bare da andelen som skal til Gramex, som er 





penger per år, for at KODA skal gjøre den jobben på deres vegne. Men, vi har ingen av de 
modellene enda i Norge.  
 
ESPEN: Det e ikkje noken plana om det heller? Som du kan sei noke om? 
 
GRØNDAHL: GRAMO ønsker, men TONO er mer skeptiske til det.  
 
ESPEN: Ok. Mm. 
 
GRØNDAHL: Og, jeg antar at dere skal snakke med en hos TONO, eller har gjort det eller? 
 
ESPEN: Jaa, vi har snakka med Ingrid Kindem. 
 
GRØNDAHL: Som- dere har snakket med … ? 
 
ESPEN: Ingrid Kindem. 
 
GRØNDAHL: Jamen, hun er jo ikke TONO-ansatt, hun er jo NOPA. Hun er styreleder i 
TONO. 
 
ESPEN: Ja, vi har ikkje snakka med noken andre enn det liksom. 
 
GRØNDAHL: Nei … neida, altså, de har litt forskjellig syn, og hvis du spør TONO, så ville 
de si at de syns at kanskje den danske modellen, at den ene gjør jobben for begge to og at den 
andre betaler en andel av kostnadene, er bedre enn at man skal slå sammen og lave et eget 
selskap og de tingene som de ikke synes har fungert så godt, og da er det særlig Finnland de 
refererer til.  
 
Men jeg mener at, og GRAMO helt definitivt, vi har det i vår strategiske plan for 2018 til 
2020, at vi bør slå sammen markedsavdelingene og lave et separat selskap for å spare 
kostnader, altså slå sammen avdelingene i TONO og GRAMO og lave et separat selskap.  
 






GRØNDAHL: Egentlig, hvis jeg skal dra dette enda lenger, så finnes jo flere 
forvaltningsorganisasjoner i hvert land, i Norge finnes jo også FONO, som er for 
billedkunstnere, så finnes det KOPINOR, som er for reprografiområdet, så er det 
NORWACO, som er videresending i kabel, så er det da TONO og GRAMO, som alle krever 
inn vederlag på vegne av rettighetshavere. Hvis man skal se på dette, så burde jo alle disse 
sett på en eller annen form for felles løsning, man burde hatt et felles kontor hvor man hadde 
felles IT, felles økonomi, felles lokaler, man kunne jo spare masse penger på kontorlokaler, 
man kunne spare penger på møtelokaler, altså, vi har alle sammen våre egne lokaler som vi 
betaler for. Hvis fem organisasjoner slår seg sammen, så ville man jo kunne gå betydelig ned i 
areal og spare mye penger. 
 
MATS: Ja, interessant. 
 
GRØNDAHL: Ja, det er veldig interessant, men det er en veldig lang og tung ball å prøve å 
forfølge. 
 
ESPEN: Ja, det e klart. Ehm, så det e noke dokke prøva å pushe for da, i GRAMO? 
 
GRØNDAHL: GRAMO har vært i kontakt med TONO, og vi kommer til å fortsette å ha 
kontakt, med tanke på at vi bør ha et nærmere samarbeid ved innkreving av annen offentlig 
framføring. I hvilken modell det kan bli, det får vi jo se, men vi har det som en plan, og det 
kommer vi til å fortsette med, fordi vi mener at det kan være gunstig for rettighetshaverne. 
 
ESPEN: Ja, mm. Eg lure på om vi skal gå litt vidare eg, og kanskje snakke litt om det vi har 
valgt å kalle den norske modellen. Ka tenke du om den modellen vi har i Norge, med 
forvaltning av musikkrettar når det kjem til dei to store vederlagsbyråa, og så har du 
interesseorganisasjonane, med kulturelle midlar osv. Har du noke tanka rundt det? 
 
GRØNDAHL: Ja, altså, jeg synes jo … da må jeg bare gjenta det jeg sa i sted, jeg synes det 
funker veldig bra, og det er veldig viktig at man har grunnorganisasjonene, eller de som du 
kalte organisasjonene ved siden av, som da er MOF, GramArt, IFPI, FONO, Norsk 
Artistforbund, og noen litt mindre på vårt område, og NOPA og komponistforreningen i 
TONO. Det er en veldig velfungerende modell, og når vi bidrar i andre land, det kan for 





forespurt å assistere i et land, så vil vi alltid anbefale at det etableres grunnorganisasjoner 
først, som representerer potensielle medlemmer til dette her, altså sånn typisk et 
musikerforbund, eller et IPFI, eller et FONO, eller sånne ting.  
 
Ehm, hvis du tenkte på, du tenkte på den der fundingen av disse organisasjonene, er det det du 
tenker på når du snakker om den norske modellen, at det bidras med penger fra 
organisasjonene til for eksempel NOPA og GramArt? 
 
ESPEN: Ja, det e jo en betydelig del av det. 
 
GRØNDAHL: Jada. Jeg måtte bare være sikker på at jeg ikke begynte å snakke om noe du 
ikke er interessert i. 
 
ESPEN: Nei, vi e absolutt interessert i det, viss du har noke å fortelle om det? 
 
GRØNDAHL: Altså, den måten … disse pengene som overføres som såkalte kulturelle 
midler, eller vi kaller det herreløse midler, kollektive midler, de oppstår jo på forskjellige 
måter. TONO beregner det som en prosent av brutto vederlagsmidler. GRAMO tar de 
pengene som er igjen når foreldelsesfristen for et vederlag går ut, og de pengene hvor vi ikke 
har klart å finne en eller flere rettighetshavere på innspillinger. Så, det oppstår noen penger 
som ikke lar seg fordele, som får en ny status, og i GRAMO så blir det da herreløse midler, 
eller kulturelle midler. Det er en veldig fin- da GRAMO ble stiftet i 1989 så visste 
kulturdepartementet veldig godt at det ville være noen penger som vi ikke ville klare å fordele 
individuelt. Det er jo- hovedmålet både til GRAMO og TONO er jo å fordele pengene som 
man får inn individuelt til rettighetshaverne; men i den grad man ikke evner å finne- det kan 
jo være folk som utlendinger som ikke melder seg inn, fra land som ikke har avtaler med 
GRAMO - så vil det oppstå en sum med penger som ikke er utbetalt, men som likevel ligger 
igjen i regnskapet. De blir da kulturelle midler. Og disse pengene, de synes jeg at det er en 
veldig fin måte å organisere for eksempel organisasjonslivet, som for eksempel MFO, Norsk 
Artistforbund og GramArt, og også kunne støtte opp under prosjekter. Og prosjekter må etter 
forarbeidene være til det beste for norsk utøvende kunst. Sånn at, det er en ganske vid 
definisjon, men det synes jeg fungerer veldig godt. Det gjør jo at type GramArt kan drive en 







ESPEN: Mm, trur du det kjem til å fortsette å være sånn, eller trur du dei kjem til å trenge 
hjelp- 
 
GRØNDAHL: Det er jo, det er jo helt avhengig av hva man blir enige om når CRM-loven 
kommer da, da altså hva- dette er jo en av de store spørsmålstegnene som kommer til å 
komme, hvilke muligheter vil det være til å generere sånne midler. I mange land så er det jo 
sterk motstand mot, de mener jo at de pengene som vi ikke har klart å få avregne, eller få 
utbetalt individuelt, de skal legges på toppen, altså med andre ord avregnes en gang til, og 
betale ut til de som allerede har fått, sånn at de skal få litt mer, de vi allerede har identifisert. 
Sånn at, nå er det jo veldig i det blå, nå er det lenge siden jeg har spurt dette, men vi går jo og 
venter på høring for denne nye CRM-loven, og vi tror jo kanskje at det skulle være 
implementert ved 01.01.18, men nå har vi jo ikke hørt noen ting på lenge, og jeg vet heller 
ikke om vi får noe høring før sommeren. Men det er jo ett av de spørsmålene som vi er mest 
usikre på, det vi lurer mest på, og- GRAMO lurer kanskje ikke så veldig på det, men at 
organisasjonene rundt oss lurer jo veldig på hvordan vil den fremtidige modellen være. At det 
vil bli noen endringer på det, det er en realitet. Her vil jo komme inn ikke-
diskrimineringsregler og mye forskjellig, her har man jo på en måte tilgodesett norske 
organisasjoner og norske utøvere primært, til det, når man har fordelt disse pengene. Det kan 
godt hende at det blir endringer på det.  
 
ESPEN: Ja, du tenke at dei punkta som kjem, som ligge under diskriminering i CRM-
Direktivet, at det kan ha noke med det å gjer? Eller kjem til å ha det? 
 
GRØNDAHL: Det kan det hende. Det er jo ikke bare det, men en av de punktene kan være at, 
for eksempel, det er ikke lov å bare gi organisasjonsstøtte til norske organisasjoner. Jeg er 
veldig usikker på dette her, men, fordi det har vært løst litt forskjellig i de forskjellige land. 
Så, hvordan den norske modellen på det området kommer til å bli når vi får CRM-loven, det 
er jeg veldig i tvil om. 
 
ESPEN: Mm. Ja, det blir spennande å sjå.  
 
GRØNDAHL: Ja. Hvis du spør organisasjonene, så ønsker nok GRAMO-organisasjonene, 





type TONO-modell, hvor man har en forutsigbarhet ved at en prosent av brutto 
vederlagsmidler kan fordeles til kulturelle midler, eller kollektive midler. Det som er 
utfordringen med å ta det fra toppen er jo naturligvis at hvis dette skal, la oss si at 
kostnadsprosenten til GRAMO er 18% da, og så skal det holdes av 10% til, da er det jo 28% 
av totalinntekten til GRAMO som ikke kommer til individuell fordeling til rettighetshaverne. 
Og hvis dette- hvis disse 10% bare tilfaller norske rettighetshavere, så vil jo utlendinger 
kunne stride om det, og det tror jeg kanskje at de kommer til å gjøre. Men det får vi se på. 
 
ESPEN: Mm. Ska vi gå vidare til det her? 
 
MATS: Ja, me kan ta neste tema. Ja, det e jo litt med distribusjon av midla, som vi jo på 
mange måtar var inne på no med kulturelle midlar, men det e jo klare reglar og rettningslinjer 
internt i vederlagsbyråa korleis det skal fordelast. 
 
GRØNDAHL: Ja, det er veldig tydelig. 
 
MATS: Ja. Har du noke tanka omkring den distribusjonsmodellen som GRAMO har, med 
poengsystem og at det blir- 
 
GRØNDAHL: -men nå, nå er du på den individuelle fordelingen, ikke sant? 
 
MATS: Ja, eg e inne på den no. 
 




GRØNDAHL: -fordi vi har klare regler for den vederlagsfordelingen med en poengtabell, og 
klare regler for fordelingen av disse kulturelle midlene, det er veldig tydelig hvordan dette 
skal gjøres på begge sider. Når det gjelder GRAMOs poengtabell, så har den fungert nesten 
uten endringer i 20 år. Vi hadde ett år hvor vi gjorde om litt på poengene, men da fikk det 
veldig uheldige utslag, jeg tror det var 2003, og da gikk man tilbake igjen til den gamle 
poengtabellen som dere sikkert da har sett på GRAMO sine hjemmesider, hvordan vi fordeler 





som er bedre, vi hadde for to, eller kanskje det er tre år siden, hadde vi et prosjekt hvor vi så 
på alternativer, hvor vi regnet ut konsekvenser og vi så på type, ja, hva ville forskjellige type 
fordelingsmodeller ha å si for den enkelte utøver eller den enkelte produsent. Og det ble 
konkludert med, den gang for tre år siden, at man fortsatt skulle holde på det gamle systemet. 
Noen mener at man skal gå over til andre typer fordelingsmodeller, men i GRAMO-
sammenhengen, så ble det bestemt, med veldig stort flertall, at vi skulle holde på den gamle 
modellen. Det er en, altså, hele poengtabellen er en type kompromiss mellom de som 
representerer hovedartisten og de som representerer medvirkende musikere, om at, hvem som 
skal få og hvilke andeler av vederlaget hver enkelt skal få. Og den har fungert godt for 
GRAMO i mange år. Jeg har ikke noe annet å si om det. 
 
ESPEN: Nei. Når det kjem til distribusjonsmodellar til organisasjonane, som var den andre 
delen av det, har du noke tanka rundt prosessen rundt bestemmelsa av det? 
 
GRØNDAHL: Har dere lest, bare ett kontrollspørsmål, har dere lest GRAMOs 
fordelingsreglement? 
 
MATS: Eg har lest nesten heile. 
 
GRØNDAHL: Ja … det er litt sånn kryptisk for en som ikke driver med dette hver dag, men- 
 
MATS: -men, det er med sektorgrupper og dei tinga? 
 
GRØNDAHL: Ja. Og hvordan man, hvordan pengene oppstår og hvordan man beregner 
poeng, og hvordan vi beregner totaler og verdier per poeng og alt dette her, men der står det jo 
også noe om fordelingen av disse kollektive midlene, disse kulturelle midlene. Jeg synes at, 
sånn som vi gjør det i dag, så beregner vi jo den enkelte organisasjons andel av utbetalte 
vederlag, altså medlemmene, hvis du tenker på medlemmene i musikernes fellesorganisasjon; 
alle de medlemmene som er medlem av MFO òg medlem av GRAMO, så beregner vi at av et 
års utbetalte midler til norske rettighetshavere, så får, bare ett eksempel, MFOs medlemmer 
22%. Så kan det hende at vi har en rettighetshaverorganisasjon som heter folkorg, som er 
folkemusikkorganisasjonen, de kanskje får 1% av totalt vederlag fra GRAMO. Så får 
GramArts medlemmer, som da representerer de fleste hovedartistene og veldig mange artister, 





fordeler vi etter den prosenten, som medlemmene i den enkelte organisasjon har opptjent 
vederlag foregående år. Jeg synes det er en god og rettferdig modell og måte og gjøre det på. 
 
ESPEN: Ja … CRM-Direktivet for eksempel toucha jo litt på det der, med korleis det blir 
bestemt da. Ka du trur om, tenke om den modellen som dokke har i GRAMO, og som for så 
vidt e i TONO òg, med representativt demokrati, i forhold til CRM-Direktivet? Trur du det 
blir noke forandringar på det, eller trur du det e innafor rammene? 
 
GRØNDAHL: Hva er det du tenker på nå, representativt demokrati, tenker du på i forbindelse 
med styrevalg og sånne ting?  
 
MATS: Ja, altså … i hvert fall sånn som ordningen e no, så e det vel kun dei som e, no hugsa 
eg ikkje ka de kalla da, ordinære medlemmar, som har stemmerett for eksempel, ved årsmøtet. 
 
GRØNDAHL: Neida, det ble gjort om, det ble gjort om i fjor, da må du lese siste vedtekter, 
dette gjorde- fordi dette så vi at CRM-Direktivet ville komme. Vi har bare ordinære 
medlemmer. Vi har ingen- tidligere så er det helt korrekt når du sier at vi skilte på ordinære 
og tilsluttede medlemmer, og at … men nå har vi bare ordinære medlemmer. Og det var fordi 
vi så at CRM ville, når det kommer, vil det stille krav til om bare én type medlemsklasse. 
Men det som kan være aktuelt, er at, hvis du tenker på CRM og denne måten å velge på, kan 
jo være at - og det kommer vi helt sikkert til - at vi må åpne for elektronisk stemmegivning på 
generalforsamlingen. For i dag så må man jo møte opp fysisk, og vi er jo alt i Oslo, vi er på 
[UFORSTÅELIG ORD] i Oslo og har vårt årsmøte eller generalforsamling, det har vi jo vært 
år i begynnelsen av Juni eller helt i slutten av Mai. Og du kan gi fullmakt for at noen skal 
stemme for deg, vi begynte vel i fjor, eller kanskje var det i forfjor, å videofilme, sånn at folk 
kunne følge med på både det som ble sagt på den debatten som var på generalforsamlingen. 
Men vi, etter CRM så vil vi også måtte lave et system sånn at folk skal kunne stemme på 
distanse, og ikke bare ved fysisk tilstedeværelse. Det er jeg helt sikker på at kommer til å bli 
en av de endringene vi må innføre i forbindelse med CRM-loven. 
 
ESPEN: Mm. Ja, men det var fint vi kunne få en oppklaring på det, så vi ikkje rota oss vekk. 
 
MATS: Ja, men det var i 2017 at- for eg satt litt med dei engelske vedtektene på nettsidene, 






GRØNDAHL: Det kan nok hende at du gjorde det, så hvis du leser de norske vedtektene så 
står det, der endret vi, det var ved generalforsamlingen 2017 hvor vi endret dette med 
medlemskap, og nå har vi bare én type medlemmer, og det, nå heter det bare medlemmer. 
 
MATS: Ja, nei den e god. 
 
ESPEN: Mm. Har du noken andre tanka rundt CRM-Direktivet? Det e eit veldig åpent 
spørsmål, men- 
 
GRØNDAHL: -ja, altså, det vi tror er jo at, og det som departementet uttaler, er at vi kommer 
til å gjøre en type sånn implementering som ligger veldig nær opptil direktivteksten; de 
kommer ikke til å gjøre veldig mye mer eller annerledes enn det som er. Det vi også vet, er at 
det kommer ikke til å bli en del av åndsverkloven, men det vil bli en egen lov; uten at det har 
naturligvis noe sånn rettskildemessig konsekvens, men det som kan være, eller det 
departementet sier, er at de kommer til å samarbeide tett med organisasjonene før en del av 
disse reglene lages, og de har varslet at vi skal være med på å kunne utforme en del av disse 
reglene der hvor det ikke er et krav i CRM-Direktivet om at endringer finner sted. Sånn at vi 
tror ikke at CRM kommer til å bli veldig stor forskjell for GRAMO sånn som det er i dag og 
det som blir etterpå. Det vil være noe i forbindelse med gjennomføringen av 
generalforsamlingen og stemmer, som jeg allerede har sagt. Det vil også kreve litt- GRAMO 
har jo fram til og med i fjor, ved utbetaling så har vi jo trukket 10% i et administrasjonsgebyr 
for ikke-ordinære medlemmer - og nå er jeg igjen tilbake til den gamle medlemsbeskrivelsen - 
det har vi fjernet også nå, for det vil også virke diskriminerende i forhold til CRM, og det ser 
vi - altså, jeg har alltid ment at det var diskriminerende uansett, så det burde vi ikke ha hatt, 
men det kommer også- det er også en diskusjon som har kommet opp nå som vi har sett at 
CRM ville medføre at det måtte fjernes, det 10%-trekket, så det har vi nå fjernet fra og med 
den utbetalingen som vi skal ha nå i Mai, som gjelder 2017. 
 
ESPEN: Ja, mm. Ja, har vi noke meir egentlig? 
 
MATS: Neei … eller altså, jo. Har du nokre tanka om implementeringen av CRM-Direktivet, 
om det kjem til å ha noke å sei for interesseorganisasjonane, altså, sia dei- du var jo inne på 






GRØNDAHL: Ja, det er helt riktig. Ja, det kan nok hende at det blir mer viktig for dem. At, 
og det blir jo da som jeg sa i sted, helt avgjørende av hvordan man beskriver reglene for 
hvordan eventuelt- og den muligheten man vil ha til å kunne trekke eller at det genereres noen 
av disse kulturelle midlene. Det er- jeg klarer ikke helt å spå om hvordan det blir.  
 
ESPEN: Nei, det e jo vanskelig sjølvsagt, når vi e so tidlig i prosessen. 
 
GRØNDAHL: Ja. Jeg tenker at, har dere vært i kontakt med kulturdepartementet om dette 
her? 
 
ESPEN: Nei, det har vi ikkje. 
 
GRØNDAHL: Nei, for de, jeg vet ikke om de er villige til å forhånds-si noe om dette og om 
hva de tenker i dag, nå har jo det at åndsverkloven ble sendt tilbake igjen til 
stortingskommitèen, og nå skal det jo være en, nå har det jo vært en ny runde med ny 
kommité etter valget og alt dette herre her, så det har jo gjort at kulturdepartementet har 
sikkert hatt en god del å gjøre fortsatt med åndsverkloven og kanskje ikke hatt så mye tid. Og 
det har kanskje medført at de ikke ville være villige til å si så fryktelig mye om det, men jeg 
tror kanskje at de kunne tenke seg å fortelle dere litt om det, hvis dere forteller hva det skal 
brukes til.  
 
ESPEN: Mm. Kanskje det kan være en mulighet. 
 
MATS: Det e eit godt tips. 
 
ESPEN: Ehm, ditte- berre for å, eg e litt nysgjerrig, du sa det at det kom ikkje til, Direktivet 
kom ikkje til å være en del av nye åndsverklova, e det noke dei har sagt, uttalt? 
 
GRØNDAHL: Vi vet at det kommer til å bli en egen lov ja. Vi vet, det er sagt ja, at vi får i 
Norge en lov som kommer til å hete CRM-loven. Implementeringen kommer til å bli gjort 
som en egen lov. I noen land så har det vært gjort ved at man har gjort det som et eget 







ESPEN: Mm, har du noken andre ting då? 
 
MATS: Nei. Eg trur egentlig me har fått mykje godt stoff. E det noke meir du tenke på som 
du ønske å tilføre, enten direkte til CRM-Direktivet eller omkring vederlagsbyråa eller den 
sokalla norske modellen? 
 
GRØNDAHL: Nei jeg tror ikke det, jeg tror egentlig jeg har fått sagt det jeg hadde tenkt jeg 
skulle si nå.  
 
ESPEN: Ja, nei men kjempebra. Tusen takk for at du ville delta. 
 
GRØNDAHL: Når er det dere har levering på dette? 
 
MATS: Det e 21. Mai, så det e en god måned til. 
 
GRØNDAHL: Ja. Kommer dere til å- det hadde vært veldig interessant å lese hva dere 
skriver, hadde dere hatt anledning trur du, at dere kunne tenkt dere, hvis dere bare kunne 
sende en fil til meg så jeg kunne få lese oppgaven deres? 
 
MATS: Ja, det kan du få, og som me og skreiv i e-posten, hvis du ønske noken form for 
sitatsjekk og sånn før me … 
 
GRØNDAHL: Hvis du siterer meg direkte, så vil jeg gjerne sjekke at … nå har du jo tatt opp, 
så jeg tviler ikke på at du kommer til å skrive dette riktig, men jeg liker alltid godt å få lov å ta 
en sitatsjekk altså.  
 
MATS: Ja, jamen då får du det òg, hvis det blir direkte sitat. Mm. Ja, neimen då trur eg berre 
at me takka masse for at du ville stille opp. 
 
 
